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Part I
Dissertation Overview
1

Dissertation Overview
This dissertation consists of five separate essays on asymmetric information, strategic behav-
ior, and institution design. In Chapter 1, Harry Pei and I abstract from the exact institutional
details and consider an important class of games with asymmetric information: signalling games.
In particular, we study the monotonicity of sender’s equilibrium strategy with respect to her
type in signalling games. We use counterexamples to show that when the sender’s payoff is
non-separable, the Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which the sender uses
non-monotone strategies. We provide sufficient conditions under which the sender’s strategy is
monotone in every Nash equilibrium. Our conditions require the sender’s payoff to have strictly
increasing differences between the state and the action profile and to be monotone with respect
to each player’s action. Our sufficient conditions fit into a number of applications, including
advertising, warranty provision, education and job assignment.
Chapter 2 focuses on the market institution and studies how firms strategically interact with
boundedly rational consumers through it. In this chapter, Andreas Hefti, Armin Schmutzler and
I ask whether firms seek to make a market transparent or they want to manipulate the perception
of product characteristics. We show that, contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous
goods, obfuscation is not necessarily an equilibrium phenomenon in markets with differentiated
goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are
relatively rare, firms seek to educate consumers. However, if the taste distribution features a
concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion is beneficial for firms and obfuscation is an
equilibrium strategy. The adverse welfare consequences of obfuscation are more severe than
with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also buy the wrong
product. Our model can also be adapted to offer new insights on the incentives for political
candidates to induce polarized opinions by confusing voters.
An important class of non-market institutions through which strategic agents interact is
that of voting mechanisms. In Chapter 3, I study the effect of public information on the voting
outcomes in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In
the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no
longer constitutes an equilibrium under the commonly-used simultaneous voting rules, while
the intuitive but inefficient follow-the-expert strategy profile almost always does. Although
more information may be aggregated if agents are able to coordinate on more sophisticated
equilibria, inefficiency can persist even in large elections if the provision of public information
introduces general correlation between the signals observed by the agents. We propose simple
voting procedures that can indirectly implement the outcomes of the optimal ex post incentive
compatible mechanisms with public information. Our voting procedures also have additional
advantages when there is a concern for strategic disclosure of public information.
The results in Chapter 3 show that the performance of an institution depends crucially on the
3
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incentives provided to its participants, and these incentives in turn depend on how the institution
is designed. In Chapter 4, Dimitri Migrow and I consider another dimension of the design of
an institution. Motivated by the observation that multinational and multiproduct firms often
experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets (due
to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products), we
study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority
to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its
decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers
to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the
form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information
asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-
market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information
acquisition, and this negative effect is amplified by the need for coordinating the activities of
different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be
driven by a large coordination motive.
In Chapters 3 and 4, the institution designer is constrained as monetary transfers between
the involving parties are either limited or entirely ruled out. Chapter 5 considers a general
setting where the designer is free to use monetary transfers. In this chapter, Alexey Kushnir
and I extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation (Manelli
and Vincent in Econometrica 78: 1905-1938, 2010; Gershkov et al. in Econometrica 81: 197-
220, 2013) to environments with nonlinear utilities satisfying a property of increasing differences
over distributions and a convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel
implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, envi-
ronmental mechanism design, and public good provision.
Part II
Research Papers
5

1 Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games1
Joint with Harry Pei
1.1 Introduction
Starting from the seminal contribution of Spence (1973), signalling games have become powerful
tools to study strategic interactions under asymmetric information. In a typical signalling model,
an informed sender, who has private information about the payoff environment (or her type),
takes an action that can influence the behavior of an uninformed receiver. This game theoretic
model helps researchers to understand phenomena such as education, limit pricing, the peacock’s
tail, etc.
In virtually all applications of signalling games, players’ payoffs satisfy a well-known Spence-
Mirrlees condition: The sender’s actions and types are ranked, such that a higher type has a
comparative advantage in taking higher actions compared to a lower type. For example, it is less
costly for a talented worker to receive more education (Spence, 1973), it is more profitable for an
efficient firm to cut prices (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), etc. Under this condition, it may seem
intuitive to predict that the sender’s action is non-decreasing in her type, or in other words, the
game’s outcome is monotone. Indeed, researchers often focus on such monotone equilibria in
many applications of signalling games, see for example, Spence (1973, 1977), Ross (1977), etc.
In this paper, we assess the robustness of this monotonicity prediction. We focus on signalling
games that satisfy a generalized version of the Spence-Mirrlees condition: the set of types
and actions are complete lattices and the sender’s payoff exhibits strictly increasing differences
between the state and her own action. An equilibrium is monotone if a higher type sender never
plays a strictly lower action than a lower type.
We examine the monotonicity of all (Bayes) Nash equilibria in these signalling games. Our
motivation for this is twofold. First, as pointed out by Fudenberg et al. (1988) and Weinstein
and Yildiz (2012), refinements in extensive form games are sensitive to the modeling details.
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the robustness of the monotonicity prediction against
equilibrium selection. Second, monotone equilibria have desirable properties, making them
straightforward to interpret, tractable to analyze and easy to compute (Athey, 2001). Therefore,
a result establishing the monotonicity of all equilibria can facilitate the characterization of the
set of equilibrium strategies and outcomes.2
1This paper should be cited as Liu, S. and H. Pei (2018): “Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games,” Mimeo.
2To address the concern that there is a plethora of equilibria in signalling games, we apply the following “double
standard”: For counterexamples, we adopt stronger solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium (Kreps and
Wilson, 1982), equilibria that can survive the refinements proposed in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Cho and
Kreps (1987), Banks and Sobel (1987), etc. When presenting positive results, we adopt weaker solution concepts
such as Nash equilibrium.
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We start with a counterexample showing that the Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot guaran-
tee the monotonicity of the sender’s equilibrium strategy. These non-monotone equilibria exist
even when both players’ payoffs are strictly supermodular functions with respect to the sender’s
type, the sender’s action and the receiver’s action. Furthermore, they can survive standard
refinements as both players have strict incentives and the sender plays every action with strictly
positive probability.
Compared to Spence (1973), non-monotone equilibria arise due to the non-separability of
the sender’s payoff, that is, her return from the receiver’s action depends on her type. This
occurs in a number of applications, such as a worker’s preference over jobs depends on her
talent. Intuitively, when jobs and talents are horizontally differentiated (Roy, 1951) and the
worker chooses which job-specific human capital to acquire (her action), a high type sender has
an incentive to play a low action if doing so can induce the receiver to play a high action. The
receiver has an incentive to play his high action after observing the sender’s low action as he
believes that the sender’s type is high, making his belief self-fulfilling.
We then proceed to provide sufficient conditions under which all Nash equilibria are mono-
tone. At the heart of our analysis is a monotone-supermodular condition, which requires in ad-
dition to the Spence-Mirrlees condition, that (1) the sender’s payoff is strictly decreasing in her
own action and is strict increasing in the receiver’s action, (2) the sender’s payoff has increasing
differences between the state and the receiver’s action.3 This fits into a number of applications,
including the education signalling game where an employer assigns workers job positions after
observing their years of education, the warranty provision game where a firm chooses the length
of warranty and the amount of refund before a consumer chooses the quantity to purchase, etc.
Our first result (Theorem 1.1) shows that every equilibrium is monotone when the sender’s
payoff is monotone-supermodular and the receiver’s action choice is binary. This fits into the
warranty provision game when the consumer has unit demand. Intuitively, thanks to the binary
choice assumption, every pair of distributions over the receiver’s action can be ranked according
to first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Since playing a higher action is more costly for the
sender, she only has an incentive to do so when it can induce a more favorable response from
the receiver. This implies that the ranking over the sender’s equilibrium actions must coincide
with the ranking over the distributions of the receiver’s action that they induce. Since a high
type sender has a stronger preference towards higher action profiles, she will never play a strictly
lower action than a low type in any Nash equilibrium.
However, in games where the receiver has three or more actions, non-monotone equilibria
can arise despite the sender’s payoff being monotone-supermodular. This is because not every
pair of the receiver’s mixed actions can be ranked according to FOSD. Consequently, one cannot
draw inference about the ranking of the receiver’s responses based on the ranking of the sender’s
equilibrium actions.
We introduce two sets of sufficient conditions to address this issue. First, we show in Theorem
1.2 that every equilibrium is monotone if the sender’s payoff is monotone-supermodular, the rank-
ing over the receiver’s action set is complete and the receiver’s payoff satisfies a quasiconcavity-
3Despite the monotone-supermodularity condition is not necessary in general, we use counterexamples to
address why every component of this condition is not superfluous in subsection 1.4.3
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preserving property (QPP). QPP requires the receiver’s payoff to be strictly quasi-concave in
his own action under every belief about the state. A sufficient condition for QPP is that the
receiver’s payoff being strictly concave in his own action, which fits into the warranty provision
game when the consumer faces decreasing marginal returns to quantity.4 QPP implies that the
receiver has at most two pure best replies in every circumstance, which must be adjacent ele-
ments in his action set. As a result, every pair of his mixed best replies can be ranked according
to FOSD.
Second, we identify a novel condition on the sender’s payoff under which every pair of the
receiver’s mixed actions can be ranked endogenously. We call this property increasing absolute
differences over distributions (IADD). Theorem 1.3 shows that if the sender’s payoff is monotone-
supermodular and satisfies IADD, then every Nash equilibrium is monotone. Unlike Theorem
1.2, Theorem 1.3 (as well as Theorem 1.1) makes no reference to the receiver’s payoff function
and incentives, so the conclusion extends to richer environments such as the sender signalling
to a population of heterogeneous receivers, the receiver having private information about his
payoff, etc. We also establish a representation result that characterizes IADD (Proposition 1.1),
which facilitates the application of our Theorem 1.3 to economic modeling.
Literature Review. Starting from Spence (1973), the monotonicity of outcome has become
a natural prediction in various applications of signalling games to labor economics, industrial
organization, corporate finance and biology. Our paper points out that even in environments
where the Spence-Mirrlees condition is satisfied, such a prediction is not without loss when the
sender’s return from the receiver’s action depends on her type. This contrasts to the alternative
channels suggested in the literature through which non-monotone equilibria can arise, as the lat-
ter often require various departures from the standard signalling model. For example, Feltovich
et al. (2002) and Araujo et al. (2007) show that if the receiver observes an exogenous signal that
is informative about the sender’s type, then there exist countersignalling equilibria in which the
high type plays a low action to distinguish herself from the medium type. As shown in several
papers on warranty provision (e.g., Balachander, 2001; Gal-Or, 1989), non-monotone equilibria
can also arise when the sender’s actions cannot be perfectly observed.
This paper also contributes to the literature on supermodular incomplete information games.
Most of the papers in this literature focus on simultaneous-move games and provide sufficient
conditions for the existence of monotone pure strategy Nash equilibrium (e.g., Athey, 2001;
McAdams, 2003; Reny, 2011; Van Zandt and Vives, 2007).5 Several papers establish the mono-
tonicity of all equilibria in simultaneous move supermodular games, for example, Morris and Shin
(1998) and the vast literature on global games. In multi-dimensional environments, McAdams
(2006) shows that every equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to a monotone equilibrium in multi-
unit uniform price auctions with risk neutral bidders and independent values. In contrast, we
analyze the monotonicity of equilibria in sequential move games where players’ payoff functions
4In Appendix A.2, we relate QPP to a strict version of the signed-ratio monotonicity condition in Quah and
Strulovici (2012) and provide a full characterization.
5Necessary conditions for the existence of monotone equilibrium are non-tractable and is beyond the scope of
this literature as well as the current paper. Mensch (2018) studies dynamic incomplete information games with
strategic complementarities and establishes the existence of monotone perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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are supermodular, with one-shot signalling games a natural starting point.6
To the best of our knowledge, the question when it is without loss to focus on monotone
equilibria has not been systematically analyzed in signalling game contexts. We take a step to
close this gap by providing sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone. Our
conditions highlight the economic forces behind equilibrium monotonicity and our counterexam-
ples illustrate how monotonicity can fail once they are relaxed. Furthermore, these conditions
are easy to verify given the functional forms of players’ payoffs, which are useful for future
applied works.
We close this section by commenting on two specific results in the literature that are related
to our sufficient conditions. The first one is obtained by Cho and Sobel (1990). While the main
focus of their paper is to analyze the uniqueness and strategic stability of the universally divine
equilibrium outcomes, they also establish a result stating that the sender’s strategy must be
monotone in every equilibrium (Lemma 4.1, p. 393 - 394). Different from ours, their result
assumes that the receiver’s best response is always a pure strategy. The second related result
is obtained in a recent work by Kartik et al. (2018). Similar to our Theorem 1.3, they also
identify a class of utility functions under which the sender will use a monotone strategy in every
equilibrium. We will show in Section 1.5 that our results neither nest theirs nor are nested by
theirs.
1.2 The Model
Consider the following two-player signalling game. Player 1 (or sender, she) privately observes
the realization of a payoff relevant state θ ∈ Θ (call it her type) and then chooses an action
a1 ∈ A1. Player 2 (or receiver, he) has a prior belief pi ∈ ∆(Θ) about θ. He chooses a2 ∈ A2
after observing a1. Player i’s payoff is ui(θ, a1, a2) with i ∈ {1, 2}. Both players are expected
utility maximizers. Let u1(θ, a1, α2) ≡
∫
a2
u1(θ, a1, a2)dα2 for every α2 ∈ ∆(A2).
Throughout the paper, we assume that Θ, A1 and A2 are finite lattices and pi has full
support.7 We will comment on cases in which Θ, A1 and A2 are infinite after stating our main
results. We use  and % to denote strict and weak orders on lattice sets. For two lattices X and
Y , a mapping f : X × Y → R exhibits increasing differences if for every x, x′ ∈ X and y, y′ ∈ Y
with x  x′ and y  y′:
f(x, y)− f(x′, y) ≥ f(x, y′)− f(x′, y′), (1.1)
and it exhibits strictly increasing differences if the above inequality is strict (Topkis, 1998). We
introduce a condition on the sender’s payoff, which generalizes the Spence-Mirrlees condition to
discrete lattices:
6Complementarities in dynamic games are explored by Echenique (2004a,b), that explain how intertemporal
incentives can weaken the implications of complementarity and supermodularity. Despite we have established
the monotonicity of all Nash equilibria in a signalling game context, a signalling game with supermodular payoff
functions is not necessarily supermodular in its normal form and, therefore, the other attractive properties of
simultaneous move supermodular games, such as the existence of extremal equilibria, monotone comparative
statics, the tâtonnement algorithm to compute the set of equilibria, etc. cannot be applied to our setting.
7A set X is a lattice if there exists a partial order  such that for every x, x′ ∈ X, x ∨ x′, x ∧ x′ ∈ X, where
x ∨ x′ is the smallest element above both x and x′, x ∧ x′ is the largest element below both x and x′.
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Definition 1.1 (Generalized Spence-Mirrlees Condition). u1 satisfies the generalized Spence-
Mirrlees condition if it exhibits strictly increasing differences in (θ, a1).
Intuitively, this generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition requires that a higher type sender has
a comparative advantage in playing higher actions compared to a lower type.8 This fits into most
applications of signalling theory, including the education game in which receiving education is
less costly for a more talented worker (Spence, 1973), the beer-quiche game in which drinking
beer is more pleasant for the strong sender (Cho and Kreps, 1987), the warranty provision game
in which providing lengthier warranty is less costly for a high quality firm (Gal-Or, 1989), etc.
Our condition is also satisfied in many multi-dimensional signalling models, such as Araujo et al.
(2007), Quinzii and Rochet (1985), etc.
Strategies & Equilibrium. The sender’s strategy is σ1 : Θ → ∆(A1) and the receiver’s
strategy is σ2 : A1 → ∆(A2). Let σθ1 ∈ ∆(A1) be the (possibly mixed) action played by type θ,
which gives σ1 =
(
σθ1
)
θ∈Θ.
The solution concept is Nash equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium), which consists of a strat-
egy profile σ ≡ (σ1, σ2) such that σi best responds to σ−i for every i ∈ {1, 2}. Since the game
is finite, an equilibrium exists. Next, we introduce the definitions of monotone strategy and
monotone equilibrium:
Definition 1.2 (Monotone Strategy & Monotone Equilibrium). σ1 is a monotone strategy if for
every θ  θ′, there exist no a1 ∈ supp(σθ1) and a′1 ∈ supp(σθ
′
1 ) such that a1 ≺ a′1. An equilibrium
(σ1, σ2) is monotone if σ1 is a monotone strategy.
In words, a strategy is monotone if a low type sender never plays a strictly higher action than
a high type. When the order on A1 is complete (or A1 is one-dimensional), the monotonicity of
σ1 is equivalent to the following:
min
a1
{
supp(σθ1)
}
% max
a1
{
supp(σθ′1 )
}
for every θ  θ′. (1.2)
That is to say, if type θ′ plays a1 with positive probability, then every type higher than θ′ must
be playing actions that are higher or equal to a1 with probability 1.
We are interested in examining the monotonicity of all Nash equilibria in signalling games,
and in particular, games in which the sender’s payoff satisfies the generalized Spence-Mirrlees
condition.9 The choice of a weak solution concept makes our positive results presented in Section
1.4 (Theorems 1.1-1.3) robust against equilibrium selection. However, due to the plethora of
equilibria in signalling games, one might argue that we should restrict attention to a subset
of equilibria that can survive standard refinements instead of all Nash equilibria. To address
this concern, we will adopt the more stringent solution concept of sequential equilibrium (Kreps
8For alternative versions of the Spence-Mirrlees condition, see Engers (1987), Cho and Sobel (1990), etc.
9The existence of monotone equilibria is often trivial given our weak solution concept. For example, when u1
is strictly decreasing in a1 (which is satisfied in many costly signalling games, such as Spence education signalling
and the beer-quiche game), let a1 be the smallest element in A1 and let aˆ2 ∈ arg max
∫
θ
u2(θ, a1, a2)dpi(θ), then
the strategy profile σ with σ1(θ) = a1 ∀θ ∈ Θ and σ2(a1) = aˆ2 ∀a1 ∈ A1 constitutes a Nash equilibrium. This is
monotone according to Definition 1.2.
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and Wilson, 1982) when presenting counterexamples. To make it even more convincing, we also
require them to survive the refinements proposed in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Cho and
Kreps (1987), Banks and Sobel (1987), etc.
Remark on Monotonicity. Our notion of monotonicity can be viewed as a strong one.
For example, when A1 is one-dimensional, (1.2) implies that supp(σθ1) dominates supp(σθ
′
1 ) in
strong set order for every θ  θ′. Nevertheless, it is worth to note that all counterexamples in
our paper (Examples 1.1 - 1.4) will violate the weaker notion of monotonicity based on strong set
order, making them more convincing. In contrast, all positive results in this paper (Theorems
1.1 - 1.3) apply under our more demanding monotonicity requirement, which strengthens their
implications.
When A1 is multi-dimensional, our definition of monotone strategies is no longer equivalent
to but is only implied by condition (1.2). This is due to the incompleteness of the order on A1.
Thus, one may be interested in further strengthening the robust prediction about the sender’s
strategy by insisting that (1.2) holds even when A1 is multi-dimensional. In Appendix A.3, we
use an example to illustrate the difficulty of obtaining positive results when Definition 1.2 is
replaced by (1.2) in multi-dimensional environments.
1.3 Counterexample: Existence of Non-Monotone Equilibria
In this section, we present a counterexample which shows that the generalized Spence-Mirrlees
condition cannot guarantee the monotonicity of the sender’s equilibrium strategy even in 2×2×2
games.
Example 1.1. Consider the following 2× 2× 2 game:
θ = θ1 h l
H 2, 2 0, 0
L 1, 1 0, 0
θ = θ0 h l
H −1,−1/2 1, 0
L 0,−1 5/2, 1/4
The sender observes θ and chooses between H and L. The receiver chooses between h and
l after observing the sender’s action choice. We leave the receiver’s prior belief unspecified as
it plays no role. One can check that according to the orders θ1  θ0, H  L and h  l, the
generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition is satisfied. In fact, these payoffs even satisfy a stronger
notion of complementarity, that is, both u1 and u2 are strictly supermodular functions of the
triple (θ, a1, a2).10 Intuitively, there are complementarities between players’ actions as well as
between the state and the action profile.
However, the above signalling game admits the following non-monotone equilibrium. The
sender plays L if her type is θ1 and plays H if her type is θ0. The receiver, who could perfectly
10Let X be a lattice. A function f : X → R is strictly supermodular if f(x ∨ x′) + f(x ∧ x′) ≥ f(x) + f(x′) for
every x, x′ ∈ X, and the inequality is strict if {x, x′} 6= {x ∨ x′, x ∧ x′}.
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learn the state from the sender’s action, plays l after observing H and plays h after observing
L. Clearly, the sender’s strategy is non-monotone and no player has any incentive to deviate.11
In fact, since players have strict incentives and there are no off-path beliefs, the above
strategy profile and its induced belief system also form a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and
Wilson, 1982). Moreover, it cannot be refined away using the selection criteria proposed in
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Cho and Kreps (1987), and Banks and Sobel (1987). Since
players’ incentives are strict, this equilibrium is also robust against perturbations on the game’s
payoff matrices.
We argue that this non-monotone equilibrium is driven by three features of the game: se-
quential moves, non-separable payoff (of the sender) and interdependent values. When players
move sequentially, every a1 induces a distribution over a2. As a result, the sender is effectively
choosing a distribution over action profiles instead of just her own action. Because u1 is non-
separable with respect to θ and a2, her preferences over the receiver’s actions also vary with the
state. Therefore, her state contingent action choice depends not only on her comparative advan-
tage in a1 but also on her preferences over a2. Since the receiver’s best response to a1 depends
on his belief about the state (i.e. values are interdependent), choosing h after observing L and
choosing l after observing H can be rationalized despite there are complementarities between
players’ actions in u1 and u2. In our non-monotone equilibrium, the receiver believes that the
state is θ1 after observing L and the state is θ0 after observing H, which provides the sender an
incentive to use non-monotone strategies and makes the receiver’s belief self-fulfilling.
While sequential moves and interdependent values are standard in signalling games, non-
separability of the sender’s payoff distinguishes our model from the classic education signalling
game (Spence, 1973) and the beer-quiche game (Cho and Kreps, 1987). In these examples, the
sender’s valuations of money and fighting do not depend on her type. Nevertheless, non-separable
payoffs arise naturally in many other economic applications. For example, consider a firm
(receiver) offering a worker (sender) a job after observing her education. The worker’s preferences
over jobs depend on her type (for example, her taste and talent) no matter whether the jobs are
horizontally differentiated (Roy, 1951) or vertically differentiated (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999;
Waldman, 1984).12 Non-separability also occurs in many applications in industrial organization,
some of which will be discussed in Section 1.5.
It is also worth to point out that the existence of non-monotone equilibrium in Example 1
does not contradict the well-known results in Van Zandt and Vives (2007) on simultaneous move
Bayesian supermodular games. This is because once we maintain the pre-specified orders over
players’ actions, a signalling game with supermodular payoffs (Example 1.1) is not supermodular
in its normal form.13
11In the context of this game, the non-monotone equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a monotone equilibrium.
However, this is not a general feature and the Pareto dominance criteria cannot always refine away all non-
monotone equilibria. In Example 1.3 (Section 1.4.3) when the prior probability of state θ0 is sufficiently high, our
non-monotone equilibrium Pareto dominates the alternative unique monotone equilibrium, in which both types
play H and player 2 plays l regardless of what the sender does.
12When jobs are horizontally differentiated, different types of workers prefer different kinds of jobs, as in Roy
(1951)’s hunting-fishing example. When jobs are vertically differentiated, the worker’s gain from a job position
depends on her talent due to the piece-rate incentive schemes, the prospects of promotion, etc.
13Echenique (2004a) shows that every game that has at least two pure Nash equilibria is supermodular if the
analyst can flexibly choose the order over players’ strategies. However, the results that are established under an
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1.4 Sufficient Conditions for Monotone Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce sufficient conditions that guarantee the monotonicity of all equi-
libria. At the heart of our analysis is the following monotone-supermodular condition on the
sender’s payoff:
Definition 1.3 (Monotone-Supermodular Condition). The sender’s payoff is monotone-super-
modular if (i) u1 is strictly decreasing in a1 and strictly increasing in a2 , and (ii) u1 exhibits
strictly increasing differences in (θ, a1) and increasing differences in (θ, a2).
Compared to the more demanding requirement that both u1 and u2 are strictly super-
modular functions of (θ, a1, a2), our monotone-supermodular condition does not require any
complementarities within players’ actions, nor does it impose any restrictions on the receiver’s
payoff function. Nevertheless, it incurs two important requirements in addition to the gen-
eralized Spence-Mirrlees condition. First, the sender’s payoff exhibits increasing differences
between the state and the receiver’s action. This includes the separable payoff (i.e., there exist
f : A1 × A2 → R and c : Θ× A1 → R such that u1(θ, a1, a2) = f(a1, a2) + c(θ, a1)) as a special
case. It also fits into many other applications where payoffs are non-separable by nature. For
example, in warranty provision games, the firm’s per unit profit (sales price minus the expected
refund paid to the consumers) increases with its product quality, and therefore, its total profit
exhibits increasing differences between its quality and the quantity sold. In education signalling
games in which a firm assigns workers to various job positions after observing their years of edu-
cation, more talented workers receive higher benefits from higher level jobs due to the piece-rate
incentive schemes and better prospects of promotion.
Second, the sender’s payoff is monotone with respect to her own action and the receiver’s
action in appropriate directions.14 This is natural in many applications. For example, it is
costly for the firm to provide lengthier warranties and higher refunds, but it can benefit when
consumers increase their purchasing quantities. Similarly, workers face higher opportunity costs
to receive more education but they can benefit from more decent job positions.
In the next two subsections (1.4.1 and 1.4.2), we state results that establish the monotonicity
of all equilibria in signalling games where the sender’s payoff is monotone-supermodular. The
role of the monotone-supermodular condition in our results will be discussed in subsection 1.4.3.
We will elaborate in Section 1.5 how the assumptions of our results fit into the classic applications
of signalling games in industrial organization and labor economics, and outline their implications
in these settings.
1.4.1 Binary Action Games
In this subsection, we study games in which the receiver’s action choice is binary, i.e. |A2| = 2.
This holds the warranty provision game when the consumer has unit demand, i.e. a2 ∈ {0, 1}.
arbitrary order cannot imply the monotonicity of the sender’s action with respect to her type.
14Our results also hold when the sender’s payoff is increasing in her own action and decreasing in the receiver’s
action. However, non-monotone equilibria can exist when the sender’s payoff is strictly increasing (or strictly
decreasing) in both players’ actions (see Example 1.3 in subsection 1.4.3)
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Our first result below states that for these games, monotone-supermodularity alone is sufficient
to guarantee the monotoncity of all equilibria.
Theorem 1.1. If |A2| = 2 and the sender’s payoff is monotone-supermodular, then every
equilibrium is monotone.
Proof. Let A2 ≡ {a2 , a2} with a2  a2. Suppose towards a contradiction that in some
equilibrium σ, there exist θ  θ′ and a1  a′1 such that σθ1(a′1) > 0 and σθ
′
1 (a1) > 0. Let
α2 ≡ σ2(a1) and α′2 ≡ σ2(a′1) be the mixed actions played by the receiver after observing a1 and
a′1, respectively. Since type θ prefers (a′1, α′2) to (a1, α2) and type θ′ prefers (a1, α2) to (a′1, α′2),
we have:
u1(θ, a′1, α′2) ≥ u1(θ, a1, α2) (1.3)
and
u1(θ′, a1, α2) ≥ u1(θ′, a′1, α′2). (1.4)
These together imply that:
u1(θ, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ, a1, α2) ≥ 0 ≥ u1(θ′, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ′, a1, α2). (1.5)
Because u1 is strictly decreasing in a1, (1.4) also implies that u1(θ′, a′1, α2) > u1(θ′, a1, α2) ≥
u1(θ′, a′1, α′2). This further implies that α2 must attach a higher probability to a2 compared to
α′2, as the sender’s payoff is strictly increasing in a2. Therefore, we have θ  θ′, a1  a′1 and
α2 dominates α′2 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Since u1 has strictly
increasing differences in (θ, a1) and increasing differences in (θ, a2), we have:
u1(θ, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ, a1, α2) < u1(θ′, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ′, a1, α2), (1.6)
which contradicts (1.5).
The intuition of Theorem 1.1 is as follows. When |A2| = 2, every pair of distributions
over the receiver’s action can be ranked according to FOSD. Since playing a higher action is
more costly for the sender, she only has an incentive to do so when it induces a more favorable
response from the receiver. This implies that the ranking over the sender’s equilibrium actions
must coincide with the ranking over the receiver’s (possibly mixed) actions that they induce.
Because a high type sender has a stronger preference towards higher action profiles, she will
never play a strictly lower action than a low type.
Since the above proof makes no reference to the receiver’s incentives, our monotonicity
property also applies to every ex ante rationalizable strategy (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984). In
fact, only monotone strategies can survive the first round of elimination. The irrelevance of the
receiver’s incentives also makes it clear that our result immediately extends to cases where the
receiver has private information about his preferences, the sender is signalling to a population
of receivers with heterogeneous preferences, etc.
Theorem 1.1 can also be generalized to signalling games with infinite A1 and Θ with two
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caveats.15 First, when the type space is infinite, Nash equilibrium needs to be defined at the
interim stage after the sender observes her type. This is to ensure that the sender will play a
best reply at every state. Second, when A1 is infinite, some of the actions in the support of
a sender’s strategy can be suboptimal. Hence, the monotonicity condition in Definition 1.2 is
too demanding. Nevertheless, we show in Appendix A.4 that the sender’s equilibrium strategy
is almost surely monotone in the following sense: For every θ  θ′ and a1 ∈ supp(σθ1), the
probability that type θ′ plays an action strictly higher than a1 equals zero.
Theorem 1.1 also has the following implication on repeated signalling games where the state is
perfectly persistent, the sender’s stage game payoff is monotone-supermodular and the receiver’s
action choice is binary. For every pair of states θ  θ′ and every Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) of the
repeated signalling game, if playing the highest action in every period is the sender’s best reply
against σ2 in state θ′, then according to σ1, she will play the highest action with probability
1 at every on-path history in state θ.16 As shown in Pei (2018), this is an intermediate step
towards establishing the commitment payoff theorem and the uniqueness of the sender’s on-path
equilibrium behavior in reputation games.
1.4.2 Games with |A2| ≥ 3
In this subsection, we generalize our findings in binary action games to ones in which the receiver
has more than two actions. To illustrate the difficulties, we first present a counterexample show-
ing that the sender’s payoff being monotone-supermodular is no longer sufficient to guarantee
the monotonicity of all equilibria.
Example 1.2. Consider the following 2× 2× 3 game:
θ = θ1 h m l
H 2− , 1 1− 2, 0 −3,−2
L 2, 0 1, 1 0, 0
θ = θ0 h m l
H 2− 3, 0 1− 3, 0 4, 0
L 2− , 0 1, 2 8, 3
Suppose  ∈ (0, 1/8) and apply the rankings θ1  θ0, H  L and h  m  l. One can verify
that the sender’s payoff is monotone-supermodular. However, consider the following strategy
profile: The sender plays L if θ = θ1, and plays H if θ = θ0. The receiver plays m after
observing L, and plays h and l with equal probabilities after observing H. One can check
that the sender’s strategy is non-monotone although this strategy profile and its induced belief
constitute a sequential equilibrium.17
15The existence of equilibrium is guaranteed by the monotonicity condition (see footnote 9).
16However, the monotonicity of equilibria in the stage game does not imply the monotonicity of the sender’s
behavior strategy at every on-path history in the repeated signalling game. Therefore, our result cannot guarantee
that the receiver will always positively update his belief about the sender’s type after observing the sender playing
her highest action.
17This counterexample is not driven by the receiver’s non-generic payoff. Even when the receiver has strict
preferences over A2 conditional on (θ, a1) = (θ0, H), there still exists a non-monotone partial pooling equilibrium
in which type θ1 mixes between H and L, and type θ0 always plays H.
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Example 1.2 highlights the following issue: When |A2| ≥ 3, the distributions over the re-
ceiver’s actions cannot be completely ranked via FOSD. In particular, u1 being monotone-
supermodular does not imply the following:
• For every α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2), if α2 is preferred to α′2 for some θ ∈ Θ when she plays a1 ∈ A1,
then the sender’s expected payoff difference between α2 and α′2 is increasing in her type
conditional on a1.
We proceed along two directions to address this challenge, leading to two monotonicity results.
First, we introduce a property on the receiver’s payoff under which every pair of his (pure or
mixed) best replies can be ranked via FOSD. This, together with the monotone-supermodular
condition on the sender’s payoff, implies the monotonicity of all equilibria (Theorem 1.2). Sec-
ond, we identify a class of utility functions u1 which can endogenously generate a complete
order on ∆(A2). When the sender’s payoff function belongs to this class and is monotone-
supermodular, every equilibrium is monotone irrespective of the receiver’s payoff (Theorem
1.3).
1.4.2.1 Quasiconcavity-Preserving Property
For this part, we assume that A2 ≡ {a12, ..., an2} is completely ordered with a12 ≺ a22 ≺ ... ≺ an2 .18
For every (θ, a1) ∈ Θ×A1 and i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}, let
γa1θ (i) ≡ u2(θ, a1, ai2)− u2(θ, a1, ai+12 ) (1.7)
be the receiver’s payoff gain by decreasing his action locally, and let
Γa1p˜i (i) ≡
∫
γa1θ (i)dp˜i (1.8)
be his expected payoff gain under belief p˜i ∈ ∆(Θ). We now recall the definition of strict
single-crossing functions in Milgrom and Shannon (1994):
Definition 1.4. Function γ : I → R satisfies the strict single-crossing property (SSCP) if for
every i ∈ I, γ(i) ≥ 0 implies that γ(j) > 0 for every j ∈ I with j > i.
If γa1θ (·) satisfies SSCP for every (θ, a1) ∈ Θ×A1, then u2(θ, a1, ·) is strictly quasi-concave in
a2. In that case, the receiver has at most two pure best replies to every (θ, a1), which must be
adjacent elements in A2. This further implies that every pair of his (pure or mixed) best replies
to a degenerate distribution on Θ×A1 can be ranked according to FOSD. However, some of the
sender’s actions may induce non-degenerate beliefs in some equilibria, so the issue of aggregating
the single-crossing property arises. This motivates us to introduce a quasiconcavity-preserving
property (QPP) on the receiver’s payoff.
18Our monotonicity result in this subsection (Theorem 1.2) can also be extended to settings where A2 is a
multi-dimensional convex set.
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Definition 1.5 (Quasiconcavity-Preserving Property). The receiver’s payoff satisfies QPP if
Γa1p˜i : I → R satisfies SSCP for every (p˜i, a1) ∈ ∆(Θ)×A1.19
A sufficient condition for QPP is γa1θ (·) being strictly increasing for every (θ, a1) ∈ Θ× A1.
This fits into the warranty provision game when the consumer faces decreasing marginal returns
with respect to quantity. Intuitively, u2 is strictly concave in a2 when γa1θ (·) is strictly increas-
ing. The latter implies QPP as strict concavity is preserved under positive linear aggregation.
Nevertheless, strict concavity is by no means necessary for QPP. In Appendix A.2, we provide
a full characterization of QPP by relating it to a strict version of the signed-ratio monotonicity
condition introduced in Quah and Strulovici (2012).
Under QPP, the receiver’s (pure or mixed) best replies to every (p˜i, a1) ∈ ∆(Θ)×A1 can be
ranked according to FOSD. This leads to our second result:
Theorem 1.2. If (i) the order on A2 is complete, (ii) the sender’s payoff is monotone-super-
modular, and (iii) the receiver’s payoff satisfies QPP, then every equilibrium is monotone.
The proof follows along the same line as that of Theorem 1.1, which we omit to avoid
repetition. Note that despite the extra condition on the receiver’s payoff function, Theorem
1.2 only requires him to play a best reply against some p˜i ∈ ∆(Θ) after every a1 ∈ A1 on the
equilibrium path. Therefore, the above monotonicity result does not depend on the receiver’s
belief updating process and applies to all outcomes under weaker solution concepts such as S∞W
(Dekel and Fudenberg, 1990) and iterative conditional dominance (Shimoji and Watson, 1998),
which are variants of rationalizability that can rule out the receiver’s suboptimal plays at off-
path information sets.20 Moreover, when applying the elimination procedure for S∞W , all non-
monotone strategies will be deleted after one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategy
followed by another of round elimination of strictly dominated strategy. When applying iterative
conditional dominance, all surviving strategies are monotone after two rounds of elimination.
1.4.2.2 Increasing Absolute Differences over Distributions
In what follows, we take an alternative approach by introducing a condition on the sender’s payoff
that can guarantee the monotonicity of equilibria irrespective of the receiver’s payoff. Unlike the
previous subsection, we allow the order on A2 to be incomplete. As illustrated in Example 1.2,
the main obstacle against equilibrium monotonicity is the lack of a complete order on ∆(A2).
We introduce the following increasing absolute differences over distributions condition (IADD)
on the sender’s payoff under which a complete order on ∆(A2) can be constructed endogenously.
Definition 1.6 (Increasing Absolute Differences over Distributions). The sender’s payoff sat-
isfies IADD if for every a1 ∈ A1 and every α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2), we have u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a1, α′2)
19A more general version of the QPP property when A2 is any subset of R is introduced and characterized by
Choi and Smith (2017). In the case where A2 is finite, our condition is equivalent to a strict version of theirs.
20S∞W is the solution concept when applying one round elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed
by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) show that it characterizes
the set of rationalizable strategies when players entertain small amount of uncertainty about their opponents’
payoffs. Shimoji and Watson (1998) show that iterative conditional dominance generalizes rationalizability in
normal form games to extensive form games.
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being either increasing in θ and non-negative for all θ ∈ Θ, or decreasing in θ and non-positive
for all θ ∈ Θ.
To make sense of the terminology, note that IADD implies that the absolute value of the
difference u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a2, α′2) is increasing in θ.21 Intuitively, if u1 satisfies IADD, then
for every a1 ∈ A1, there exists a complete ordinal preference on ∆(A2) (denoted by %a1) that
is shared among all types of senders. In addition, this ordinal ranking coincides with the one
based on the intensity of preferences. In other words, if α2 %a1 α′2, then the difference in the
sender’s payoffs between (a1, α2) and (a1, α′2) must be increasing in θ. This leads to our last
monotonicity result:
Theorem 1.3. If u1 is monotone-supermodular and satisfies IADD, then every equilibrium is
monotone.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that in some equilibrium (σ1, σ2), there exist θ  θ′
and a1  a′1 such that σθ1(a′1) > 0 and σθ
′
1 (a1) > 0. Let α2 ≡ σ2(a1), α′2 ≡ σ2(a′1) with
α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2). Since type θ prefers (a′1, α′2) to (a1, α2), and type θ′ prefers (a1, α2) to (a′1, α′2),
we have:
u1(θ, a′1, α′2) ≥ u1(θ, a1, α2) (1.9)
and
u1(θ′, a1, α2) ≥ u1(θ′, a′1, α′2). (1.10)
Since u1 is strictly decreasing in a1, we have u1(θ′, a′1, α2) > u1(θ′, a1, α2). Inequality (1.10)
then implies that u1(θ′, a′1, α2) > u1(θ′, a′1, α′2). Applying (1.9) and (1.10) we have:
u1(θ, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ, a1, α2) ≥ u1(θ′, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ′, a1, α2). (1.11)
Meanwhile, note that
u1(·, a′1, α′2)− u1(·, a1, α2) = u1(·, a′1, α′2)− u1(·, a′1, α2) + u1(·, a′1, α2)− u1(·, a1, α2).
Since u1 exhibits strictly increasing differences between θ and a1, we have:
u1(θ, a′1, α2)− u1(θ, a1, α2) < u1(θ′, a′1, α2)− u1(θ′, a1, α2). (1.12)
In addition, IADD and u1(θ′, a′1, α2)− u1(θ′, a′1, α′2) > 0 imply that:
u1(θ, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ, a′1, α2) ≤ u1(θ′, a′1, α′2)− u1(θ′, a′1, α2). (1.13)
Summing up (1.12) and (1.13), we obtain a contradiction against (1.11). Therefore, every
equilibrium must be monotone.
As a remark, since the order on ∆(A2) can be constructed endogenously under IADD,
21IADD is also necessary for
∣∣u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a2, α′2)∣∣ to be increasing in θ when Θ is a continuum and u1
is a continuous function of θ.
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our result does not rely on the pre-specified order on A2, nor does it rely on the monotone-
supermodularity condition on u1 with respect to a2. In fact, it is clear from the above proof
that once u1 satisfies IADD, all equilibria are monotone if u1 is strictly decreasing in a1 and
exhibits strictly increasing differences in (θ, a1).
Furthermore, since the proof of Theorem 1.3 makes no reference to the receiver’s rationality
and incentives, it possesses the same robustness properties as Theorem 1.1. That is, all ex
ante rationalizable strategies of the sender must also be monotone. This monotonicity result
continues to hold when the receiver has private information about his payoff, when the sender is
signalling to a population of receivers with heterogeneous preferences, etc. In addition, Theorem
1.3 immediately extends to cases where A2 is infinite as the cardinality of A2 plays no role in
the above proof. Finally, extensions of Theorem 1.3 to cases where Θ and A1 are infinite are
subject to the same cautions mentioned in subsection 1.4.1 and Appendix A.4, with the main
issue being that the support of the sender’s strategy may include suboptimal actions that are
played with zero probability.
In order to apply Theorem 1.3, it is necessary to verify whether IADD is satisfied. To
facilitate this process, we fully characterize the functional form restrictions of IADD in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1.1. u1 satisfies IADD if and only if there exist functions f : A1 × A2 → R,
v : Θ×A1 → R+ and c : Θ×A1 → R with v(θ, a1) increasing in θ, such that:
u1(θ, a1, a2) = f(a1, a2)v(θ, a1) + c(θ, a1). (1.14)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Remark on IADD. IADD enables us to construct endogenous orders on ∆(A2). Nevertheless,
as shown in Kartik et al. (2018) and Kushnir and Liu (2018), there are other conditions on
players’ payoff functions under which we could obtain a complete order over distributions. These
include the single-crossing expectational differences (SCED) and the monotone expectational
differences (MED) in Kartik et al. (2018), and the increasing differences over distributions
(IDD) in Kushnir and Liu (2018).
When applied to the same probability space, IADD is more demanding than MED and SCED.
This is because, for example, IADD on ∆(A2) requires that (i) u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a2, α′2) does
not change sign when we vary θ and (ii) its absolute value is increasing in θ. These together
imply that the expected difference u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a2, α′2) is monotone in θ.22
However, as shown in subsection 1.4.3, neither MED, SCED nor IDD on ∆(A2) is sufficient
for our purpose. It is also important to note that IADD on ∆(A2) neither implies nor is implied
by MED or SCED on ∆(A1×A2). We will further elaborate on this in the context of education
22In our signalling game context, IDD on ∆(A2) would require that for every a1 ∈ A1 and every α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2),
the expected payoff differences u1(θ, a1, α2) − u1(θ, a1, α′2) is either strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, or
constant in θ. In contrast, IADD only implies that these differences are either increasing or decreasing. Thus, in
general Kushnir and Liu (2018)’s IDD is only implied by the strict version of our IADD (i.e. for every a1 ∈ A1
and α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2), |u2(θ, a1, α2)− u2(θ, a1, α′2)| is either constant of strictly increasing in θ).
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signalling (section 1.5.2), which helps clarify the novel implications of Theorem 1.3 compared to
a related result in Kartik et al. (2018).
1.4.3 Discussion
In this subsection, we argue that the monotone-supermodular condition on the sender’s pay-
off plays an indispensable role in our analysis. In particular, we will show that neither the
monotoncitiy nor the supermodularity part of the condition can be replaced by other appealing
alternatives.
1.4.3.1 Alternative Monotonicity Conditions
One may conjecture that the existence of non-monotone equilibria (e.g. the one in Example
1.1) is driven by the state dependence of the sender’s ordinal preferences over a2, or whether
we could modify the monotonicity assumption on the sender’s payoff by letting it to be strictly
increasing (or strictly decreasing) in both a1 and a2. However, the following counterexample
suggests that these conjectures are not true.
Example 1.3. Consider the following 2× 2× 2 game:
θ = θ1 h l
H 2, 2 0, 0
L 1, 1 −1/2, 0
θ = θ0 h l
H 1/4,−1/2 1/8, 0
L 0,−1 −1/16, 1/4
One can verify that according to the order θ1  θ0, H  L and h  l, the sender’s payoff
satisfies the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition. Moreover, as in Example 1.1, both u1 and
u2 are supermodular functions of the triple (θ, a1, a2). Different from Example 1.1, the sender’s
ordinal preferences over a1 and a2 are state independent. In particular, the sender’s payoff is
strictly increasing in both a1 and a2. However, her cardinal preferences over the receiver’s actions
still depend on the state. As a result, there exists a non-monotone equilibrium in which type θ1
plays L, type θ0 plays H, and the receiver plays h after observing L and plays l after observing
H. One can also construct similar counterexamples in which the sender’s payoff exhibits strictly
increasing differences in (θ, a1), increasing differences in (θ, a2) but is strictly decreasing in both
a1 and a2.
1.4.3.2 Single-Crossing Differences vs. Increasing Differences
In this part, we show that our strictly increasing difference condition on u1 cannot be replaced
with the strict single-crossing difference property in Milgrom and Shannon (1994), which is
well-known in the monotone comparative statics literature.
Definition 1.7. The sender’s payoff has strict single-crossing differences (SSCD) if for every
θ  θ′ and every (a1, a2)  (a′1, a′2), u1(θ′, a1, a2)− u1(θ′, a′1, a′2) ≥ 0 implies that u1(θ, a1, a2)−
u1(θ, a′1, a′2) > 0.
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By definition, SSCD is a weaker property than strictly increasing differences. The following
example shows that SSCD is not sufficient for guaranteeing the monotonicity of equilibria in
signalling games, even when the sender’s payoff satisfies our monotonicity condition.
Example 1.4. Consider the following 2× 2× 2 game:
θ = θ1 h l
H 1, 2 −3, 0
L 3, 1 −1, 0
θ = θ0 h l
H 1, 0 −2, 0
L 2,−1 −1, 0
Consider the orders θ1  θ0, H  L and h  l. One can check that, first, u1 is strictly
increasing in a2 and is strictly decreasing in a1. Second, u1 has SSCD although it fails to have
increasing differences. Let α2 ≡ 23h+ 13 l and α′2 ≡ 13h+ 23 l be two mixed actions of the receiver,
we have:
u1(θ0, h, α2)− u1(θ0, l, α′2) = 0 > −
2
3 = u1(θ1, h, α2)− u1(θ1, l, α
′
2). (1.15)
When the receiver’s prior belief attaches probability 1/3 to state θ1, one can proceed to construct
the following non-monotone equilibrium: Type θ1 plays L for sure, type θ0 plays H and L each
with probability 1/2, the receiver plays α2 after observing H and α′2 after observing L.
In the above example, the receiver’s best reply to the sender’s action is mixed. SSCD only
requires that u1(θ, a1, a2)− u1(θ, a′1, a′2) has the strict single-crossing property for every pair of
pure action profiles that can be ranked. This does not imply that u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a′1, α′2) is
also strict single-crossing for every (a1, α2), (a′1, α′2) ∈ A1 ×∆(A2) with a1  a′1 and α2 FOSDs
α′2.23 This leaves open the possibility of (1.15), which leads to the existence of non-monotone
equilibria.
1.5 Applications
In this section, we revisit two classic applications of signalling games in industrial organization
and labor economics. We apply our sufficient conditions to establish the monotonicity of all
equilibria in these games and discuss the relationships between our results and the existing ones
in the literature.
1.5.1 Advertising and Warranty Provision
Consider a firm (sender) selling products to a consumer (receiver). Let θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R be the
product’s quality, which is the firm’s private information. For simplicity, we assume that the
per unit sales price is exogenous, which is normalized to 1. Every product sold has a positive
probability of breakdown, which depends on its quality. The firm chooses a 3-dimensional action:
a1 ≡ (aad1 , alen1 , are1 ) ∈ A1 ⊂ R+×R+× [0, 1], where aad1 is the intensity of advertising, alen1 is the
length of warranty, and are1 is the (per unit) refund the firm commits to pay if the product breaks
23In fact, since |A1| = |A2| = 2 in this example, the payoff function u1 also has SCED on both ∆(A1) and
∆(A2) (Kartik et al., 2018). However, it does not have SCED on the larger space ∆(A1 ×A2).
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down during the length of the warranty. The consumer chooses how many units to purchase
after observing a1, which is denoted by a2 ∈ A2 ⊂ N.
Our monotone-supermodular condition requires that (i) u1 is strictly decreasing in the triple
(aad1 , alen1 , are1 ) and is strictly increasing in a2, and (ii) u1 has strictly increasing differences
in (θ, aad1 ), (θ, alen1 ) and (θ, are1 ), and increasing differences in (θ, a2). The first part of the
monotonicity requirement is most straightforward, as advertising, providing lengthier warranty
and more refund are all costly for the firm. Monotonicity also requires that, keeping other factors
fixed, the firm’s profit is higher when the consumer purchases larger quantities.24
Next, we justify the supermodular part. First, there are complementarities between θ and
aad1 when the cost of promoting a good product is lower than the cost of promoting a bad one.
This can be driven by regulation policies, reputation concerns, umbrella branding (Wernerfelt,
1988), etc. Second, there are complementarities between θ and are1 when higher quality product
has lower probability of breakdown, so therefore, committing to a higher per unit refund is
less costly. Similarly, the firm’s per unit profit (defined as sales price minus expected refund
payment) is strictly increasing in the product’s quality, and therefore, u1 has strictly increasing
differences in (θ, a2). Finally, there are complementarities between θ and alen1 when breakdown
arrives according to a time homogeneous Poisson process with intensity strictly decreasing in
the product’s quality (Gal-Or, 1989).
As the firm’s payoff is monotone-supermodular, it will use a monotone strategy in every
equilibrium when the consumer has unit demand (Theorem 1.1), when the consumer faces
decreasing marginal returns to quantities (Theorem 1.2), or when its payoff takes the following
functional form (Theorem 1.3):
u1(θ, a1, a2) =
(
1− g(θ, alen1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. of breakdown
within alen1 periods
·
per unit refund︷︸︸︷
are1 + f(θ)
)
a2 − c(θ, aad1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of advertising
, (1.16)
where
(i) g : Θ×R+ → [0, 1] is strictly decreasing in θ, strictly increasing in alen1 and exhibits strictly
decreasing differences in (θ, alen1 ),
(ii) f : Θ → R+ is strictly increasing, which captures the firm’s benefit from initial sales
beyond the sales price in a reduced form,25 and
(iii) c : Θ× R+ → R is strictly increasing in aad1 and exhibits strictly decreasing differences in
(θ, aad1 ).
1.5.2 Education Signalling with Vertically Differentiate Jobs
Consider the following variant of the Spence (1973) education signalling model. Let θ ∈ Θ be
the talent of the worker, a1 ∈ A1 be the education the worker receives, and a2 ∈ A2 be the job
24This rules out cases in which the low quality seller will lose money when offering the equilibrium war-
ranty/refund policy of the high quality seller. Nevertheless, it still fits into a number of cases of economic interest.
25This is relevant when the product is a newly introduced experience good Milgrom and Roberts (1986a); Nelson
(1974). Nevertheless, the absence of f(θ) will not affect the applicability of our monotonicity result.
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offered by the employer after he observes a1.
The sender’s payoff being monotone-supermodular implies that (i) u1 is strictly decreasing
in a1 and strictly increasing in a2, (ii) u1 exhibits strictly increasing differences between θ
and (a1, a2). The monotonicity assumption requires that receiving education is costly, and
the jobs are vertically differentiated so that every worker prefers a higher level job.26 For the
supermodularity assumption, first, u1 exhibits strictly increasing differences in (θ, a1) when
receiving education is less costly for more talented workers (Spence, 1973). Second, u1 exhibits
strictly increasing differences in (θ, a2) when the returns from a higher level job (relative to
a lower level one) increases with the worker’s talent, which is a well-established fact in the
personnel economics literature.27
When the worker’s payoff is monotone-supermodular, more talented workers receive more
education in every equilibrium when there are only two jobs (Theorem 1.1). If the employer’s
payoff function is strictly concave in a2,28 then Theorem 1.2 guarantees the monotonicity of all
equilibria even when there are three or more jobs. Alternatively, suppose the worker’s payoff
function takes the following form:
u1(θ, a1, a2) = f(θ, a1)g(a2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
worker’s return from job assignment
− c(θ, a1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of education
, (1.17)
where f : Θ × A1 → R+ is strictly increasing in θ, and g : A2 → R and c : Θ × A1 → R are
functions compatible with u1 being strictly decreasing in a1 and exhibiting strictly increasing
differences in (θ, a1). Intuitively, this means that the net (material) return from education is
always negative, but it is strictly increasing with respect to the sender’s type. Compared to
the separable payoff function studied in Spence (1973), (1.17) allows the worker’s return from a
job offer to depend non-trivially on her type and education. Despite the non-separability of the
sender’s payoff function, Theorem 1.3 implies that every equilibrium is monotone regardless of
how the employer evaluates various matches between jobs, talent and education.
Kartik et al. (2018) study a similar application, with a2 ∈ R+ being the wage offered by the
firm. They show that if the worker’s payoff function has SCED over ∆(A1 × A2), then every
equilibrium of this game is monotone. According to their characterization result, u1 has SCED
over ∆(A1 ×A2) if and only if it takes the following functional form:
u1(θ, a1, a2) = g1(a1, a2)f1(θ) + g2(a1, a2)f2(θ) + h(θ), (1.18)
where both f1 and f2 are single-crossing functions that satisfy a ratio-ordered condition.29 Their
26If jobs are instead horizontally differentiated (Roy, 1951), then the resulting payoff structure resembles Ex-
ample 1.1, in which we have shown that non-monotone equilibria can exist.
27See for example, Waldman (1984) and Gibbons and Waldman (1999). Different types of workers receive
different returns to a higher level job can be due to, for example, that the talent of a worker affects her prospects
of promotion, the expected compensation she receives under piece-rate incentive schemes, etc.
28Concavity of u2 is satisfied if for every (θ, a1) ∈ Θ × A1, there exists an ideal job assignment a∗2(θ, a1) that
maximizes u2(θ, a1, ·), and the employer incurs a quadratic loss when there is a mismatch between talent and
jobs.
29According to Kartik et al. (2018), for two single-crossing functions f1, f2 : Θ → R, f1 ratio dominates
f2 if (i) ∀θ  θ′, f1(θ′)f2(θ) ≤ f1(θ)f2(θ′), and (ii) ∀θ  θˆ  θ′, f1(θ′)f2(θ) = f1(θ)f2(θ′) if and only if
f1(θ′)f2(θˆ) = f1(θˆ)f2(θ′) and f1(θˆ)f2(θ) = f1(θ)f2(θˆ). Functions f1 and f2 are ratio-ordered if either f1 ratio
Chapter 1 25
results provide insights on cheap talk games and education signalling games when the receiver’s
payoffs are unknown to the sender. However, their results are not applicable to education
signalling games where the worker’s payoff is given by (1.17) and c(θ, a1) cannot be written as
the product of two functions c1(θ) and c2(a1).30 Our Theorem 1.3 accommodates these cases
and implies the monotonicity of all equilibria.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we show that equilibrium monotonicity does not
follow from the Spence-Mirrlees condition nor is it implied by the complementarities in players’
payoff functions. Our counterexamples are robust against equilibrium refinements and highlight
the problems that can arise when the sender’s returns from the receiver’s action depend on her
type. Second, we provide sufficient conditions under which all Nash equilibria are monotone.
These conditions are easy to verify and fit into a number of applications, including advertising,
warranty provision, education and job assignment, etc. In these scenarios, our results imply
that it is without loss of generality to focus on monotone equilibria.
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2 Confusion, Indecisiveness and Polarization1
Joint with Andreas Hefti and Armin Schmutzler
2.1 Introduction
Some of the most important consumption decisions are inherently complex. For instance, when
faced with the choice between two different cars, smartphones or insurance contracts, consumers
often have a hard time figuring out which alternative they prefer. Assessing the difference in
the monetary value of two goods is an even more challenging task. For complex consumption
decisions, it therefore appears reasonable to assume that consumers’ judgments are noisy at
best.
The extent of such noise in consumer decisions is typically not an entirely exogenous char-
acteristic of the goods under consideration. On the one hand, firms can engage in measures to
educate consumers. They can describe the products’ properties in a transparent fashion and
discuss the exact needs of consumers with them. On the other hand, firms can also deliberately
confuse consumers. For instance, insurance companies may write contracts in such a way that
comparison becomes difficult. Smartphone manufacturers may add features with unclear value
to their products. More generally, when advertising differentiated products, firms may empha-
size irrelevant product details rather than those characteristics that really matter for consumer
valuations.
This paper asks whether firms want to educate consumers or whether instead they want to
engage in obfuscation activities to confuse consumers. The special case of homogeneous goods
might suggest that firms’ incentives are clear-cut. Oligopolistic producers of such goods suf-
fer from the temptation to undercut each others’ prices, resulting in a zero-profit equilibrium
under well-known conditions.2 To alleviate this problem, firms may seek to reduce the under-
cutting temptation. With homogeneous goods, obfuscation may allow competitors to escape the
“Bertrand trap” by reducing market transparency. The literature has made this point in several
variants, but the bottom line is that producers of homogeneous goods can obtain positive profits
by confusing consumers, even when this would otherwise be impossible.3
While the case of homogeneous goods is an important theoretical benchmark, in many in-
dustries firms offer differentiated products to cater to the needs of heterogeneous consumers.
1This paper should be cited as Hefti, A., S. Liu and A. Schmutzler (2019): “Confusion, Indecisiveness and
Polarization,” Mimeo.
2Such an equilibrium arises, e.g., if the following conditions hold simultaneously: static interaction, identical
and constant marginal costs, no capacity constraints; see, e.g., Tirole (1988).
3For instance, firms can benefit by using hidden fees (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Heidhues et al., 2016), spurious
differentiation resulting from the credulity of consumers (Spiegler, 2006), complex price formats (Carlin, 2009;
Chioveanu and Zhou, 2013; Piccione and Spiegler, 2012), intransparent webpages (Ellison and Ellison, 2009), or
more generally from increasing consumer search costs (Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012).
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In such environments, the role of obfuscation is more subtle. On the one hand, the scope for
confusion is larger than with homogeneous goods. For example, there can be many ways to
present the differences between products, and the dimensions that firms emphasize are likely
to influence the perceived valuations. On the other hand, the incentives to confuse consumers
are less obvious. Firms usually obtain positive profits in differentiated markets even without
obfuscation. It therefore is possible in principle that, by blurring the perception of consumers,
obfuscation reduces rather than increases profits. It could thus potentially be in the interest of
firms to educate consumers.
We seek to identify conditions under which consumer confusion arises in markets with dif-
ferentiated products. To this end, we study a duopoly framework, where the population of
consumers is characterized by a distribution of valuations for the two goods with an arbitrary
correlation structure, encompassing a wide range of discrete choice models. The two firms first
decide on their marketing activities. Thereafter they compete in prices. Finally consumers
choose which product to buy. Firms can choose their marketing activities from an exogenously
given set of options. The activities jointly determine the noise in consumer perceptions, thereby
resulting in a distribution of perceived valuations in the consumer population that may differ
from the true valuation distribution.4 We abstract from any cost heterogeneity between differ-
ent activities. As we are asking whether and how firms want to influence the noise in consumer
decisions, we assume that the stochastic perturbations do not bias valuations systematically.
More precisely, we assume that marketing does not affect the expected valuation differences.5
In this sense, firms cannot systematically fool consumers.
Our main result establishes that both confusion and education can be equilibrium phenom-
ena, with the outcome depending on the true valuation distribution. Consumer confusion arises
if the distribution of perceived valuation differences and the distribution of true valuation dif-
ferences do not coincide. Any marketing profile that induces confusion is called obfuscating,
and any profile inducing (or restoring) the true distribution is called educating. Our analysis
identifies simple properties of the true preference distribution determining whether firms will en-
gage in obfuscation activities. We distinguish between indecisive preferences, for which, roughly
speaking, indifferent consumers are relatively common and polarized preferences, for which in-
different consumers are relatively rare. For instance, in the standard textbook Hotelling model,
the former (latter) case arises when the density of the consumer distribution has a maximum
(minimum) in the middle of the interval.6 To illustrate the relevant properties of the taste
distribution, consider for instance the hospitality industry. It is hard to imagine that a guest
will be indifferent when faced with the choice between a “family” hotel and a “business” hotel –
instead, most consumers will clearly prefer one alternative over the other, resulting in a polarized
distribution. However, if the comparison is between two business hotels, the situation may be
better described by a substantial amount of indecisive consumers.
4As we will discuss in Section 2.4.1, our analysis is thus related to Johnson and Myatt (2006) who consider a
monopolist’s incentive to influence valuation distributions
5From a theoretical perspective, unbiasedness can be seen as playing a similar disciplining role in our (non-
Bayesian) analysis as the assumption of “conformity with the prior” in models of persuasion (Kamenica and
Gentzkow, 2011) or costly information acquisition (Caplin and Dean, 2015)
6For definiteness, think of a situation with firms located at the ends of a compact interval that is symmetric
around the mid-point; moreover, take transportation costs to be linear in distance.
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Our first result assumes that firms’ obfuscation possibilities are constrained by the degree of
true taste differentiation.7 In this case, we find that consumer confusion arises in equilibrium if
preferences are indecisive, whereas it does not arise if preferences are polarized. Our second result
requires more structure on the set of feasible marketing activities. If firms’ marketing activities
can be partially ordered by the amount of confusion generated (e.g., by a mean-preserving spread
of the noise distribution), then with indecisive tastes, the unique equilibrium features maximal
consumer confusion. By contrast, full education arises as the unique equilibrium outcome for
polarized tastes.
For the third result, we allow that the marketing tools can be so powerful that even the
most loyal consumer of a firm can be confused enough to perceive the other firm’s good as
better, which seems plausible if there is only very little dispersion in the true tastes. When
such “massive” confusion is possible, a U-shaped relation between confusion and firm payoffs
results if tastes are polarized. We show that confusion can then arise in equilibrium despite
polarized tastes. In particular, in the limit case of homogeneous goods, true taste differentiation
is negligible, so that obfuscation is an equilibrium phenomenon independently of the shape of
the taste distribution.
Our results shed lights on the advertising literature which has discussed firms’ incentives to
engage in informative advertising. Interpreting a reduction in the noise of relative valuations
as informative advertising, we see that the preference distribution determines whether such
advertising arises as an equilibrium phenomenon.
The welfare analysis of obfuscation differs from the case with homogeneous goods, for which,
in the absence of binding outside options, the main effect is redistribution from consumers to
firms. With differentiated goods, whenever firms choose to obfuscate, this not only increases
prices, but it also leads to a mismatch between consumers and products. In addition, with a
strictly binding outside option, obfuscation can make some consumers inefficiently opt out of
the market.
The general logic of our model applies beyond the oligopoly setting, for instance, to compe-
tition between candidates for voters. Candidates can choose how much information to provide
to voters about their platforms. In addition, they can engage in other measures to convince
voters, such as promises and campaigning efforts. Promises are costly only if the candidate wins
the election; efforts are costly even when she does not. In the former case, our oligopoly model
applies directly. The latter case requires modifications of the setting, as unconditional efforts
lead to a contest structure. In both situations, we find that candidates will want to engage in
obfuscation activities only if the voter preference distribution displays indecisiveness. Intuitively,
with indecisive preferences obfuscation distorts the preference distribution so that it becomes
more polarized. This reduces the necessary efforts of the candidates when competing for voters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model, Section 2.3 presents the
main results. We discuss several aspects of our framework in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 contains
the application to political economy. The related literature is discussed in Section 2.6, and
Section 2.7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
7More precisely, no matter which marketing activities the firms choose and what the realization of the noise
term is, for each firm there exist consumers who will not buy from the competitor at equal prices.
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2.2 The Model
Consider a duopoly where each firm i = 1, 2 produces a good at zero marginal cost. There is a
unit mass of consumers. Each consumer has a true valuation vi ∈ R for the good produced by
firm i. The true valuations (v1, v2) of the consumers are drawn according to a joint distribution
function F0 : R2 → [0, 1]. The firms play a two-stage complete information game. In the
first stage, they simultaneously choose marketing activities ai ∈ A. The marketing profile a =
(a1, a2) ∈ A ≡ A×A determines a distribution function Fa : R2 → [0, 1], from which the perceived
valuations (v˜1, v˜2) of the consumers are drawn. In the second stage, firms observe the chosen
marketing profile a and infer the resulting distribution Fa, after which they simultaneously
choose prices pi ∈ R+. The chosen prices (p1, p2) and the realizations of the perceived valuations
(v˜1, v˜2) then determine the consumption choices of the consumers, and thus also the profits of
the firms. Throughout the main analysis, we assume there is no outside option (or it is not
binding if there is one).8 Accordingly, a consumer will acquire the alternative with the highest
perceived net utility u˜i = v˜i − pi, i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, the distribution of perceived valuation
differences v˜∆ ≡ v˜2 − v˜1 suffices for studying the model.
For every a ∈ A, the marketing activities affect the perceived valuation differences according
to
v˜∆ = v∆ + εa, (2.1)
where the random variables εa and v∆ = v2 − v1 are independently distributed. Let G0 : R →
[0, 1] and Γa : R → [0, 1] be the distribution functions of v∆ and εa, respectively. With (2.1),
the distribution function of v˜∆, which we denote by Ga, is then induced by G0 and Γa according
to the convolution
Ga(x) =
∫ +∞
−∞
G0(x− ε)dΓa(ε), ∀x ∈ R.
For given (p1, p2) ∈ R2+ and a ∈ A, since Pr(v˜∆ ≤ p2 − p1) = Ga(p2 − p1), the expected
demands of firms 1 and 2 are D1(p1, p2;a) = Ga(p2 − p1) and D2(p1, p2;a) ≡ 1 − Ga(p2 −
p1), respectively. Further, the expected profits of the firms, which they aim to maximize, are
Πi(p1, p2;a) = piDi(p1, p2;a), ∀i = 1, 2.
Main assumptions We say that a random variable X is symmetric at zero if its distribution
function G : R → [0, 1] satisfies either (i) G(x) = 1 − G(−x) ∀x ∈ R, or (ii) G(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0
and G(x) = 0 otherwise. Further, if case (ii) holds, we say that X is degenerate at zero, and we
denote such a random variable by O. If X admits a density function g : R → R+, we also use
supp(g) to denote its support. We are now ready to state the main assumptions on the variables
of interests, v∆ and εa.
Assumption 2.1 (Distributional assumptions). The following conditions are satisfied:
(A2.1.1) v∆ is symmetric at zero and has a density g0.
8This assumption simplifies the analysis but does not alter the qualitative nature of our main results. See
Section 2.3.5 for an extension with outside options.
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(A2.1.2) G0 is log-concave on supp(g0).
(A2.1.3) g0 is continuous at zero and g0(0) > 0.
(A2.1.4) ∀a ∈ A, εa is symmetric at zero.
(A2.1.5) If εa 6= O, εa has a density γa that is log-concave on supp(γa).
The log-concavity conditions (A2.1.2) and (A2.1.5) assure that the first-order conditions
for profit maximization in the pricing stage are sufficient. Jointly with the technical condition
(A2.1.3), this is useful for establishing equilibrium existence. (A2.1.1) and (A2.1.4) are of
economic importance. They state that no firm has a pre-existing systematic advantage over
the other, nor can it gain such an advantage by marketing activities. We discuss the economic
rationale for (A2.1.4) in Section 2.4. Further, the condition in (A2.1.1) that v∆ has a density
g0 implies that true consumer valuations are heterogeneous, and we can view the (Lebesgue)
measure of supp(g0) as a measure of the degree of taste (or product) differentiation.9
Assumption 2.1 guarantees that a density function ga of v˜∆ exists in the pricing stage, given
by
ga(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
g0(x− ε)dΓa(ε), ∀x ∈ R. (2.2)
In particular, ga(x) = g0(x) ∀x ∈ R if εa = O.
2.3 Main Results
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game. Section 2.3.1
contains the main results requiring only little structure on A and the marketing technology. In
Section 2.3.2, we derive stronger results by imposing a partial order on A. In Section 2.3.3,
we discuss the case where consumer confusion can be arbitrarily large relative to the true taste
differentiation. Finally, we provide welfare results in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Endogenous Confusion and Education
Our first result characterizes the equilibria in the second-stage pricing subgames.
Lemma 2.1. Under Assumption 2.1 there is a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in
every pricing subgame, where both firms choose the price p∗a = 12ga(0) , ∀a ∈ A.
9It is straightforward to derive G0 from the more primitive joint distribution F0. For example, if F0 has a
density function f0, G0 can be expressed as
G0(v∆) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ v∆
−∞
f0(v, v + x)dxdv, ∀v∆ ∈ R.
It is then easy to derive sufficient conditions on F0 under which the symmetry condition (A2.1.1) holds. For
example, it holds if F0 itself is symmetric, i.e., F0(x, y) = F0(y, x) ∀x, y ∈ R. Likewise, log-concavity (A2.1.2) can
be checked by standard calculus tools if F0 has a differentiable density function; a sufficient condition is that v1
and v2 are independent and each is drawn from a log-concave distribution function. Alternatively, (A2.1.2) holds
if F0 is an (arbitrary) multivariate normal distribution.
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Density of v∆
0−1 1
(a) An indecisive distribution
Density of v∆
0−1 1
(b) A polarized distribution
Figure 2.1: Examples of preference distributions, supp(g0) = [−1, 1].
As perceived valuation differences are dispersed with a zero-symmetric log-concave density
ga for any a ∈ A, an equilibrium existence in the pricing subgames exists. Crucially, Lemma
2.1 shows that the equilibrium price p∗a is determined by and decreasing in ga(0), the measure
of perceptually indifferent consumers. Since higher prices correspond to higher revenues, firms
prefer marketing profiles that reduce the measure of perceptually indifferent consumers. Intu-
itively, such marginal consumers react most sensitively to price changes. Thus, if ga(0) is low,
there are many infra-marginal customers whom the firms want to exploit, and high equilibrium
prices become sustainable.
Building on the above insight, we now proceed to show that the distribution of true valuations
determines whether consumer confusion arises in equilibrium. The conclusion will depend on
differences in the shape of the distribution of v∆ as depicted in the two parts of Figure 1. The
following definition makes the relevant concepts precise.
Definition 2.1. Let δ > 0 be such that [−δ, δ] ⊂ supp(g0).
(i) (Indecisiveness) True preferences are
(a) weakly δ-indecisive if g0(0) > g0(x) ∀x ∈ [−δ, 0) ∪ (0, δ],
(b) δ-indecisive if g0 is strictly increasing (decreasing) on [−δ, 0] (on [0, δ]), and
(c) strongly δ-indecisive if g0 is strictly concave on [−δ, δ].
(ii) (Polarization) True preferences are
(a) weakly δ-polarized if g0(0) < g0(x) ∀x ∈ [−δ, 0) ∪ (0, δ],
(b) δ-polarized if g0 is strictly decreasing (increasing) on [−δ, 0] (on [0, δ]), and
(c) strongly δ-polarized if g0 is strictly convex on [−δ, δ].
The consumer tastes represented in Figure 2.1 feature strongly δ-indecisive and strongly δ-
polarized preferences, respectively, where [−δ, δ] = supp(g0). Given the zero-symmetry of v∆,
strong δ-indecisiveness implies δ-indecisiveness, which in turn implies weak δ-indecisiveness. The
difference between the latter two concepts is the monotonicity requirement in the definition of
δ-indecisiveness. For δ-indecisive preferences, less pronounced valuation differences occur more
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frequently than more pronounced ones, while weakly δ-indecisive preferences only require that
indifference (v∆ = 0) occurs more often than all other alternatives on [−δ, δ]. The relation
between different concepts of polarization is similar. Our most general result (Theorem 2.1)
only requires the weak notions of indecisiveness of polarization. The more restrictive concepts
are useful for obtaining stronger results on equilibrium uniqueness and monotonicity (Theorem
2.2), which will be presented in the next subsection.
For expositional simplicity, in the rest of the paper we indicate marketing activities by real
numbers, so that A ⊂ R and A ⊂ R2. We also use the convention that ε0 = O. Thus, if the
marketing profile a = 0 is available to and chosen by the firms, consumers will be fully educated
(or the market will be transparent) in the sense that their perceived valuation differences will
coincide with their true ones. We impose the following minimal structure on the set of marketing
profiles A.
Assumption 2.2. The set A satisfies the following two conditions:
(A2.2.1) 0 ∈ A.
(A2.2.2) ∀i = 1, 2, j 6= i and ∀aj ∈ A, ∃ ai ∈ A, such that ε(ai,aj) 6= O.
(A2.2.1) assures that full consumer education is among the feasible options. (A2.2.2) states
that each firm can induce some consumer confusion unilaterally. Thus, Assumption 2.2 implies
that, while a transparent market is a possible outcome, it cannot be enforced unilaterally. We
are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold.
(i) If there exists δ > 0 with supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ] ∀a ∈ A and the true preferences are weakly
δ-polarized, then an SPE without consumer confusion exists.
(ii) If there exists δ > 0 with supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ] ∀a ∈ A and the true preferences are weakly
δ-indecisive, then no SPE without consumer confusion exists.
Even with a small degree of taste differentiation, full consumer education can be sustained
as an equilibrium outcome if preferences are polarized. Conversely, if preferences are indecisive,
consumer confusion necessarily arises in any equilibrium even with an arbitrarily large degree
of taste differentiation. As an illustration, suppose that supp(γa) ⊂ [−1, 1] ∀a ∈ A. The
distributions g0 and g′0 in Figure 2.2 (a) differ in their degrees of taste differentiation, but in both
cases an SPE without consumer confusion, or an education equilibrium, exists. By contrast, g0
and g′0 in Figure 2.2(b) have the same degree of taste differentiation, but an education equilibrium
only exists in the latter case, as g0 is polarized while g′0 is indecisive.
The rationale for Theorem 2.1 is as follows. If firms choose an obfuscating marketing profile
(i.e., εa 6= O), some truly indifferent consumers perceive one good as strictly superior, while some
consumers who strictly prefer one good over the other become indifferent. By Lemma 1, firms
benefit from consumer confusion if the former effect dominates the latter. With polarized tastes,
confusion breaks pre-existing allegiance with a firm, as more consumers are pushed towards
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Figure 2.2: Taste differentiation and preference distribution
indifference than vice versa. Therefore, both firms have the incentive to avoid the intensified
price competition caused by an obfuscated market. Because fully educating the consumers is
feasible (0 ∈ A), it must be part of an SPE. By contrast, confusion is beneficial for firms if
true preferences are indecisive. In such a situation, confusion reduces the measure of marginal
consumers, as more truly indifferent consumers end up perceiving one of the products as superior
than vice versa. As any individual firm can always force some confusion on the market (condition
(A2.2.2)), full education cannot be supported as an equilibrium outcome.
If, contradicting condition (A2.2.2), consumer education could be enforced unilaterally, then
part (i) of Theorem 2.1 could even be strengthened in that any SPE involves full education. Fur-
ther, there could be SPE without consumer confusion despite indecisive preferences. Specifically,
if, similar to Heidhues et al. (2016), each firm can perfectly educate all consumers by choosing
some marketing activity ae ∈ A i.e., εa = O if ae ∈ {a1, a2}, then full education (with both
firms choosing ae) is always an equilibrium outcome because neither firm can unilaterally affect
the distribution of perceived valuation differences. Such an education equilibrium, however, is
strictly dominated by any possible SPE with consumer confusion.
2.3.2 Maximal Confusion and Education
On intuitive grounds, one should expect that firms seek to confuse consumers as much (as little)
as possible if preferences are indecisive (polarized). In this section, we study this idea more
formally.
We will assume that the noise distributions {Γa}a∈A can be partially ordered in one of two
ways. The first order appeals to the familiar notion of a mean-preserving spread (MPS).10 The
second order is induced by a property which we call sidewise single-crossing (SSC): Let Γ,Γ′ be
two zero-symmetric distribution functions with supports [−ω, ω] and [−ω′, ω′], respectively, Γ is
either degenerate at zero or has a density function γ, and Γ′ has a density function γ′. We say
10Formally, for two random variables X and Y , Y is a MPS of X if Y has the same distribution as X+η, where
η 6= O and E[η|X] = 0. Intuitively, Y is a noisy version of X. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) show that if the
involved distribution functions have a uniformly bounded support, then the MPS ordering between distributions
is equivalent to the order induced by second-order stochastic dominance. Müller (1998) shows how to extend the
equivalence result to the case of an unbounded support.
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Figure 2.3: Examples of SSC orderings
that Γ′ is more dispersed than Γ in the sense of sidewise single-crossing, denoted by Γ′ SSC Γ,
if either (i) Γ is degenerate at zero, or (ii) ω′ ≥ ω and ∀e, e′ ∈ [0, ω′] with e′ > e,
γ(e)− γ′(e) ≥ 0 =⇒ γ′(e′)− γ(e′) > 0. (2.3)
In words, (2.3) requires that the two densities intersect only once in [−ω′, 0] and [0, ω′], respec-
tively; see Figure 2.3 for illustrations.
Assumption 2.3. A ⊂ R+ is compact, and εa = O if and only if a = 0. Moreover, one of the
following conditions holds:
(A2.3.1) ∀a,a′ ∈ A with a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′, Γa′ is an MPS of Γa.
(A2.3.2) ∀a,a′ ∈ A with a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′, Γa′ SSC Γa.
Provided that {0} ( A, Assumptions 2.3 implies Assumption 2.2.11 Moreover, consumer
confusion is maximal (minimal) in the MPS if both firms choose a¯ ≡ maxA (a ≡ minA). Our
second main result provides conditions under which such maximal/minimal consumer confusion
is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds.
(i) If there exists δ > 0 such that supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ],∀a ∈ A and either
(a) true preferences are strongly δ-indecisive and (A2.3.1) is satisfied, or
(b) true preferences are δ-indecisive and (A2.3.2) is satisfied,
then there exists a unique SPE. In equilibrium, consumer confusion is maximal.
(ii) If there exists δ > 0 such that supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ],∀a ∈ A and either
(a) true preferences are strongly δ-polarized and (A2.3.1) is satisfied, or
(b) true preferences are δ-polarized and (A2.3.2) is satisfied,
then there exists a unique SPE. In equilibrium, consumer confusion is minimal.
11This follows because i) ε0 = O and ii) εa 6= O whenever some firm chooses a > 0.
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The conditions (a) and (b) in parts (i) and (ii) of the theorem cannot be ranked according
to their generality. If the distributions {Γa}a∈A are ordered by the SSC criterion, they are also
ordered by the MPS criterion. The converse statement does not hold. However, we only need
indecisive or polarized tastes in the SSC case, while their strong counterparts are required in
the MPS case.12
Several examples of marketing technologies illustrate Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3. Suppose
that for every a 6= 0, εa follows the uniform distribution with support supp(γa) = [−ωa, ωa],
ωa > 0, so that an increase of ωa means more consumer confusion in the sense of a larger range
of possible opinions. Consider the special cases (i) ω(a1,a2) = a1 +a2, (ii) ω(a1,a2) = max{a1, a2},
and (iii) ω(a1,a2) = min{a1, a2}. In case (i), individual marketing activities have an independent
incremental effect on the overall level of confusion, while with (ii) the level of confusion depends
only on the firm that engages most in obfuscation. If 0 ∈ A, then case (i) is consistent with both
Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3. Case (ii) is consistent with Assumption 2.2, but violates Assumption
2.3. In case (iii), the firm with the lower level of obfuscation determines the prevailing level of
confusion. Thus, neither assumption holds.
2.3.3 Massive Confusion
Theorems 1.1 and 2.2 apply to situations where the scope for consumer confusion is constrained
by the degree of the existing taste differentiation, i.e., supp(γa) ⊂ supp(g0) ∀a ∈ A. In other
words, we have implicitly assumed that obfuscation can never convert consumers with the most
extreme true valuations in favor of one firm to the other. Our next result shows that if such
“massive” reversals in consumer opinions are possible, then firms may choose to obfuscate the
market even when preferences are polarized.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that conditions (A2.1.1) - (A2.1.3) hold, A is compact, and ∀a ∈ A,
εa is uniformly distributed on [−ωa, ωa], where ωa ≥ 0. Then, an SPE with maximal confusion
(ωa∗ = ω¯ ≡ maxa∈A ωa) exists if either (i) true preferences are indecisive on supp(g0), or (ii)
true preferences are polarized on supp(g0) and ω¯ is sufficiently large.
Thus, under the simplifying assumption of uniform noise distributions, we obtain clear re-
sults for the case of massive confusion: For indecisive consumers, the result that firms want to
obfuscate as much as possible generalizes, independently of ω¯, the maximal degree of possible
confusion. Even with polarized consumers, maximal obfuscation arises when it is possible to
confuse consumers sufficiently. Intuitively, when firms can induce arbitrarily large differences
in perceived valuations, the mass of indifferent consumers will eventually become negligible,
regardless of the true valuation distribution. As a result, firms always benefit from confusing
consumers if the scope for confusion is sufficiently large. This discussion suggests a reinterpre-
tation of the idea that obfuscation always arises in equilibrium with homogeneous good: In a
situation where true valuation differences are all zero, any confusion is massive, so firms benefit
from introducing it.
12The proof of Theorem 2.2 shows that Assumption 2.3 is sufficient but not necessary for our results. For
example, for the proof of the MPS case to go through, it suffices to assume that i) εa¯,aj is a MPS of εai,aj
∀ai, aj ∈ A with ai < a¯ and ii) εai,aj is a MPS of εa,aj ∀ai, aj ∈ A with ai > a. Therefore, the order on the
distributions {Γa}a∈A can be even more incomplete than what Assumption 2.3 requires.
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2.3.4 Welfare
In the homogeneous goods case, consumer confusion increases prices and therefore benefits firms
at the expense of consumers. In our setting, consumer confusion could, in principle, reduce
prices. However, whenever this would be the case (when preferences are polarized), firms avoid
obfuscating the market according to Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. In addition to the price effect,
confusion also reduces consumer surplus because some consumers buy the wrong good. This not
only has redistributive effects, but also reduces total surplus.
Taking the equilibrium marketing profile a∗ of the firms in the first stage as given, we can
compute the total expected welfare loss from mismatch as follows:
L =
∫ +∞
0
xΓa∗(−x)g0(x)dx+
∫ 0
−∞
(−x)(1− Γa∗(x))g0(−x)dx
= 2
∫ +∞
0
xΓa∗(−x)g0(x)dx, (2.4)
where the second equality uses the symmetry of Γa and g0. To understand the measure in
(2.4), note that if a consumer buys from the wrong firm, the welfare loss is her true valuation
difference |v2 − v1|. Without loss of generality, suppose that x = v2 − v1 > 0. Then, g0(x)
captures the likelihood of type x and Γa∗(−x) is the probability that type x buys from the
wrong firm. Clearly, the welfare loss is zero (i.e., L = 0) if and only if εa∗ is degenerate at zero.
In what follows, we shall focus on the case where εa∗ is uniformly distributed. The next result
shows that more confusion always leads to larger welfare loss, regardless of the shape of the true
preference distribution.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that εa∗ is uniformly distributed on [−ωa∗ , ωa∗ ], where ωa∗ > 0. The
expected welfare loss from mismatch is strictly increasing in ωa∗.
Intuitively, increasing obfuscation increases the chances that consumers buy from the wrong
firm. A more subtle question is how the size of the welfare loss depends on the distribution of
true preferences and, in particular, on whether it is indecisive or polarized. Equation 2.4 reflects
two competing intuitions. On the one hand, when confusion arises, chances are high that almost
indifferent consumers will buy the wrong product, and there are many such consumers when the
preference distribution is indecisive, contrary to when it is polarized. On the other hand, when
almost indifferent consumers buy from the wrong firm, the welfare loss is smaller than when
those with strong preferences do so. Thus, the net effect of preference polarization/indecisiveness
on welfare loss is not obvious in general. In the remainder of this section, we resolve this issue
for a concrete example.
Competition on the line We suppose that each consumer is characterized by a parameter
θ, which is drawn from a commonly known distribution H with support Θ = [−λ, λ], where
λ > 0. The true valuation of a type θ consumer for product i ∈ {1, 2} is vθi = µ − (xi − θ)2,
where µ > 0, and x1 = −λ, x2 = λ are the locations of the firms. We assume that H has the
symmetric density h(θ) = αθ2 +β on Θ, where α ∈
[
− 34λ3 , 32λ3
]
and β = 12λ − αλ
2
3 . H translates
into a distribution G of valuation differences, where G(x) = H( x4λ), ∀x ∈ R. If α > 0, the true
preferences are strongly polarized on the support of G, [−4λ2, 4λ2]. Conversely, if α < 0, the
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true preferences are strongly indecisive on [−4λ2, 4λ2]. Naturally, in this setting the parameter
α is a measure of preference polarization/indecisiveness, while λ is a measure of product/taste
differentiation.
We first show that the above canonical model can be covered by our analysis. The following
proposition is a direct application of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
Proposition 2.2. Consider the model with competition on the line. Suppose that α ≤ αˆ ≡
(6− 3√3)/4λ3, (A2.1.4) and (A2.1.5) hold, and supp(γa) ⊂ [−4λ2, 4λ2] ∀a ∈ A.
(i) If Assumption 2.2 also holds, then there exists (does not exist) an SPE without consumer
confusion if α > 0 (α < 0).
(ii) If Assumption 2.3 also holds and α 6= 0, then there exists a unique SPE. This SPE features
minimal (maximal) consumer confusion if α > 0 (α < 0).
The proof of Proposition 2.2 shows that the location distribution H, and thus also the
distribution G, is log-concave for α ≤ αˆ. This allows us to apply Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 The
result confirms the main insight of our paper: with differentiated goods, the firms’ incentives to
obfuscate the market crucially depends on the shape of the distribution of consumer preferences
and, in particular, whether it is polarized or indecisive.
Under the additional assumption that the noise resulting from the equilibrium marketing
profile a∗ is uniformly distributed, our last result in this section describes how the expected
welfare loss depends on α, the measure of polarization.
Proposition 2.3. Consider the model with competition on the line. Suppose that εa∗ is uni-
formly distributed on [−ωa∗ , ωa∗ ], where ωa∗ > 0. If ωa∗ < ωˆ ≡ 64λ2/15, then the expected
welfare loss is strictly decreasing in α. If ωa∗ > ωˆ, then the expected welfare loss is strictly
increasing in α.
Thus, if the maximal confusion is small (large) relative to product differentiation, the ex-
pected welfare loss always decreases (increases) as preferences become more polarized. A com-
plete welfare analysis must also identify the circumstances under which consumer confusion
arises in equilibrium. Under the conditions of Proposition 2.2, confusion only arises for inde-
cisive consumers (α < 0). There is no welfare loss with polarized consumers, as the firms do
not obfuscate the market. When the maximal degree of confusion is sufficiently large, however,
firms no longer want to maintain a transparent market even with polarized consumers (Theorem
2.3), so that Proposition 2.3 also applies.
2.3.5 Outside Options
In this section, we illustrate how the presence of binding outside options affects the analysis.
For simplicity, assume that the perceived valuations are given by
v˜1 =
m
2 +
υ
2 +
ε
2 , v˜2 =
m
2 −
υ
2 −
ε
2 ,
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where m > 0 is some constant, and υ ∈ [−1, 1] is drawn from some distribution G0.13 We now
suppose that the consumers have a reservation value u0 = 0, so that a consumer will only buy
from firm i if v˜i − pi ≥ max{v˜j − pj , 0}. We use pMa to denote the solution to the monopoly
problem
max
p≥0
ΠM (p) ≡ p (1−Ga(2p− 1)) .
Note that a unique solution of this maximization problem exists if Ga is log-concave on supp(ga).
The following extension of Lemma 2.1 characterizes the equilibria in the pricing stage.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. In the game with outside options, there
exists a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in every pricing subgame, and each firm
chooses the price
p∗a =

1
2ga(0) if ga(0) >
1
m ,
m
2 if ga(0) ∈
[
1
2m ,
1
m
]
,
pMa otherwise.
Thus, when the concentration of consumers around indifference is sufficiently high, everything
is as in the equilibrium without outside options. Competition for the indifferent consumers keeps
prices so low that everybody is served. Below a certain threshold concentration of indifferent
consumers, firms charge lower prices than without outside options (p = m/2), but the market
remains completely covered. Finally, for a very low concentration of indifferent consumers, firms
give up on these consumers and charge higher (monopoly) prices. Thus, with a binding outside
option and monopolistic pricing there is another source of inefficiency associated with confusion:
some consumers may not purchase at all though a transaction would be socially desirable.
To see that inefficient opt-outs can indeed arise an SPE outcome, consider a simple example
where m = 2, and G0 has a density function g0 with g0(x) = x+1 if −1 ≤ x ≤ 0, g0(x) = −x+1
if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and g0(x) = 0 otherwise (thus true preferences are strongly indecisive). Suppose
also that the set of marketing activities is given by A = {0, 1}, and εa is uniformly distributed
on [−2(a1 + a2), 2(a1 + a2)]. It is easy to verify that in this game there is a unique SPE where
both firms choose to obfuscate the market in the first stage (i.e., a∗ = (1, 1)), and then set
the monopoly price pMa∗ = 1.5 in the second stage. In this example, the presence of consumer
outside options does not alter the firms’ equilibrium choices of marketing activities, but it does
discipline the firms by forcing than to set a lower price (since pMa∗ < 12ga∗ (0) = 4). In equilibrium,
1
4 of the consumers stay out of the market even though max{v1, v2} ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ [−1, 1].
2.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss several aspects of our framework. In Section 2.4.1, we link our
approach to the treatment of demand rotations, as introduced by Johnson and Myatt (2006).
13As in the Hotelling example discussed in Section 2.3.4, we therefore assume that valuations are negatively
correlated; however, we now assume that the support is a straight line in R2.
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Section 2.4.2 discusses the firms’ marketing activities. Section 2.4.3 deals with default activities
and marketing costs.
2.4.1 Demand Rotations
At an abstract level, our paper asks whether competing firms benefit from changes in demand
that increase the (perceived) valuations of some consumers and decrease those of others. Johnson
and Myatt (2006) explore a related question for a monopolist. They suppose the firm can engage
in measures related to advertising, marketing or product design that result in a rotation of
the entire demand function (or, equivalently, the valuation distribution). A clockwise rotation
increases the distribution function below a threshold value, but reduces it above the threshold.
In particular, a rotation around the point corresponding to the median valuation takes away
mass from this point. In our setting, a clockwise rotation of the distribution G0 of valuation
differences around the point of indifference (v∆ = 0) would therefore always be desirable for
firms. In fact, it would be sufficient for rotation to occur locally. However, a key observation
of our paper is that obfuscation, i.e., adding noise to the distribution as in (2.1), does not
necessarily lead to a desired local rotation. When the preferences satisfy weak polarization, the
mass at zero increases under obfuscation, which is not consistent with a clockwise rotation of
the distribution. Therefore, while firms would want to induce a rotation of distribution, they
do not want to engage in obfuscation in this case.
In Johnson and Myatt (2006), the monopolist does not even necessarily want to induce a
clockwise rotation of the valuation distribution. Doing so is only desirable if the monopolist
follows a niche strategy according to which he only serves consumers with valuations above the
rotation point. When consumers are sufficiently homogeneous, the monopolist will instead follow
a mass market strategy, that is, he also serves consumers with valuations below the rotation
point. In this case, a rotation is undesirable because it necessitates a price reduction. The
difference in the role of rotations in Johnson and Myatt (2006) and our paper reflects the fact
that in a duopoly setting the distribution of valuation differences is relevant, rather than the
valuations themselves.
Contrary to Johnson and Myatt (2006), our focus is on demand changes resulting from
valuation distortions rather than changes in true valuations. As far as the positive analysis
(Theorems 1.1 - 2.3) is concerned, this difference is immaterial: All our results can, for instance,
be applied to changes in product design that change the true valuations from vi to v˜i, as long as
they are in the form of (2.1). The welfare analysis of Section 2.3.4, however, refers only to the
case that there is a conflict between true and perceived valuations, so that confused consumers
take wrong decisions.
2.4.2 Marketing Activities
We now explain in more detail what kind of marketing activities are consistent with our ap-
proach. Our analysis requires symmetry of the distributions Γa capturing the noise in valuation
differences. This assumption is consistent with activities that increase the relative valuations for
some consumers, but decrease them for others. These activities fall into two broad categories
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depending on whether they only affect the valuation for a firm’s own good or also the valuation
for the competitor’s product.
2.4.2.1 Confusion about a firm’s own good
The key restrictions of our framework captured in Condition (2.1) and Assumption 2.1 are
expressed in terms of distributions of valuation differences. As we show in more detail in the
appendix, these assumptions can be generated from a random utility model where the valuation
for each firm’s good consists of a noise term reflecting its marketing activities. In particular,
we consider a specification where the degree of noise reflects product complexity that results in
information overload.
A large literature in marketing has documented confusion resulting from information overload
(Kasabov, 2015; Walsh et al., 2007). Overload confusion arises because information recipients
fail to properly match their responses to stimuli once the overall stimulus volume passes a cer-
tain threshold (Miller, 1956). For instance, such stimuli can come from marketing messages
(Jacoby, 1977). Overload confusion occurs once consumers are “confronted with more product
information and alternatives than they can process in order to get to know, to compare and to
comprehend alternatives” (Walsh et al., 2007). The general consequences of information over-
load, surveyed by Eppler and Mengis (2004) across fields as diverse as accounting, organizational
science, marketing and consumer research, are unsystematic decision mistakes, a decreased deci-
sion accuracy, a lack of critical evaluation, a “failure to develop correct interpretations of various
facets of a product or service” (Turnbull et al., 2000), and ambiguous perceptions by consumers
(Solomon, 2014). Overload confusion is directly linked to the notion of product complexity in
marketing. There is a strong consensus in over 40 years of research on product complexity that
the number of attributes, functions or labels of a product contribute to the total complexity car-
ried on each product, and as such to the information volume to which the consumer is exposed
(Mützel and Kilian, 2016).
Product labels constitute a specific example of product attributes that may cause confusion.14
In the case of labels, the evidence indicates that not only the sheer number of labels, but also
their contents, are a source of consumer confusion. As an illustration, a two-year study by
the British Food Advisory Committee concluded that labels like “fresh”, “original” or “pure”,
which are frequently used to describe food products, result in consumer confusion. To quote
the principal policy advisor at the British Consumer Association: “Labels are all too often more
of a marketing gimmick than a way of providing meaningful information to help consumers
make. Confusion in the comparison of products due to food labels has also been experimentally
verified by Leek et al. (2015). Likewise, the “Nutrition facts label” introduced in the 1980’s in
the US, originally intended to allow consumers to make better informed food choices, has turned
out to be a source of consumer confusion. Moreover, overload confusion has been associated
with product packaging, arising for instance from small fonts or a dense writing style (Mitchell
14Langer et al. (2007) find that the number of eco-labels on yogurts is positively correlated with consumer
confusion, and Kuester and Buys (2009) find that increasing the number of describing attributes, increases con-
sumer confusion in case of jams. Complexity confusion has been found in computers, mobile phones, automobiles,
digital cameras, buildings or insurance policies. See Kasabov, 2015; Mützel and Kilian, 2016; Walsh et al., 2007
for surveys on complexity confusion.
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and Papavassiliou, 1999). Further, lengthy and complicated contracts involving “fine print” can
cause overload confusion. A typical example where complex contracts have caused consumer
confusion is the mobile phone market (Turnbull et al., 2000). In Appendix B.10, we also provide
a formulation that accounts for the possibility that certain combinations of features have stronger
effects on confusion than others.
2.4.2.2 Confusion about the market
The second broad category of marketing instruments consists of activities that not only affect
a firm’s own perceived valuation, but also the perceived valuation for the competitor’s good.
This is consistent with the view that complexity is a synthetic phenomenon of all marketing
messages interacting with each other, leading to a market level or “category complexity” Mützel
and Kilian (2016). This means that the chosen marketing activities (labels, ads, design aspects,
etc.) jointly shape consumer confusion. For instance, if one food brand uses the label “original”
while another brand uses “authentic”, the comparison of the two labels by consumers may cause
some confusion, which possibly could have been avoided if both firms were to coordinate on the
same label. In such cases, the noise in the valuation of one good is not independent of the noise
in the valuation of the other good. Then, it is more convenient to depict the confusion effects
directly in the valuation differences – which is perfectly in line with Condition (2.1).
Market confusion is also addressed in the work of Carlin (2009), Piccione and Spiegler (2012)
and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). These authors study homogeneous goods models where the
mutual choice of a “frame”, i.e., a way to present the price of the product, by two firms determines
whether or not a consumer can draw a product comparison. If such a comparison is made, the
consumer (correctly) chooses the cheaper product; if no comparison is made, the consumer picks
at random. With the framing interpretation, it is again not reasonable to impose a notion of
i.i.d. valuation shocks; instead we think of the realized frame as a consequence of an interaction
of the chosen marketing activities. For example, if a firm chooses to highlight a specific set of
attributes, the (comparative) evaluation of these attributes may depend on what attributes the
competitor has highlighted. Alternatively, disclosing some information about features of the
own product may affect the perception of the competitor, who tries to hide those features.
Spiegler (2014) considers a generalization of Piccione and Spiegler (2012), where two firms
simultaneously choose their marketing messages, which jointly determine the distribution of the
frames a single consumer could adopt. The adopted frame, in turn, determines the market
shares (choice probabilities) of each firm. Our model can be easily interpreted through the lens
of his setting by assuming that there is a set of possible frames. Any realized frame in this
set corresponds to a particular (deterministic) way how a given consumer evaluates the two
products, which can shift consumer perception in favor of one or the other alternative. The
precise frame adopted by the consumer after being exposed to marketing profile a is unknown
to the firms, but they know the probability distribution over the frames induced by a. Then
εa is the random variable that describes the effects of the various frames on the likelihood of
a given consumer to choose a certain option (given prices p1, p2). Our assumptions require
that, whatever marketing activities are chosen, the probabilities to obtain a favorable frame are
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symmetric from each firm’s perspective.15
2.4.3 Default Strategies and Marketing Costs
So far, we have implicitly assumed that marketing strategies differ only with respect to the
amount of noise they induce. We now address two further, closely related sources of heterogene-
ity. First, there could be a default marketing strategy a ∈ A which corresponds to “inactivity".
Second, there could be heterogeneous marketing costs. As a normalization, it is useful to assume
a firm can implement the default marketing activity with no cost. In principle, the default could
be a = 0, and the interpretation is that if a firm does “nothing”, perceived and true valuations
coincide. It would then be natural to further assume that the cost function is increasing in
obfuscation for an order satisfying (A2.3.1) or (A2.3.2). Alternatively, there could just as well
be some pre-existing confusion, which will remain unresolved unless the firms engage in costly
education activities. In this case, the default satisfies a 6= 0. Assuming that larger deviations
from the default are more costly would be consistent with a cost function that is decreasing in
obfuscation (if the default corresponds to maximal confusion) or non-monotone (if the default
corresponds to an interior level of confusion).
In the presence of default activities and pre-existing confusion, Theorems 2.2 apply directly
if marketing costs are negligible: With indecisive tastes, firms still choose marketing activities
that induce maximal confusion; with polarized tastes, they strive to eliminate any confusion.
With marketing costs, the analysis would change in two related ways. First, extreme marketing
profiles as predicted by Theorem 2.2 would no longer arise if they are too costly for the firms.
Second, there would be a potential conflict of interest between the firms who would have to
coordinate on who engages in more costly marketing activities. As a result, even if obfuscation
(or education) can increase joint profits, it may not necessarily arise in equilibrium.
2.5 Competition for Voters
The ideas of our model can be applied to other types of competitive interactions. We illustrate
this for the case of competition for voters. This involves extending our formal apparatus to deal
with contests.
We consider a two-stage model where candidates i ∈ {1, 2} compete for voter k by first
choosing the clarity of their platform and then engaging in costly activities to persuade voters.
Paralleling the set-up of Section 2.2, we assume there is a population of voters that can be
described by a joint valuation distribution F0 (v1, v2) of idiosyncratic “baseline valuations” for
the politicians. However, we assume that politicians can influence the perceived valuations of
15In Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Spiegler (2014), a property called Weighted Regularity (WR) plays a
critical role for the equilibrium analysis. WR means that each firm can always choose her marketing messages,
possibly by randomization, such that it can unilaterally enforce a certain fixed probability distribution over the
frames the consumer can adopt, independent of the other firm’s marketing choices. WR may or may not be
satisfied under the assumptions imposed on our model: Suppose A = {0, 1}. Let µa denote the probability
measure induced by a ∈ {0, 1}2. If µ(1,0) = µ(0,1) = µ(1,1) and µ(0,0) 6= µ(1,1), meaning that there can only be two
effective “confusion states”, then WR must hold. By contrast, if µ(1,0) = µ(0,1) but µ(1,1) 6= µ(0,0) 6= µ(1,0), such
that there are three confusion states, e.g., because marketing activities are ranked in the sense of second-order
stochastic dominance, then WR generally fails. Put differently, WR is not critical for our equilibrium analysis.
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voters in two ways. In the first stage, they choose to present their political platforms more or less
clearly: A candidate can use mixed messages that can be interpreted positively or negatively
by any recipient, leading to a noisy picture of the candidate, whereby some voters get a too
positive impression of the candidate’s value for them and others get a too negative impression.
We model this by assuming that candidate i can choose from a set of platform descriptions
Ai which are characterized by additive noise distributions Γa distorting the underlying baseline
valuations and generating perceived baseline valuations v˜i. We maintain the same assumptions
on G0 and Γa as imposed in Assumption 2.1 for the oligopoly model.
However, we now also assume that, once the perceived baseline valuations are determined,
the candidates can engage in costly effort si ∈ R+ to convince voters to vote for them, with an
effort cost function c : R+ → R+ satisfying c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, and c(0) = c′(0) = 0. As a result of
exerting effort, the perceived utility of a voter from candidate i becomes
u˜i = v˜i + si. (2.5)
The effort cost si allows for two different interpretations. First, it is well known that, e.g.,
a strong media presence of a candidate can persuade voters to favor the candidate. In this
interpretation, a persuasion effort of si is associated with advertising expenditure c(si) which,
like in an all-pay auction, the politician needs to pay, no matter whether she is successful or
not. Second, si could correspond to a commitment to a policy which the candidate needs to
fulfil should she be elected. This commitment comes at a cost c(si) which only needs to be paid
in case of success: We think of this cost as reflecting the reduction in credibility coming from
an inability to live up to the expectations generated by the commitments. The politician could
be concerned about this loss of credibility because of intrinsic feelings of shame from being
perceived as dishonest or because the inability to deliver will impede the election chances in
future elections.
In both cases, the probability that candidate i wins is
Pr(v˜i∆ ≤ si∆ + εa) =
∫
G0(s∆ + e)γa(e)de, (2.6)
where v˜i∆ ≡ v˜j − v˜i and si∆ = si − sj is
We normalize the payoff of the candidate from winning to 1, which is without loss of generality
for our purpose. Candidate i’s payoff in the advertising case is
Πi(s1, s2;a) = Pr(v˜i∆ ≤ si∆ + εa)− c(si)
and in the commitment case
Πi(s1, s2;a) = Pr(v˜i∆ ≤ si∆ + εa))(1− c(si)).
The commitment case is essentially isomorphic to the model of Section 2.2. In particular, a
higher effort in the second stage has an analogous effect as a lower price in the previous model:
It increases the chances of winning, but it is costly only in case of success.16 By contrast, the
16Similarly a price reduction in the original model increases demand, but results in a cost only in those cases
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second stage of the advertising example is a contest: The candidate incurs the advertising cost
no matter whether she wins the election or not.
In spite of these differences, the intuition from Theorem 2.1 applies in both cases. As stated
in Proposition B.1 in the appendix, voter preferences fully determine whether or not candidates
engage in (small) obfuscation: Candidates will only use obfuscation when preferences are in-
decisive rather than polarized. In particular, ex ante indecisive preferences provide a breeding
ground for voter confusion. With ex-ante indecisive preferences, both candidates are forced to
choose high levels of commitments in order to win the campaign if there is no confusion, be-
cause small differences in commitments have a strong effect on the voter shares. With obfuscated
campaigns, the perception of commitments (of their differences) becomes noisy, which reduces
the measure of perceptually indecisive consumers and thereby allows candidates to reduce their
commitments.
It is useful to think more about the nature of the “baseline preferences” and the sources of
indecisiveness. In reality, voters form judgments about policy platforms under potentially large
uncertainty about their consequences. Even if candidates describe their position in the clearest
possible way, this uncertainty will not be resolved. For instance, the effects of a politician’s
approach to climate policy are subject to scientific uncertainty as well as uncertainty about the
strategies of other countries. We should therefore think of the baseline valuations as reflecting
the valuation that a voter puts on a candidate when being clearly informed about the platform
– but this valuation leaves large scope for uncertainty about the true effects of different policies
if implemented. One reason for indecisiveness may then be that this uncertainty is so large
that, absent obfuscation strategies, many voters will be unsure whom to vote for. This does not
reflect indifference about policy platforms, but uncertainty about the relation between candidate
platforms and outcomes. In such a situation, our model then predicts polarizing obfuscation
strategies as a means to overcome voter indifference.17
2.6 Relation to the Literature
Our paper belongs to the literature on competition with boundedly rational consumers.18 The
most distinctive feature of our contribution is that we treat the case of heterogeneous preferences,
where the incentives for confusing consumers are less immediate than for homogeneous goods.
Building on the intuition of Scitovsky (1950), several authors have argued that producers
of homogeneous goods can escape the Bertrand trap if they manage to mislead, deceive or
confuse consumers. For example, firms may present prices in such a way that comparison
becomes difficult (Carlin, 2009; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2013; Piccione and Spiegler, 2012). Hence,
where a consumer buys the good.
17In principle, this idea is applicable to the oligopoly context as well. For instance, even when producers of
health food describe the contents in a perfectly transparent fashion, there can be irreducible uncertainty about
the long-term health effects, reflecting a lack of knowledge at the firm level. Then consumers may be indecisive
because even with the best possible information they simply cannot tell which good serves them better.
18A peripherally related literature going back to Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1986b) asks under which conditions firms want to disclose product information to
consumers who otherwise only have stochastic information about quality, assuming (unlike we do) that the
consumers are sufficiently sophisticated to use Bayesian updating to interpret the disclosure decisions of firms.
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consumers may sometimes choose from high-price firms even if better offers are available. Firms
exploit this by playing mixed-strategy equilibria in which expected profits are positive. Several
authors have shown how firms can benefit if consumers perceive homogeneous goods as better
than they really are. For instance, in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) firms hide add-on costs
of products, so that naïve consumers ignore these costs in their purchasing decisions. The
authors show how firms and sophisticated consumers can benefit from the presence of naïve
consumers. Heidhues et al. (2016) establish that fooling naïve consumers with hidden fees
becomes particularly profitable for socially wasteful products. On a related note, Spiegler (2006)
shows how firms producing valueless services can benefit if consumers apply simple sampling
procedures to evaluate the services. In our framework, obfuscation does not necessarily bias
consumer valuation upwards. Thus, firms cannot be systematically fooled.19 Nevertheless, firms
may still benefit from consumer confusion. In fact, with indecisive preferences, firms may want
to obfuscate the market even if it causes a decrease of expected (absolute) consumer valuations.20
More broadly, our paper sheds light on the advertising literature. First, this literature deals
with the role of advertising that is informative about “the existence, prices and characteristics
of goods” (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). We can think of our model as capturing the choice be-
tween relatively informative advertising (little or no obfuscation) and uninformative advertising
(more obfuscation); thus informative advertising reduces the noise in perception of the relative
product valuations. Our analysis thus shows that information about product values may or
may not increase prices, contrary to the effects of information about product existence, which
typically reduces prices by increasing competition (Bagwell, 2007).
The paper can also be put into the perspective of persuasive advertising. This strand of the
advertising literature considers advertising activities that firms use to increase the willingness to
pay for their product or, similarly, shift the taste distributions in their favor (see, e.g., Dixit and
Norman, 1978; Von der Fehr and Stevik, 1998). The literature argues that games of persuasive
advertising have the structure of a prisoners’ dilemma: Firms engage in costly advertising races,
which, in equilibrium, do not affect prices and gross profits. Contrary to the bulk of this
literature, the marketing activities in our model can be interpreted as activities that persuade
some consumers at the cost of alienating others.21 At first glance, it would appear that such
activities are less attractive to firms than persuasive advertising, since they do not shift demand
systematically in the direction of a firm. Our equilibrium analysis shows, however, that this is
not the case: Firms either refrain from such advertising measures (with polarized preferences)
or they use the measures to soften competition – under no circumstances do they end up in the
a standard prisoners’ dilemma.
Many papers in the literature have worked with the assumption that consumers differ with
respect to their degrees of sophistication, distinguishing between a group of perfectly rational
consumers and a group of boundedly rational or cognitively constrained ones. The relative size
of these groups is usually a central parameter in this literature (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson, 2006;
19Spiegler (2017) asks when decision-makers can be fooled if they hold a misspecified causal model. He defines
“fooling” in terms of the expected outcome or prediction from the mispecified model relative to the correct model.
20While we assume that obfuscation leaves expected valuation differences unaffected, there is no such statement
for expected valuations.
21As an example, consider the cold-calls of tele-marketing agents (see Schumacher and Thysen, 2017).
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Heidhues et al., 2016). In our setting, one can think of the noise distribution as capturing the
degree of sophistication in the population in a continuous rather than in a discrete fashion:
For completely sophisticated consumers, the perceived valuation differences are equal to zero;
the more naive a consumer is, the greater the difference between perceived and actual valua-
tions. Our assumptions on the noise distribution can thus be interpreted as assumptions on the
distribution of consumer sophistication.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze firm-driven consumer confusion when consumers differ in their opinions
about the values of existing alternatives. We find that the overall dispersion of consumer tastes
has decisive implications for the propensity of firms to confuse or educate consumers and for
the subsequent price competition. If undecided consumers are relatively common, firms benefits
from obfuscating the market, because it results in more consumers conceiving one product
as better than the other. This allows the firms to increase its price without losing too much
demand. Consumers can be harmed in up to three ways by such obfuscation: they may purchase
less-matched product, pay higher prices, or forego purchases that would be socially efficient.
With a polarized dispersion of tastes, we obtain the opposite result that consumer confusion
is harmful for firms. In this case, firms seek to increase market transparency by educating
confused consumers, e.g., by providing qualified information and guidance that helps consumers
understand the offered alternatives in the market.
Finally, no matter what the shape of the true preference distribution is, obfuscation tends
to be beneficial for firms and harmful for consumers if confusion becomes so strong that it
dominates true preference differences.
In sum, our results suggest that research on market transparency and confusion cannot be
agnostic about the nature of the existing dispersion of opinions, as this interacts non-trivially
with the firms’ incentives to influence the effective perception of consumers.
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3 Voting with Public Information1
3.1 Introduction
A common argument for voting mechanisms is that they help aggregate the information that
agents in a committee privately hold, and thus lead to better decisions compared to the case
of a single decision-maker. Indeed, in a setting of collective decision-making where agents have
purely common interests, the celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) suggests that the
simple majority rule can lead to the first-best outcome if agents truthfully convey their private
information through their votes (Condorcet, [1785], 1994). However, Kawamura and Vlaseros
(2017) (henceforth KV) make the interesting observation that, as long as there exists a public
signal that can be commonly observed by all agents and that is superior to each of their private
signals, a vote-your-private-information strategy profile will not constitute an equilibrium under
the simple majority rule, even though this would have been the case if the public signal were
absent. What’s worse, the presence of public information opens the possibility for agents to
coordinate on an equilibrium in which everyone just votes according to whatever the public signal
suggests. Clearly, in such an equilibrium, the private information of the committee members is
completely disregarded. This can be very inefficient since public information is rarely perfect and
the total private information possessed by the committee is often more valuable in determining
the optimal collective decision. Experimentally, KV find that a large proportion of subjects in
the laboratory behave quite consistently with what the inefficient equilibrium would predict.
Consequently, the outcome of the collective decision almost always coincides with that in the
inefficient equilibrium.
This observation is highly relevant, because it should be clear that the access to both private
and public information for the voters is the rule rather than the exception: in business, members
of the board of directors receive (or even ask) advice from the advisory board of the company; in a
court, an expert witness states his/her testimony in front of all members of the jury; the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, which has only seven members, often invites
renowned scholars in the relevant fields to give short presentations when important decisions
that affect the well-being of more than 1.3 billion people are needed to be made. If in the end
only the public information counts, why should we bother to use the voting mechanism in the
first place? This issue is even more alarming if we take into account that in reality, the party
that provides the relevant public information is often strategic and self-interested as well.
With these practical concerns in mind, we first take KV’s observation one step further in
this paper. We study the effect of public information in a richer setting where agents have both
common and conflicting interests: while agents share the common goal of making a collective
1A version of this paper is published as Liu, S. (2019): “Voting with Public Information,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 113, 694-719.
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decision that will match the state, they may have different payoffs from the different types of
decision errors that could occur. We show that the presence of public information can have
a profound impact on the agents’ voting behavior. In particular, it significantly limits the
existence of the informative voting equilibrium, in which every agent simply casts her vote in
accordance with her private information: If the public information is superior to each agent’s
private information and the voting threshold is fixed (which is the case for the simple majority
rule), the informative voting equilibrium does not exist for any preference profile of the agents.2
To make things worse, the presence of public information introduces the intuitive but inefficient
obedient voting equilibrium, which robustly exists under different voting rules. In the obedient
voting equilibrium, agents always support the alternative suggested by the public information
and, hence, the public information is the only determinant of the final decision outcome. We
later show that a self-interested party who controls the provision of public information may
exploit its influential effect by strategically disclosing (withholding) good (bad) news about his
favored alternative.
The inefficient outcome of the obedient voting equilibrium echos the common concern that
public information, especially expert opinions, may have excessive influence on decision mak-
ing.3 In theory, if agents are sophisticated enough to coordinate on equilibria that entail mixed
and/or asymmetric strategy profiles, then the committee’s decision may still incorporate both
the private and the public information. However, as we argue in Section 3.4.1, the concern of
public information being detrimental should be far from being resolved by this theoretical pos-
sibility. In particular, by extending the baseline model and considering more generally how the
provision of public information introduces correlation between the signals privately observed by
the agents, we are able to show that informational inefficiency can persist even in large elections,
no matter how sophisticated the equilibria played by the agents are.
We then study the design of optimal voting mechanisms in environments with public in-
formation. We first introduce a class of more flexible voting rules that we call the contingent
k-voting rules. Under a contingent k-voting rule, the number of votes required for the committee
to select an alternative will depend on the content of the public information: For example, if
a job candidate is supported by an exceptionally strong recommendation letter, the committee
may consider requiring less votes to approve the hire of this candidate. We show that, if agents’
preferences satisfy a (mild) no-indifference condition, then for any ex post incentive compatible
direct mechanism that is optimal there exists an equivalent contingent k-voting rule. Specifi-
cally, by sustaining informative voting as an equilibrium (or implementing informative voting),
the equivalent contingent k-voting rule achieves the same informational efficiency as the optimal
ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. Therefore, in the search for optimal mechanisms it is
without loss to focus on contingent k-voting rules that can implement informative voting.
A contingent k-voting rule incorporates the public information by letting its voting threshold
2Even if the public information is less accurate than the private information, the set of preference profiles that
allow for informative voting under some voting rule with a fixed threshold is strictly smaller than it would be
in the absence of the public information. For example, if the public information is just slightly less precise than
each agent’s private information, under the simple majority rule the informative voting equilibrium exists only if
all agents are sufficiently unbiased ex ante (see Corollary 3.2).
3For instance, because of the concern that their testimonies will have too much influence upon the jury, in the
US court rules are set to prevent expert witnesses from “usurping the province of the jury” (Tanay, 2010).
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be contingent on the realization of the public signal. It also incorporates the private information
of the agents if it is responsive, which requires that the agents’ votes can always make a difference
on the final decision, regardless of the realization of the public signal. We show that it is
often optimal to use a responsive contingent k-voting rule to implement informative voting.
Moreover, the informative voting equilibria sustained by the responsive contingent k-voting rules
are asymptotically efficient, in the sense that the ex ante probability of the collective decision
being matched to the state becomes arbitrary close to 1 as the size of the committee increases.
In other words, we obtain a version of the CJT in a voting environment with both private and
public information.
Within a setting where agents have purely common interests, which is mostly studied in the
literature, we demonstrate that the first-best informational efficiency can always be achieved
by using a specific contingent k-voting rule, the contingent majority rule, under which the
informative voting equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. In particular, we show that given all the
information that is available to the committee, the probability of the collective decision being
matched to the state is maximized in the informative voting equilibrium under the contingent
majority rule. In other words, the contingent majority rule aggregates both the private and the
public information efficiently.
To strengthen the applicability of our results, we further introduce a simple two-stage vot-
ing mechanism that can equivalently implement the informative voting equilibrium under the
contingent k-voting rules. In the first stage of this voting mechanism, agents vote to select
the voting threshold that will be used. In the second stage, they proceed to vote about which
collective decision to take by using the voting rule that they agreed on. We argue that this
two-stage voting mechanism is practically appealing because its procedure is deterministic and
independent of the informational details of the environment.
Finally, we show, perhaps to one’s surprise, that using voting procedures that incorporate
the public information can actually have additional advantages when there is a concern for
strategic disclosure of public information. Intuitively, the use of the contingent k-voting rules or
the above two-stage voting mechanism makes it possible for the agents to rationally commit to
informative voting, independent of the disclosure policy of the public information. Thus, even
a self-interested party may find it optimal to always publicly communicate the information it
receives to the agents, given that its message will not directly affect the agents’ voting behavior
but will indirectly increase the accuracy of the collective decision.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. Section 3.3 presents
the model. In Section 3.4 we show how the presence of public information can lead to inefficient
information aggregation. We study in Section 3.5 the design of optimal voting mechanisms with
public information. In Section 3.6, we analyze settings where the provision of public informa-
tion is strategically determined by a self-interested information controller. Finally, Section 3.7
concludes. All proofs are contained in Appendix C.
3.2 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature on strategic voting starting with the seminal paper of Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996). Many of the papers in this literature study how informational efficiency
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of various voting mechanisms is affected by the agents’ strategic behavior (see, e.g., Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997) and Duggan and Martinelli (2001) on simultaneous voting rules, and
Dekel and Piccione (2000) on sequential voting rules). Among all of them, the most closely
related paper besides KV is actually Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). Specifically, they notice
that whenever the voters do not have an extremely biased prior, the informative voting equi-
librium will exist under some simultaneous voting rule with a fixed voting threshold value (p.
38, Lemma 2). However, our paper shows that if we explicitly take into account how agents’
prior is shaped by public information, then the simultaneous voting rules commonly used in
practice may no longer suffice to incentivize agents to truthfully reveal their private informa-
tion via their votes. As another connection to our paper, Section 2 of Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996) extends their analysis to a case where agents have access to both private and (exogenous)
public information. They conclude that in such a setting, sincere voting, which is equivalent to
obedient voting in our model whenever the public information is more precise than each agent’s
private information, cannot be both informative and rational (p. 42, Theorem 3). In contrast,
we address the related but distinct question of whether informative voting can be rational under
some simultaneous voting rule when it is not required to be sincere. Our model and focus are
also quite different from the few other papers that study the effect of public information in a
voting environment (e.g., Gersbach, 2000; Tanner, 2014; Taylor and Yildirim, 2010).
Several papers study the effect of pre-voting deliberation (e.g., Austen-Smith and Feddersen,
2006; Coughlan, 2000; Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). In these models, agents can communicate their
private information before the vote takes place, thus public information endogenously arises. Our
model differs from them in two main aspects. First, in the models with deliberation, conflicts
between an agent’s private information and the public information usually do not matter because
the former has already been incorporated in the latter. In our model, however, such conflicts
have a direct and profound effect on agents’ provision of private information, which can lead
to a severe loss of informational efficiency. Second, unlike in the obedient voting equilibrium in
the current paper, in these models it is actually socially efficient for the agents to always follow
the public information, conditional on their private information being credibly revealed in the
deliberation stage.4
Finally, there is a third strand of literature on committee design and optimal voting rules
with strategic agents.5 For example, Persico (2004) studies the optimal size and threshold value
for simultaneous voting rules when agents’ private information is endogenous. Subsequently,
Gershkov and Szentes (2009) show that when information is costly, the optimal direct mechanism
can actually be implemented by a random, sequential reporting/voting scheme, which suggests
in general that the use of more flexible voting rules can be welfare-enhancing. This insight is also
shared by Gersbach (2004, 2009, 2017), who shows that allowing the voting rule to depend on the
4Buechel and Mechtenberg (2018) is a recent exception that shows that pre-voting communication can actually
impede efficient information aggregation within a common-interest setting. They consider a network model in
which agents are heterogeneously informed, and each informed agent can privately make a voting recommendation
to the uninformed agents that are connected to her. They show that if the network structure is too centralized
around a few informed agents, majority voting may lead to inefficient information aggregation. Compared to their
paper, we focus on the public communication between a (strategic or non-strategic) information controller and a
group of homogeneously informed agents.
5See Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2014) for the design of optimal collective decision
rules with non-strategic agents.
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proposal to be determined may yield efficient outcomes for classic social choice problems such
as provision of public projects and division of limited resources among agents. More recently,
Gershkov et al. (2017) show that in an environment where agents have single-crossing preferences,
a successive voting rule with a descending threshold achieves the highest utilitarian efficiency
among all anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms. Our
paper contributes to this literature by showing that when relevant public information is salient
in the strategic environment being considered, the voting rules should also be more carefully
and flexibly designed in order to achieve a more efficient outcome.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Players, actions and payoffs
Consider a committee of n members (agents) indexed by i ∈ I ≡ {1, ..., n}. We assume n is
odd and n ≥ 3. Agents need to make a collective decision d ∈ D ≡ {0, 1} over a binary set
of alternatives. For concreteness, one could think of a setting in which a board of directors is
choosing between two business proposals.
Each agent can cast a vote to support one of the alternatives. We denote vi = 1 if agent
i votes in favor of the decision d = 1, and vi = 0 otherwise. A voting profile of the agents is
denoted by v = (v1, ..., vn) ∈ V ≡ {0, 1}n. For the moment, we restrict our attention to a class
of collective decision rules gk : V → D called k-voting rules, which are arguably most commonly
used in practice. Formally, if we set the alternative associated with d = 0 as the default option,
under the voting rule gk the alternative associated with d = 1 will be chosen if and only if there
are at least k ∈ {1, .., n} votes in favor of it:
gk(v) =
1 if
∑n
i=1 vi ≥ k,
0 otherwise.
Each k-voting rule is uniquely characterized by its threshold value k. In particular, the simple
majority rule is given by k = (n+ 1)/2.
The state of the world θ is drawn from a binary set Θ ≡ {0, 1} with equal probability.6 In the
context of the board of directors and business proposals, one could think of θ as the uncertain
(relative) quality of the two proposals, where θ = 1 means the proposal associated with d = 1
is of higher prospective revenue, while the other is better if θ = 0. We assume agent i’s utility
function ui : D × Θ → R takes the following form (see also Coughlan, 2000; Iaryczower and
6The assumptions that the prior probability of θ is uniform and that the accuracy of the agents’ private signals
is state-independent (see Section 3.3.2) are mainly made for the convenience of exposition. Most of our analysis
can be straightforwardly extended beyond the current setting. See, for example, how we prove Proposition 3.1 in
Section 3.4 more generally in Appendix C without the above two assumptions.
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Shum, 2012; Kojima and Takagi, 2010):
ui(d, θ) =

0 if d = θ,
−qi if d = 1, θ = 0,
−(1− qi) if d = 0, θ = 1,
where qi ∈ [0, 1]. In words, we assume the agents in the committee have a common interest in
matching the collective decision to the state (i.e., choosing the proposal of higher quality), and we
normalize the payoff of successfully choosing d = θ to zero. However, we allow the agents’ payoffs
to differ when committing different types of decision errors. We also allow these differences to
be heterogeneous across agents. Each agent’s utility function is uniquely characterized by the
parameter qi, and the preference profile q = (qi)i∈I is common knowledge among the agents.
We interpret qi as a measure of how biased agent i is towards the default option ex ante: If
qi = 1/2, agent i is unbiased and indifferent between the two alternatives; if qi < 1/2, agent i
is inclined to choose d = 1; similarly, qi > 1/2 implies that agent i would prefer d = 0 if there
is no further information to be revealed. In addition, if qi 6= qj , the two agents i and j may
strictly prefer different alternatives even when they have exactly the same information. Hence,
we interpret qi 6= qj as a potential conflict of interest between the two agents. We refer to the
case where qi = 1/2 ∀i ∈ I as the setting where agents have purely common interests.
Note that, given the above specification of payoffs, if agent i assigns a posterior probability
pi ∈ [0, 1] to the event θ = 1, she would prefer d = 1 over d = 0 if and only if pi ≥ qi, that is,
whenever the evidence of the state being 1 is sufficiently strong.
3.3.2 Information structure and timing
Before casting their votes, each agent privately receives an i.i.d. signal si ∈ Si ≡ {0, 1}, which
is drawn according to the conditional probability distribution Pr(si = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(si =
0|θ = 0) = α ∈ (1/2, 1). We denote s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S ≡ Πni=1Si as the agents’ (private)
signal profile. In addition to their private signals, all agents commonly observe a public signal
sp ∈ Sp ≡ {0, 1}, which is independently drawn from the conditional probability distribution
Pr(sp = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(sp = 0|θ = 0) = β ∈ [1/2, 1). We choose to model public information
as an additional conditionally independent signal mainly because it has a clear interpretation,
especially when considering committees of moderate sizes: In the context of the board of directors
and business proposals, for example, one can think of the public signal as the opinion expressed
by the advisory board to all directors before the vote takes place. If β > α, we can further
interpret the public signal as the advice provided to the committee by some external expert.
In addition, this modeling assumption allows us to conveniently extend our analysis to settings
where the disclosure of public information is strategically determined by a biased party (see
Section 3.6). We will discuss an alternative way to model public information when considering
large elections in Section 3.4.1.
For later use, we define a measure of (relative) informativeness of the public signal:
r ≡ ln β − ln(1− β)lnα− ln(1− α) . (3.1)
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For given α and β the value of r is uniquely determined, and we will say that the public signal
is r-times as informative as a private signal. For example, if α = 0.6, then β = 0.55, 0.69, 0.77
correspond to the cases where the public signal is 0.5-, 2- and 3-times as informative as a private
signal, respectively. Intuitively, the measure r tells us how many private signals of opposite
realization would counter-balance the informational effect of the public signal.
The timing of the voting game is as follows. First, nature draws θ. After that, each agent
observes her private signal and, in addition, the public signal. Agents then cast their votes,
and the collective decision d is determined according to the voting profile and the voting rule.
Finally, the state is revealed and agents collect their payoffs.
3.3.3 Strategies and equilibrium
In the voting game, a strategy of agent i is a mapping σi : Si × Sp −→ [0, 1], where σi(si, sp)
denotes the probability that agent i will vote vi = 1 when observing (si, sp). We will frequently
refer to the following two types of (pure) voting strategies (see also KV):
Definition 3.1. A strategy is informative if σi(si, sp) = si, ∀si ∈ Si, sp ∈ Sp.
Definition 3.2. A strategy is obedient if σi(si, sp) = sp, ∀si ∈ Si, sp ∈ Sp.
The informative strategy is interesting because it is simple and allows the agent to fully con-
vey her private information via her vote. In addition, as we will show in Section 5, the outcomes
of the optimal voting mechanisms with public information can be indirectly implemented by
voting procedures that incentivize the agents to play the informative strategy. The obedient
strategy is interesting because it is also simple and it can be very appealing in a context where
the public signal is considered as a recommendation from someone supposed to be an expert
of the issue. The downside of this “follow-the-expert" strategy is that it entirely disregards the
agent’s private information, which is also informative about the state.7
We call a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all agents play the informative strategy an infor-
mative voting equilibrium (IVE). Similarly, a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all agents play
the obedient strategy will be called an obedient voting equilibrium (OVE). For a given prefer-
ence profile q, if there exists a k-voting rule under which the IVE exists, we say that such a
preference profile allows for the existence of the informative voting equilibrium or simply allows
for informative voting.
In the absence of public information, if qi ∈ [1−α, α] ∀i ∈ I, it is easy to check that under the
simple majority rule the IVE exists and the CJT holds. If all agents are highly biased towards one
of the alternatives, we may still be able to sustain informative voting as an equilibrium by using
a threshold value different from (n+1)/2. For example, if qi ∈ [α, α3/(α3 +(1−α)3)] ∀i ∈ I, one
can show that the IVE still exists in a voting game with the super-majority rule k = (n+ 3)/2,
and the CJT continues to hold as n becomes sufficiently large (Laslier and Weibull, 2013). In
fact, in all the above-mentioned cases the informative voting strategy profile also constitutes an
ex post Nash equilibrium (Crémer and McLean, 1985), since no agent would ever have a strict
7Nevertheless, provided it exists, the equilibrium in which all agents play the obedient strategy maximizes the
predicted accuracy of the collective decision among all symmetric equilibria in which the agents use a private-
information-independent voting strategy (i.e., σi(0, sp) = σi(1, sp) ∀sp ∈ Sp).
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incentive to revise her vote even if she could observe the whole voting profile. However, as
shown in the next section, the set of preferences that allow for informative voting may shrink
drastically in the presence of public information.
3.4 Inefficient Information Aggregation
To see how the presence of a public signal could affect the equilibrium outcome of the voting
game, we first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the informative
voting equilibrium under any given k-voting rule:
Proposition 3.1. Given a k-voting rule, the informative voting equilibrium exists if and only
if
∀i ∈ I, qi ∈
 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n−2 1−β
β
,
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n β
1−β
 . (3.2)
In Appendix C, we prove a more general version of Proposition 3.1 which allows the prior
probability of the state to be non-uniform and the accuracy of the private signals to be state-
dependent. By doing so, we generalize a similar result obtained by Wit (1998) for common-
interest voting games with majority rule.
To understand Proposition 3.1, first note that under a given k-voting rule, an agent is pivotal
only when there are exactly k−1 other agents who vote in favor of the decision d = 1, while the
remaining n− k agents choose to support the decision d = 0. Second, if agent i prefers to vote
according to her private signal even when it conflicts with the public signal, she will also prefer
to do so when the two signals agree. Assuming all other agents j 6= i follow the informative
voting strategy, for a given k-voting rule, the left (right) endpoint of the interval in (3.2) is
the posterior probability that a Bayesian agent i will assign to the event θ = 1 conditional on
si = 0, sp = 1 (si = 1, sp = 0) and being pivotal. Since a rational agent cares only about
the cases in which she is decisive about the final voting outcome, we can conclude that all qi
lying between the above two posterior probabilities is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of the informative voting equilibrium under the given k-voting rule.
KV observe that if the public signal is more accurate than each of the private signals (β > α),
informative voting for agents who have purely common interests cannot constitute an equilibrium
under the majority rule. The next two corollaries, which follow Proposition 3.1 immediately,
generalize this important observation to arbitrary precision of the public signal, the whole class
of k-voting rules, and a much larger set of preferences.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose β > α. For any threshold value k and any preference profile (qi)i∈I ,
the informative voting equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose β ≤ α. The informative voting equilibrium does not exist under
any k-voting rule if there exist i, j ∈ {1, .., n} such that qi < 1/
(
1 + α1−α
1−β
β
)
and qj >
1/
(
1 + 1−αα
β
1−β
)
.
In words, Corollary 3.1 confirms that whenever the public signal is strictly more precise
than each of the private signals, it is impossible to obtain the informative voting equilibrium
Chapter 3 57
under any k-voting rule.8 Meanwhile, Corollary 3.2 implies that even if the public signal is less
accurate, it is still hard to guarantee the existence of the informative voting equilibrium as long
as there are two or more agents who are sufficiently biased toward different alternatives ex ante.
Note that the required bias becomes arbitrarily small when β is close to α.
The intuition behind both corollaries can be understood via the following simple example
of three agents with heterogeneous preferences, such that q1 = 1 − α, q2 = 1/2 and q3 = α.
Assume that the collective decision is made according to the majority rule (k = 2). In the
absence of public information, one can check that informative voting constitutes an equilibrium,
even though the first and third agents are biased toward different alternatives ex ante. Suppose
now agents also observe a public signal that is more informative than each of their private
signals. If the unbiased agent 2 assumes that the other two agents will vote informatively, she
could infer that the only situation in which she is pivotal is when agent 1 and 3 receive conflicting
signals, but this implies that the others’ private signals are collectively uninformative about the
state. Hence, in this case, agent 2 would make her voting decision by comparing the observed
public signal and her own private signal, and simply follows the public one because of its higher
precision. Conversely, suppose the public signal is less informative than the private signals.
While it is now rational for the unbiased agent 2 to vote informatively (assuming the other two
agents do so as well), this is not the case for the two biased agents. For example, agent 1 will
still strictly prefer to choose v1 = 1 if s1 = 0 and sp = 1, even when she assumes that the other
two agents are voting informatively. This is because the public signal, albeit less informative, is
still in favor of her preferred alternative. Moreover, this problem cannot be resolved by using the
unilateral (k = 1) or unanimity rule (k = 3) instead. For example, suppose all three agents are
unbiased and the public signal is just slightly more informative than the private signals. While
adopting the unanimity rule can successfully encourage agents to vote informatively whenever
sp = 0, it provides even stronger incentives for the agents to disregard their private information
whenever sp = 1.
Figure 3.1 interprets the above results graphically. Suppose for a given k-voting rule, an agent
i with qi will find it optimal to play the informative voting strategy when assuming that all other
agents j 6= i are voting informatively. Let Qα,k(β) ⊆ [0, 1] denote the set of all such qi, for given
k, α and β. For a preference profile q, the informative voting equilibrium exists under a given
k-voting rule if and only if qi ∈ Qα,k(β), ∀i ∈ I. For fixed parameter values n = 3 and α = 0.75,
the top, middle, and bottom part of the gray area in Figure 3.1 corresponds to the graph of
Qα,3(β), Qα,2(β) and Qα,1(β), respectively.9 As the precision of the public signal increases, the
size of each Qα,k(β) decreases. In particular, when β > α, Qα,k(β) = ∅,∀k = 1, 2, 3.
8In general, in this case the strategy profile that the agents would vote for some alternative if and only if it is
supported by both private and public signals (while the other alternative is always chosen whenever the two signals
disagree) does not constitute an equilibrium either. This would be the case, for example, if ∀i ∈ I, qi ∈ [1− α, α]
and the simple majority rule is used. This is because that whenever an alternative is supported by the more
precise public signal, then conditional on all other agents would vote for that alternative if and only if it is also
supported by their own private signals, an agents whose private signal disagrees with the public signal would then
have the incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy.
9For every α ∈ (1/2, 1], Qα,k(1/2) corresponds to the set of preferences that allow for informative voting under
the given k-voting rule when the public signal is absent.
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Figure 3.1: The graphs of the correspondences Qα,k(β) given n = 3, α = 0.75.
Besides shrinking the set of preference profiles that allow for informative voting, the presence
of the public signal also opens the possibility for the agents to coordinate on the obedient voting
equilibrium. In fact, when 1 < k < n, the OVE always exists.10 Clearly, the OVE can be highly
inefficient, especially when the public signal is less accurate or just moderately more accurate
than each of the private signals.11 As a numerical example, suppose that n = 7, α = 0.6 and the
simple majority rule is used. By introducing a public signal that is twice as informative as each
agent’s private signal (i.e., β = 0.69), the probability of reaching a correct decision can actually
decrease (from 0.71 to 0.69) if the agents are induced to switch to the OVE from the IVE. In
contrast, if instead we enlarge the size of the committee by two, then the predicted accuracy
will increase to 0.73 provided that the agents continue to coordinate on the IVE.12
3.4.1 Discussion
Informative voting and information aggregation. The result regarding the (non-)existence
of the informative voting equilibrium is interesting for the following reasons. First, the IVE has
the desirable property that it can aggregate potentially a large amount of private information
by asking the agents to play a simple and intuitive strategy that requires little coordination.
Hence, it may seem reasonable to expect that, provided it exists, an equilibrium in informative
voting strategies is more likely to be played by the agents than other possibly more sophisticated
and/or less efficient equilibria.
Second, if the IVE does not exist, then in many settings obedient voting may already be
the most appealing equilibrium prediction of the game. In particular, if there is minimal het-
erogeneity in preferences (i.e., qi 6= qj for some i, j ∈ I), the OVE is already the most efficient
10For k = 1, the OVE exists if ∀i ∈ I, qi ≥ 1/
(
1 + 1−α
α
β
1−β
)
. For k = n, the OVE exists if ∀i ∈ I,
qi ≤ 1/
(
1 + 1−α
α
β
1−β
)
.
11For such inefficient use of private information to arise as an equilibrium outcome, it suffices to have more
than n0 ≡ max{k + 1, n− k + 1} agents who follow the obedient voting strategy.
12Suppose that the IVE exists given the preference profile of the original seven-member committee. Then, the
IVE also exists after the size of the committee is increased if the preferences of the new members do not exaggerate
the initial maximal degree of conflict of interest in the committee (see Proposition 3.4).
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equilibrium among the ones that are symmetric (with respect to both the agents and the re-
alization of the public signal). The symmetry requirement is important because even in the
simplest voting games, there are lots of (and even a continuum of) asymmetric equilibria (see,
e.g., the example with three homogeneous agents in p. 417, Guarnaschelli et al., 2000). Thus,
in the absence of an effective coordination device, it is rather demanding to require all agents
to correctly anticipate which asymmetric equilibrium will be selected. A possible ramification
of miscoordination is that the committee may get stuck in the inefficient OVE outcome even if
some agents make the attempt to deviate from it (e.g., because they may be confused about
who should vote informatively and who should follow the public signal).
In fact, KV present strong experimental evidence supporting the above arguments. In par-
ticular, for the important benchmark case where all agents are unbiased, they show that if the
public signal is less accurate than the private signals (thus both the IVE and the OVE, and pos-
sibly many other equilibria, exist under the majority rule), most subjects vote for their private
signals over 90% of the time when the public and the private signals disagree. In contrast, when
the public signal is more accurate than the private signals and thus the IVE does not exist, a
large proportion of voters tend to follow the public signal instead of their private signals much
more frequently than non-OVE equilibria would predict.13 Consequently, the collective decisions
coincided with what the public signal suggested over 97% of the time, which is consistent with
the prediction of the OVE.
As pointed out by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), from a game-theoretic point of view the
non-existence of the IVE per se does not necessarily imply a failure of information aggregation.
Indeed, unless we restrict ourselves to symmetric equilibria, in general it is very difficult to rule
out the existence of equilibria which may efficiently incorporate both public and private infor-
mation in a more sophisticated way than the OVE (e.g., by asking agents to play idiosyncratic
mixed strategies). It is also possible that these equilibria can lead to asymptotic information ag-
gregation as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).14 However, in our view, an important lesson
from KV’s experimental results is that the non-existence of the IVE together with the presence
of an “expert opinion" type of public signal can indeed lead to a substantial efficiency loss. A
possible explanation is that a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1] of agents are somewhat naive, in the sense that
they always vote sincerely (i.e., they follow the strategy σi(si, sp) = 1 if E[θ|si, sp] ≥ qi and
σi(si, sp) = 0 otherwise). Assume that the fraction of naive/sincere agents is sufficiently large
(ρ > α− 12). It is straightforward to show that whenever the public signal is more precise than
the private signals (i.e., it is of the “expert opinion" type), there will a non-vanishing probability
for the committee to reach the wrong decision, no matter which k-voting rule is used and what
strategies are played by the sophisticated/fully strategic agents.15
13In their setting, in addition to the obedient voting equilibrium KV also identify a symmetric equilibrium
in which the agents play mixed strategies whenever the public signal disagrees with their private ones, and an
asymmetric equilibrium in which only a small subset of the agents vote obediently.
14Note that we cannot use the general results from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) to conclude that infor-
mation will be perfectly aggregated as the size of committee increases either. This is because Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997) assume that all observed signals are conditionally independent between agents.
15In contrast, when β ≤ α holds, efficient information aggregation is possible even if all agents are naive (ρ = 1).
This will be the case, for example, if the agents are unbiased and the simple majority rule is used.
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Correlated signals and large elections. So far we have modeled public information as
an additional conditionally independent signal that is perfectly observed by all agents. This is
equivalent to the assumption that each agent privately observes a correlated signal sˆi = si + ηsp
with η > 1, as the agents can perfectly back out the signal profile (si, sp) from the realization
of sˆi. This assumption fits into applications with committees of moderate size (e.g. boards
of directors, hiring committees, juries), since typically in these scenarios not only the public
information itself but also its source is clear (e.g., the expert invited to the board meeting,
the reference letters submitted to the hiring committees, the witnesses testify in the court).
However, this assumption may not capture very well what happen in large elections (i.e., large
size committees), where information often comes from multiple sources and is transmitted in
a more decentralized way. In that case, an agent may find it difficult to tell for sure what is
publicly known from what is her private knowledge. To capture such a situation, we can instead
assume that each agent’s private signal is given by sˆi = si + sp (i.e., η = 1): in this case, an
agent becomes uncertain about what is publicly known when she observes sˆi = 1.16 Despite this
uncertainty, assuming β ≥ α, from an individual agent’s point of view the correlated signal sˆi is
actually more precise than the independent signal si, since the expected conditional variances
satisfy E[Var(θ|sˆi)] < E[Var(θ|si)].
In the final part of this section, we will investigate the above more general model with
correlated signals and show that how making agents’ observations correlated by providing pub-
lic information can have profound ramifications for information aggregation. Let us fix an
arbitrary sequence of preference profiles {qn = (q1, ..., qn)}n∈N. We say that {σkn}n∈N is a
sequence of equilibria induced by a sequence of k-voting rules {gkn}n∈N if ∀ n ∈ N, σkn con-
stitutes an equilibrium under the voting rule gkn . We say that a sequence of k-voting rules
{gkn}n∈N aggregates information asymptotically if (i) it admits a subsequence {gkn(τ)}τ∈N such
that limτ→∞ kn(τ)/n(τ) = κ ∈ [0, 1], and (ii) {gkn(τ)}τ∈N induces a sequence of equilibria in
which the probability of reaching a correct decision goes to one. The following result shows
that, in general, with correlated signals the probability of reaching the wrong decision may not
vanish even in large elections.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that each agent only observes a correlated signal sˆi = si + sp. For
any sequence of preference profiles, there exists no sequence of k-voting rules that aggregates
information asymptotically.
To sum up, unlike endowing voters with better private information, introducing public in-
formation may actually worsen the quality of the collective decision. This is similar to one of
the most striking findings in the global games literature, namely the heterogeneous effect of
public and private information. For instance, in a highly influential paper, Morris and Shin
(2002) show that in a setting where agents’ actions are strategic complements, additional public
information can have negative social value. Although agents in the current setting have no
intrinsic motive of coordination, our results suggest similarly that the conventional wisdom that
16While the case η = 1 may seem to be non-generic, this is largely due to the binary structure of the signals in
our model. If, for example, both si and sp are continuously distributed over [0, 1], then no η can guarantee that
an agent will always be able to perfectly back out both si and sp from the signal sˆi = si + ηsp.
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additional information is always beneficial for decision-makers should be carefully examined.17
3.5 Optimal Voting Mechanisms
In this section, we study the design of optimal voting mechanisms with public information.
We will show that the outcomes of the optimal mechanisms can be indirectly implemented by
simple voting procedures that incorporate the public information appropriately. For clarity of
exposition, we will maintain the assumption that the public signal is exogenous throughout this
section. We will illustrate in Section 3.6 that our new voting procedures have also additional
advantages when strategic information disclosure is a non-negligible concern.
By the revelation principle, we consider only direct mechanisms f : S × Sp → [0, 1]. The
interpretation is that for every signal profile (s, sp) ∈ S×Sp the mechanism specifies the proba-
bility f(s, sp) that the alternative associated with d = 1 will be chosen. We start by introducing
some definitions.
Definition 3.3. A mechanism f is ex post incentive compatible if ∀sp ∈ Sp, ∀s−i ∈ S−i,
∀si, s′i ∈ Si and ∀i ∈ I, E [ui(f(si, s−i, sp), θ)|si, s−i, sp] ≥ E [ui(f(s′i, s−i, sp), θ)|si, s−i, sp].
Definition 3.4. A mechanism f is responsive (to private information) if ∀sp ∈ Sp, there exist
s, s′ ∈ S such that f(s, sp) 6= f(s′, sp).
The notion of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) requires every agent to prefer truth-
telling at every signal profile (s, sp) if all the other agents also report truthfully. Similar
to the role of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in private-value environments, EPIC
guarantees robust behavior of agents in interdependent-value environments (Bergemann and
Morris, 2005). Trivially, an EPIC mechanism exists: For example, the mechanism fo with
fo(s, sp) = sp∀(s, sp) ∈ S × Sp satisfies ex post incentive compatibility. However, fo is not a
responsive mechanism as it makes no use of the agents’ reports. By matching the realization of
the public signal, it replicates the outcome of the obedient voting equilibrium discussed in the
previous section.
We next introduce a new class of voting rules gk0,k1 : V → D that we call contingent k-voting
rules, which can be obtained by adjusting the standard k-voting rules in an intuitive way. In
particular, the threshold values in such voting rules will be no longer fixed but a function of the
realization of the public signal:
ksp =
k0 if sp = 0,k1 if sp = 1, (3.3)
where k0, k1 ∈ {0, 1, ..., n + 1}. Any standard k-voting rule amounts to a special case of the
contingent k-voting rules with k0 = k1 ∈ {1, ..., n}. We say that a contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1
is responsive if k0, k1 /∈ {0, n+1}. We also say that the voting rule gk0,k1 implements informative
voting if it can sustain the informative voting strategy profile as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in
17The non-beneficial effect of public information also resembles the finding from the rational herding literature
(e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). In the models studied in this literature, public information
arises endogenously as observed actions taken by previous agents. However, agents who arrive in the future need
not be able to fully learn about the state from public observables, as herds or information cascades may arise in
equilibrium.
62 Voting with Public Information
the corresponding voting game. Finally, the voting rule gk0,k1 is said to be equivalent to an
EPIC mechanism f if, for every realization of the signals (s, sp), the probability of reaching the
correct decision is the same in both the informative voting equilibrium sustained by gk0,k1 and
the truth-telling equilibrium sustained by f .
Given an EPIC mechanism f , the (ex ante) probability of the collective decision being
matched to the state can be computed as follows:
Pr(d = θ | f) =
∑
s,sp
Pr(s, sp, θ = 1)f(s, sp) +
∑
s,sp
Pr(s, sp, θ = 0)(1− f(s, sp)).
Let F be the set of EPIC mechanisms. An EPIC mechanism f∗ is optimal if Pr(d = θ | f∗) ≥
Pr(d = θ | f) ∀f ∈ F . We are interested in finding an optimal EPIC mechanism. Our next result
states that if agents’ preferences satisfy a (mild) no-indifference condition, then in the search
for optimal EPIC mechanisms it is without loss to focus on contingent k-voting rules that can
implement informative voting.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that ∀i ∈ I, @(s, sp) ∈ S × Sp such that qi = Pr(θ = 1 | s, sp). For
every optimal EPIC mechanism f , there exists a contingent k-voting rule that is equivalent to f .
In addition, the equivalent contingent k-voting rule is responsive if and only if f is responsive.
Intuitively, the condition in Proposition 3.3 requires that if an agent could observe all the
signals, she would always strictly prefer one of the two available alternatives. Taking the infor-
mation structure and the number of agents as given, there are only finitely many q ∈ [0, 1] such
that q = Pr(θ = 1 | s, sp) for some (s, sp) ∈ S × Sp. Hence, the set of preferences q = (q1, ..., qn)
that violate the no-indifference condition is of measure zero relative to the set of all possible
preferences [0, 1]n. We will therefore say that a preference profile q is generic if it satisfies the
no-indifference condition in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 implies that the search for optimal mechanisms with public information can
often be reduced to choosing two threshold values k0, k1 ∈ {0, 1, ..., n + 1}. This is perhaps
surprising, because in general an EPIC mechanism can discriminate agents for their possibly
asymmetric preferences, but the contingent k-voting rules are in fact anonymous. The driving
force behind this result, as we show in a series of lemmas in Appendix C (Lemmas C.1 - C.3),
is that the ex post incentive compatibility constraints have already largely restricted the set of
agents who can possibly be pivotal. In particular, the preferences of these agents cannot be too
heterogeneous. We remark that these lemmas do not rely on the no-indifference condition and
may be of interests that are beyond the scope of the current paper.
Assume that agents’ preferences are generic and thus focusing on the contingent k-voting
rules is without loss. It would be optimal to choose the extreme threshold values k0 = n + 1
and k1 = 0, for example, if the degree of conflicts of interests in the committee is so large
that the only available EPIC mechanisms are the non-responsive ones with f(s, sp) = f(s′, sp)
∀s, s′ ∈ S and ∀sp ∈ Sp. While these EPIC mechanisms and their equivalent contingent k-
voting rules can incorporate the public information, they disregard all the information privately
held by the agents. Hence, provided that a responsive EPIC mechanism exists, there can be
an efficiency gain by using its equivalent and responsive contingent k-voting rule to further
incorporate the agents’ private information. It also seems intuitive that such an efficiency gain
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should be increasing in the size of the committee. Hence, one may conjecture that a responsive
contingent k-voting rule is optimal when the size of the committee is sufficiently large. To
formalize and prove this conjecture, we introduce the notion of conflict-preserving expansion:
Let q be a preference profile with q¯ ≡ maxi∈I qi and q ≡ mini∈I qi. We say that a sequence of
preference profiles {qτ = (qˆ1, ..., qˆn, ..., qˆn+2τ )}τ∈N is a conflict-preserving expansion of q if ∀qτ ,
q¯τ ≡ maxj∈{1,...,n+2τ} qˆj ≤ q¯ and qτ ≡ minj∈{1,...,n+2τ} qˆj ≥ q. In words, an expansion of the
committee is conflict-preserving if it does not exaggerate the initial maximal degree of conflict
of interest. We are now ready to state the main result of this section, which demonstrates the
optimality of responsive contingent k-voting rules.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that, for a given preference profile q with q, q¯ ∈ (0, 1), there exists
a responsive contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1 that implements informative voting. Then, for any
conflict-preserving expansion {qτ}τ∈N of q:
(i) For each qτ , there exists a responsive contingent k-voting rule gkτ0 ,kτ1 that implements in-
formative voting. This contingent k-voting rule is unique if q¯τ 6= qτ , and the corresponding
threshold values are given by kτ0 = k0 + τ and kτ1 = k1 + τ .
(ii) If qτ is generic for all τ ∈ N, then there exists τ∗, such that ∀τ ≥ τ∗ there exists a
responsive contingent k-voting rule that is equivalent to an optimal EPIC mechanism.
(iii) As τ → ∞, the ex ante probability of the collective decision being matched to the state in
the informative voting equilibrium under any responsive contingent k-voting rule becomes
arbitrarily close to 1.
We thus obtain a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for the contingent k-voting rules in a
general voting environment with both private and public information. In particular, Proposition
3.4 implies that the complete-information outcome can be asymptotically achieved if we incor-
porate the public information into the voting procedure appropriately. In addition, if agents’
preferences are generic, then, for finite but large n, no truth-telling equilibrium under any EPIC
mechanism may outperform the informative voting equilibrium under a responsive contingent
k-voting rule.
Proposition 3.4 shows that it is often desirable to use a responsive contingent k-voting rule
to implement informative voting. Our next result characterizes when such a practice would be
feasible.
Proposition 3.5. For a given preference profile q with q¯, q ∈ (0, 1), there exists a responsive
contingent k-voting rule that implements informative voting if and only if there exist integers
k0, k1 ∈ {1, ..., n} such that
k0 ∈ K0 ≡
[
(pi01)−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)
]
, and k1 ∈ K1 ≡
[
(pi11)−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)
]
,
where
(pi00)−1(q) =
1
2
 ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2 + r
 , (pi01)−1(q¯) = 12
 ln
(
1−q¯
q¯
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ r
 ,
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(pi10)−1(q) =
1
2
 ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2− r
 , (pi11)−1(q¯) = 12
 ln
(
1−q¯
q¯
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n− r
 .
Importantly, there are cases where allowing the threshold to be contingent on the realization
of the public signal is necessary for implementing informative voting. To see this, consider a
simple example with n = 5 and qi = 1/2, ∀i ∈ I. If there is no public signal, the informative
voting equilibrium exists under the simple majority rule. Now let us introduce a public signal
that is twice as informative as a private signal. By Corollary 3.1, this implies that the informative
voting equilibrium no longer exists under any k-voting rule. However, consider the contingent
k-voting rule with k0 = 4 and k1 = 2. Suppose all agents j 6= i are voting informatively. If
sp = 1, agent i is pivotal only when three of the other agents draw sj = 0 and the remaining
one draws sj = 1. Given the above assumption on the informativeness of the public signal,
these private signals are collectively uninformative about the state when they are combined
with the realization of the public signal. Thus, voting according to her own private signal is a
best response for agent i. Similarly, if sp = 0, agent i is pivotal under the contingent k-voting
rule only when there are three private signals in favor of d = 1 and one in favor of d = 0 among
all others’ private signals. Again, the collective informational effect of all sj , j 6= i, will be
exactly counterbalanced by the fact that sp = 0, which makes it optimal for agent i to simply
follow her own signal. Intuitively, what we are doing here is to vary the information that agents
can infer from pivotality. Under the contingent k-voting rule chosen in the above example, an
agent is pivotal when and only when the private signals of the other agents are collectively more
against the alternative favored by the public signal. This restores the incentive for agents to
vote according to their own signals.
While both (pi00)−1 and (pi10)−1 are strictly increasing in q¯, both (pi01)−1 and (pi11)−1 are strictly
increasing in q. Hence, it is possible that both of the intervals K0 and K1 contain no integer if
q¯ is sufficiently larger than q. Intuitively, if the degree of conflict of interest between the agents
is too large, it is very difficult to find a responsive voting rule that ensures the incentive for all
agents to vote informatively, even if we allow the voting threshold value to be flexibly contingent
on the public signal. Nevertheless, we are able to show that for the important limiting cases
where agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Koriyama
and Szentes, 2009; Persico, 2004), there always exists a responsive contingent k-voting rule that
implements informative voting, provided that the size of the committee is sufficiently large:
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that ∀i ∈ I, qi = q ∈ (0, 1). There exists n¯(q), such that for each
n ≥ n¯(q), there exists a responsive contingent k-voting rule that implements informative voting.
3.5.1 Contingent majority rule
In this subsection, we provide further analysis of optimal voting mechanisms for the setting
where agents have purely common interests, i.e., qi = 1/2 ∀i ∈ I. This important benchmark
setting has been extensively studied in the literature. Especially, KV show that in this setting
if the public signal is r-times as informative as a private signal, where r ≤ (n− 1)/2, then under
the simple majority rule there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which r∗ = N ∩ (r − 1, r]
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agents obey the public signal, while the remaining n− r∗ agents vote according to their private
signals. This r∗-asymmetric equilibrium is shown to be more efficient than both the obedient
voting equilibrium and the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, as well as all other
asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the same voting game. In the following, we will show
in the same setting that one can always construct a responsive contingent k-voting rule that
not only implements informative voting, but also leads to strictly higher efficiency than the
r∗-asymmetric equilibrium.
Specifically, consider a contingent k-voting rule with the following threshold values:
ksp =

n+1
2 +
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 0,
n+1
2 −
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 1,
where [(r−1)/2]+ denotes the smallest integer that is larger or equal to (r−1)/2. For convenience,
we will call this rule the contingent majority rule. Note that the contingent majority rule is
responsive whenever r ≤ n. The following result justifies our focus on this particular contingent
k-voting rule:
Corollary 3.4. Suppose that r ≤ n. The contingent majority rule implements informative
voting if and only if
∀i ∈ I, qi ∈ Qαcm(r) ≡
 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|−1 , 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)−|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|+1
 . (3.4)
Since |r − 2[(r − 1)/2]+| ∈ [0, 1] for all r ≥ 0, we always have 1/2 ∈ Qcm(r). Therefore,
for the case where all agents are unbiased, one can always use the contingent majority rule to
implement informative voting.18 The next proposition further shows that the informative voting
equilibrium under the contingent majority rule achieves the first-best informational efficiency.
Proposition 3.6. Given all the information that is available to the committee, the probability
of the collective decision being matched to the state is maximized in the informative voting
equilibrium under the contingent majority rule.
To gain some intuition, consider a simple example of n = 5 and r = 2. Assume all agents
are unbiased. Imagine that we introduce two additional phantom agents on top of the existing
five real agents. These phantom agents are programmed so that they simply vote in line with
the public signal. Suppose now the simple majority rule is used to decide which alternative
will be chosen. One can easily show that (1) all real agents voting informatively constitutes
an equilibrium in this game (despite that the public signal observed by the agents is more
precise than each of their private ones), (2) the equilibrium outcome is identical to that of the
informative voting equilibrium under the contingent majority rule without the phantom agents,
and (3) the equilibrium outcome maximizes the probability that the decision will be matched to
the state, given all the available information. Intuitively, by allowing the threshold value to be
18The contingent majority rule is also the unique responsive contingent k-voting rule that implements informa-
tive voting except when r happens to be is an odd integer.
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dependent on the public signal and by encouraging agents to vote informatively, the contingent
majority rule aggregates both the private and the public information efficiently.
On the contrary, in the r∗-asymmetric equilibrium, inefficiency still prevails because there
are r∗ agents who always disregard their valuable private information. To see this issue more
clearly, consider again the above example. Since in this case we have r∗ = 2 = (n − 1)/2,
under the simple majority rule there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which two agents
play the obedient strategy, while the remaining three agents vote informatively. Without loss
of generality, assume the first two agents are the obedient voters. Consider the signal profile
s = (1, 1, 0, 1, 1) and sp = 0. In equilibrium, such a realization of signals will lead to a collective
decision d = 0. However, from a benevolent social planner’s point of view, given all the available
information, the welfare maximizing decision should be d = 1. Therefore, the r∗-asymmetric
equilibrium is strictly less efficient than the first-best.
3.5.2 Equivalent implementations
The analysis of contingent k-voting rules has highlighted the importance, especially in terms of
the potential efficiency gain, of having a more flexible voting procedure that can appropriately
incorporate the content of the public information. In practice, however, it might be difficult to
implement (or even just prespecify) a voting rule that is contingent on some public information.
If it is known that the public information comes from some non-strategic expert,19 an alternative
and rather straightforward way to achieve the informative voting equilibrium outcome under a
contingent k-voting rule is to also count the expert’s opinion as a vote. In addition, the expert’s
vote should be counted with a larger weight if he is indeed better informed than the agents
(β > α). Similar voting rules are used, for example, in the famous reality television singing
competition The Voice.20
Plainly, the above alternative voting rule would not be feasible if the source of the relevant
public information is ambiguous ex ante. We now introduce a simple two-stage voting mechanism
that is immune to this concern. The voting rule is as follows. After observing the private and
the public signals, the agents first vote to select an integer k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n + 1}. The integer k∗
that receives the most votes will be selected, with ties being broken randomly. In the second
stage, the agents vote about which collective decision to take according to the voting rule gk∗ ,
i.e., d = 1 if and only if ∑ni=1 vi ≥ k∗. Practically, this two-stage voting procedure can be more
appealing than the contingent k-voting rules because the procedure itself is deterministic and
independent of the informational details of the environment.
Fix a preference profile q, and suppose that there exists a contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1
that implements informative voting. We say that the above two-stage voting mechanism can
equivalently implement the informative voting equilibrium under gk0,k1 , if in the two-stage vot-
ing game there exists a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) in which the agents first
collectively vote to agree on the threshold value that would have been chosen by gk0,k1 , and then
19See Section 3.6 for an analysis with strategic experts.
20In some rounds of the singing competition, both the coaches of the singers (or a jury of music professionals)
and the viewers can vote to determine whether a contestant can advance to the next stage. However, the votes
of the coaches (or the professionals) typically count more for the final outcome (see https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/The_Voice_(franchise)).
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they vote informatively in the second stage.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that, for a given preference profile q, there exists a contingent k-
voting rule gk0,k1 that implements informative voting. Then, the two-stage voting mechanism
can equivalently implement the informative voting equilibrium under gk0,k1.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.7 is simple: Since the voting threshold k∗ is determined
by a simple plurality rule, no agent could unilaterally change the voting outcome in the first
stage if all other agents agree to choose either k0 or k1. But then given that the informative
voting strategy profile constitutes an ex post Nash equilibrium under gk0,k1 , no agent would
have the incentive to deviate from informative voting in the second stage either, no matter how
she updates her beliefs about the state and other agents’ private information after observing the
voting outcome of the first stage.21
We close this section by noting that the use of the plurality rule for determining the voting
threshold is not generally necessary for our result. To see this, suppose, for example, that the
agents have purely common interests and either of the following rules (i) and (ii) is used in the
first stage: (i) If all agents agree to use some k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n+ 1}, then we let k∗ = k. Otherwise,
the simple majority rule will be used, i.e., k∗ = (n + 1)/2; (ii) An agent i ∈ I is randomly
selected, and then she dictates which voting threshold to be used. These alternative two-stage
voting mechanisms can also equivalently implement the informative voting equilibrium under
the contingent majority rule. The reason is that, according to Proposition 6, the expected social
welfare is maximized when the voting threshold values of the contingent majority rule are used.
Since each agent’s interest is perfectly aligned with the social welfare, any deviation in the first
stage will only yield a lower expected payoff to an agent.22
3.6 Strategic Information Disclosure
In this section, we drop the assumption that the disclosure of public information is exogenous,
and consider it to be strategically determined by a possibly biased information controller (e.g.,
an external expert). As illustrated in Section 3.4, public information can have a huge influence
on the committee’s decision when the standard simultaneous voting rules are in use. Taking this
into account, a biased controller may only publicly reveal his information to the agents when
21A legitimate concern that one may have is that the two-stage voting mechanism does not uniquely implement
the informative voting equilibrium. This problem is not specific to the two-stage voting rule that we propose.
For example, even when the public signal is absent and all agents are unbiased, the simple majority rule also
cannot achieve the unique implementation of the informative voting equilibrium (it is always an equilibrium that
all agents vote for d = 1 (or d = 0) regardless of their private signals). Nevertheless, given that the informative
voting equilibrium is symmetric (thus no sophisticated coordination is required) and can have very desirable
efficiency properties (see Propositions 3.4 and 3.6), it seems reasonable to expect that it is more likely to be
played by the agents compared to other possibly asymmetric and/or less efficient equilibria in the two-stage
voting mechanism.
22When agents are unbiased (or, more generally, when condition (3.4) is satisfied), we can consider yet another
voting rule: Let vˆi = ηvi if vi 6= sp, and vˆi = η′vi if vi = sp, where η = n+1n+1−2[(r−1)/2]+ and η′ = n+1n+1+2[(r−1)/2]+ .
The decision d = 1 is taken if and only if
∑n
i=1 vˆi ≥ (n+ 1)/2. It is straightforward to check that an informative
voting equilibrium exists under this voting rule, and it is outcome-equivalent to the one under the contingent
majority voting rule. Since η ≥ η′, this voting rule has the interesting interpretation that it discourages the
agents from blindly following the public information, and it does so by assigning a larger weight to the votes that
disagree with the public signal.
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its content is in support of his favored alternative. For example, an advisory board member
who has private interests in the targeted firm may withhold unfavorable information from the
directory board when the acquisition decision is being made. In what follows, we will formalize
this intuition by extending our baseline model from Section 3.3. In addition, we will show that
using a contingent voting rule adapted from the ones constructed in Section 3.5 can mitigate
the controller’s incentive for strategic disclosure and his influence on the voting outcome, which
in turn improves the efficiency of the collective decision.23
Suppose now that the signal sp described in Section 3.3.2 is no longer public by default
but can only be observed by an information controller with some probability. Specifically, with
probability λ ∈ (0, 1), the controller is uninformed and can only send a public message m = ∅
(remain silent) to the agents. With the complementary probability 1−λ, the controller observes
the signal and can decide whether to publicly communicate its content to the agents or not.
While we allow the controller to withhold his information, we assume that the signal is hard
information and hence cannot be faked. In other words, in the latter case the public message m
can only be chosen from the set {sp, ∅}.
Assume for simplicity that qi = 1/2 ∀i ∈ I and that the collective decision is made according
to the simple majority rule.24 Note again that in this case, the informative voting equilibrium
exists if no additional public information is available to the committee members. Assume also
that the controller has the same form of utility function as the agents, and his bias parameter
is given by qc ∈ [0, 1]. Let λˆ = max{0, (β − α)/(β − (1 − α)}. The following proposition
establishes that if agents update their beliefs sufficiently little upon observing silence (i.e., λ is
large enough), a biased information controller may indeed exploit the publicity of his message
and reveal his information selectively.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose λ ≥ λˆ. There exists qˆ ∈ [1− β, 1/2] such that if qc ≤ qˆ (qc ≥ 1− qˆ),
then there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the controller sends m = sp if and only if he
observes sp = 1 (sp = 0), and the agents vote obediently if m = sp and informatively if m = ∅.
As a numerical example, if n = 3, α = 0.65 and β = 0.7, the threshold values are given
by λˆ ≈ 0.14 and qˆ ≈ 0.48, respectively. Depending on the relative precision of the signals, the
informational efficiency of the committee’s decision could be improved if there were more or
less information disclosure than that in the equilibrium. For instance, the decision will be more
accurate in the above numerical example if the controller always keeps silent and just lets the
agents credibly coordinate on informative voting in the voting stage.
Some recent papers look at the question how an information controller can optimally per-
suade uninformed agents by designing the informational content of a public signal (e.g., Alonso
and Câmara, 2016; Bardhi and Guo, 2018; Wang, 2015). In our model, voters are privately
informed and the controller has control over the disclosure of the public signal only. Hence, our
environment is notably less favorable for the controller. Nevertheless, Proposition 3.8 suggests
that the strategic incentive of the controller and his impact on the committee’s decision still
23The same result will also hold if we use the two-stage voting mechanism (see Section 3.5.2) instead.
24With the general results in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, our analysis in the current section can be straightforwardly
extended to settings with general preference profiles and voting rules.
Chapter 3 69
cannot be ignored.25
Fortunately, the concern of strategic information disclosure can be mitigated by instead using
a contingent voting rule with the following threshold values:
km =

n+1
2 if m = ∅,
n+1
2 +
[
r−1
2
]+
if m = 0,
n+1
2 −
[
r−1
2
]+
if m = 1.
Proposition 3.9. Suppose that r ≤ n and the proposed contingent voting rule is used. There
exists q∗ ∈ [0, 1− β] such that
1. If qc ∈ [q∗, 1−q∗], there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the controller sends m = sp
whenever he is informed, and the agents always vote informatively.
2. If qc ≤ q∗ (qc ≥ 1 − q∗) and λ ≥ λˆ, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the
controller sends m = sp if and only if he observes sp = 1 (sp = 0), and the agents always
vote informatively.
By comparing Propositions 3.8 and 3.9, we can see that the contingent voting rule has two
main advantages over the simple majority rule. First, the contingent voting rule incorporates
the informational content in the controller’s message appropriately and makes it credible for the
agents to coordinate on informative voting in the voting stage. Hence, by the same reasoning as
in Proposition 3.6, the decision selected by the contingent voting rule is most likely to match the
state, given all the information that is available to the committee, independent of the controller’s
disclosure policy and the relative precision of the signals. Second, under the contingent voting
rule the controller also has a higher incentive to share his information unconditionally, since he
anticipates that his message will not have a direct impact on the agents’ voting behavior and
will always help increase the accuracy of the committee’s decision. Indeed, for the previous
numerical example (n = 3, α = 0.65 and β = 0.7), we have q∗ ≈ 0.23, which is substantially
smaller than qˆ.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we show in a general setting of collective
decision-making that the provision of public information can have a detrimental effect on the
efficiency of the committee decision. The inefficient equilibrium outcome is consistent with
experimental evidence, and it echos the common concern that expert opinions may have excessive
25This result does not necessarily hold, however, if the controller himself is also a member of the committee.
This is because other members in the committee may anticipate that the information contained in the controller’s
message will already be incorporated in his vote. For example, suppose that the controller is agent 1, qi = 1/2
∀i = 2, ..., n, β ≥ α and the simple majority rule is used. One can check that if qc ∈ [1 − β, β] and r < 2, then
regardless of whether the controller reveals his signal to the other agents or not in the communication stage, it
will be incentive compatible for all agents including the controller to vote informatively in the voting stage . This
example suggests that the public information emerges from pre-voting deliberations is less likely to threaten the
existence of the informative voting equilibrium. We cannot, however, conclude from this that there is no value
in pre-voting deliberations, because informative voting per se does not necessarily lead to the efficient outcome
under other voting rules (e.g. the unanimity rule).
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influence on (both individual and collective) decision-making. We believe these results to be
of high policy relevance, especially since the immense influence of public information may be
strategically exploited by a biased information controller.
Second, we propose simple voting procedures that can indirectly implement the outcomes
of the optimal ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. By appropriately incorporating the
public information and providing incentives for the agents to vote informatively, our voting
procedures facilitate information aggregation and enhance the accuracy of the collective decision.
By reducing the direct effect of public information on the agents’ voting behavior, the proposed
voting procedures also mitigate the concern of strategic information disclosure.
It should be remarked that our results are not suggesting that experts should be discouraged
from providing their expertise to decision makers. For example, besides providing additional
information, advice from experts may also help decision makers to better assess the situation
based on their private knowledge (i.e., the precision of the private signals α increases). In-
tuitively, this effect should be beneficial for increasing the probability of reaching the correct
decision. Therefore, we would like to highlight that the key message of this paper is that in a
voting environment with both private and public information, the voting procedure matters and
the optimal voting rule should reflect the content of the public information. For example, if the
advisory board indicates that one of the business proposals is more promising than the other, it
might be desirable for the board of directors to set up a voting rule that is more in favor of the
acceptance of that proposal. The design of optimal mechanisms in more general social choice
environments with public information remains an open and important research question.
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4 Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets1
Joint with Dimitri Migrow
4.1 Introduction
Many modern organizations operate in multiple markets. The most immediate example, per-
haps, is that of multiproduct firms: Apple offers both smartphones and watches, BMW sells
both cars and motorcycles, and Google’s business is not restricted to running a search engine.
In the era of globalization, multinational firms provide another important case in point. Ac-
cording to a recent study by Lincoln and McCallum (2018), the median number of destination
countries for U.S. exporting firms was three in 2006. Moreover, for many top U.S. exporters,
selling domestically produced goods to foreign consumers only counts as a limited part of their
involvement in the world economy. For instance, it is common nowadays for a multinational
corporation to own production facilities in several foreign countries.2
Motivated by the prevalence and increasing influence of multibusiness firms in the economy,
this paper asks the following question: When local markets (defined by products, industries,
geographic boundaries, demographics of targeted customers, etc.) feature uncertainty in their
relative profitability, how should a multi-divisional organization optimally allocate decision-
making authority to its managerial members? In particular, should decision rights be centralized
to a headquarter manager who can coordinate the activities of different division contingent on
the market prospects, or be decentralized to division managers who have advantages in collecting
costly information about local market conditions?3
The uncertainty in relative market profitability is a highly relevant problem for many orga-
nizations. A broad set of economic and political conditions, which may be difficult to predict,
can affect how rewarding it is to conduct activities in a product market or in a country. Thus,
the value of success in a particular local market in terms of overall organizational performance is
uncertain from the central management’s perspective. For multinational firms, a major source
of such uncertainty is the volatility of currency exchange rates.4 With physically different prod-
1This paper should be cited as Liu, S. and D. Migrow (2019): “Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets,”
Mimeo.
2For an overview of the stylized facts about multinational firms documented in the international trade literature,
see, e.g., the comprehensive survey by Antràs and Yeaple (2014).
3The design of multi-divisional organizations is an active area of research. See, e.g., Athey and Roberts (2001),
Alonso et al. (2008, 2015), Dessein et al. (2010), Friebel and Raith (2010), and Rantakari (2008, 2013). Section
4.2 reviews several prominent contributions in this growing literature. We refer interested readers to the excellent
survey by Roberts and Saloner (2013).
4For example, even without considering the change in tariffs due to the U.S. - China trade war, the recent
sharp depreciation of Chinese Yuan already implies a drop in the dollar value per sale that Ford can collect from
its joint venture in China (Changan Ford).
72 Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets
ucts, uncertainty regarding the relative profitability or strategic importance of the markets may
also be due to general shifts in consumer tastes or changes in market size.5
If the organizational activities in different local markets are unrelated, relative changes in
market profitability may be of little relevance for central management. However, quite often
an organization can benefit from synchronizing its activities across markets (e.g., because of
economies of scale), though doing so may imply that these activities are less adapted to the local
conditions of each market (e.g., product design is less fitted to the tastes of local consumers).
When the prospect of each market cannot be perfectly forecasted, resolving the trade-off between
coordination and adaptation is particularly challenging, because ex ante it is unclear whether
the organization should adapt more to one market’s local conditions and less to the other’s. By
centralizing the decision-making process, the headquarter manager can take into account the
actual profitability conditions and make contingent decisions that are globally optimal for the
organization. Yet, to the extent that local market information is privately acquired and observed
by division managers, the flexibility granted by centralization also comes with a downside. That
is, it may harm the incentives of the division managers by making them more skeptical about
how their acquired information will be used.
The main insight of our paper is that whether the above cost of centralized decision-making
may outweigh its benefit depends crucially on how important coordination is compared to adap-
tation, and in an unexpected way. In particular, due to a reinforcing interaction between the
uncertainty in market profitability and the need for coordination, the optimality of a decen-
tralized authority structure can be the result of a large coordination motive. In addition, as
an important step toward establishing the optimality results, we show that if the information
acquired by the division managers is verifiable, complete voluntary disclosure arises as a unique
equilibrium outcome irrespective of the chosen authority structure.
We formalize our arguments by modeling an organization which needs to adapt and coor-
dinate the strategic decisions of its two divisions. As in Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari
(2008), a division’s performance is determined by how close its action (e.g., the design of a
product) is matched to an unobserved local state, and how well it is coordinated with the action
of the other division. Specifically, any mismatch between division i’s action and its local state
or division j’s action will result a quadratic loss in i’s performance. Each division is run by an
agent (e.g., a divisional manager, he) who can privately exert effort to acquire a signal about
the local state, where more effort results in a better signal. The agents are led by a common and
uninformed principal (e.g., a headquarter manager, she). While each agent cares only about
the performance of his own division, possibly because of career concerns, the principal cares
about the overall performance of the organization. The novel feature of our model is that the
contribution of each division’s success to the overall organizational performance need not be
certain. This idea is formally captured by a pair of stochastic weights that the principal’s payoff
attaches to the divisions’ performances. While these weights are observed by all players before
5Making precise predictions about these factors can be challenging even for large firms. In 2013, soon after
announcing his stepping down as the CEO of Microsoft, Steve Ballmer openly admitted that the company was
too slow to recognize the importance of the smartphone market. He blamed this strategic failure on Microsoft’s
long-time focus on the business of its Windows operating system (see “Microsoft too slow on phones, admits boss
Steve Ballmer”, BBC News, 20 September 2013).
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the final actions are taken, they are unknown at the outset of the game and can be arbitrarily
correlated. As mentioned, examples of such interrelated uncertainty include the exchange rate
volatility incurred by multinational corporations, as well as the constantly changing prospects
of different product markets. We refer to these stochastic weights as the global states of our
model because, unlike the local states, they determine which actions are globally optimal for
the organization rather than locally optimal for individual divisions.
We compare two widely-studied authority structures: centralization and decentralization. In
both cases the agents first exert efforts to acquire information about the local states, and then
they communicate their findings with the player(s) endowed with decision-making authority.
Specifically, under centralization, the agents simultaneously report to the principal, who will
subsequently dictate the actions of both divisions. Under decentralization, the agents can ex-
change messages with each other, after which they make independent decisions over the actions
of their own divisions.6 The communication between players is strategic and takes the form of
verifiable disclosure, where an informed agent always has the option of certifying the outcome
of his information experiment. This includes the persuasion game of Milgrom (1981) and Gross-
man (1981) and the evidence game of Dye (1985) as special cases. Previous works have argued
that the quality of communication is important for explaining the relative performance of dif-
ferent organizational structures (e.g. Alonso et al., 2008; Aoki, 1986; Dessein and Santos, 2006;
Rantakari, 2008). Our model predicts that if information is verifiable, the incentive constraints
for communication are irrelevant in determining where the authority over decisions should be
lodged in the organization. As we prove in Section 4.4, fully revealing communication arises as
a unique equilibrium outcome regardless of which authority structure is chosen (Propositions
4.1 - 4.4). Thus, in equilibrium all the obtained information will be truthfully transmitted to
the decision-making parties. The full-revelation result is not obvious, because it is known that
costly information acquisition and/or uncertain information endowment can prevent complete
voluntary disclosure (e.g., Shavell, 1994; Shin, 1994).7
While the resulting quality of communication does not differ between centralization and
decentralization, the allocation of decision rights does have an impact on the agents’ incentives
for information gathering. In Section 4.5, we first establish a benchmark result (Theorem 4.1(i))
that if the local markets are always equally profitable, then, regardless of the importance of
coordination, a centralized organization always outperforms its decentralized counterpart in
motivating information acquisition. This optimality of centralized decision-making shows that
the incentive view of delegation in Aghion and Tirole (1997) need not be valid in multi-agent
settings with coordination motives. Intuitively, as the principal always deems the two divisions
equally important, under centralization she acts as if she were a neutral party who aims to
maximize the joint surplus of the agents. In contrast, the decentralized equilibrium outcome
6The comparison between centralization and decentralization is only meaningful if contracts are incomplete
as in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), because otherwise any decentralized allocation can
be implemented centrally by a suitably designed mechanism. Thus, similar to Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari
(2008), our analysis applies to situations where the organizational decisions of interests are sufficiently complex
(e.g., product design), which renders ex ante contracting infeasible.
7Moreover, as shown in Section 4.6.2, if the space of the local states is unbounded and the agents are able to
misrepresent their private information at a cost, then in addition to full revelation the equilibria under different
authority structures will also feature language inflation (Kartik, 2009; Kartik et al., 2007).
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fails to achieve the same efficiency because of the conflicting interests between the agents. This
coordination failure lowers the marginal benefit of information and thus discourages information
acquisition under decentralization. Hence, given the fully revealing communication equilibrium
outcome, the principal is better off retaining the decision rights when doing so can motivate the
agents to acquire more information.8
Since the local markets are symmetric ex ante, the equal-profitability condition in the bench-
mark result above is satisfied if and only if the global states are perfectly and positively corre-
lated. This is a knife-edge case, and the picture changes as soon as we move away from it. A
key finding of our paper, stated in Theorem 4.1(ii), is that provided there is any uncertainty
in the relative profitability of the local markets, decentralization will outperform centralization
in terms of information gathering if coordination is sufficiently important. To understand the
result, note that under centralization the principal would prioritize the adaptation problem of
the division that turns out to be more profitable. The information passed on by the less prof-
itable division may thus receive little attention. Not surprisingly, since (i) the agents cannot
perfectly forecast the relative profitability of the local markets ex ante and (ii) the loss from mis-
adapting to one’s local state is convex, the uncertainty in the ex post value of information tends
to discourage information gathering. What is less obvious, perhaps, is the following reinforcing
interaction between this negative effect and the need for coordination. As coordination becomes
more important, knowledge about local market conditions plays less of a role in the principal’s
choice of actions. However, since the adaptation problem of the more profitable division is still
relatively more important, the decrease of influence in decision-making is more substantial for
the less profitable division. Hence, compared to the case where the agents are autonomous, a
large coordination motive can be much more harmful for their information-gathering incentives
when the principal is in charge.
Next, in Theorem 4.2, we show that if the distribution of the global states is sufficiently
volatile, then the agents would also acquire more information under decentralization when coor-
dination is of little importance relative to adaptation. Further, by fully characterizing the cases
where the global states are binomially distributed, we demonstrate that with high volatility the
comparative advantage of decentralization in motivating information acquisition may even hold
regardless of the importance of coordination (Propositions 4.5 and 4.6). Thus, the more volatile
the local markets, the larger the motivational benefits of decentralization.
Whether and when the above benefits of decentralization can outweigh the cost of losing
control is not obvious, because it is exactly when the local markets are highly volatile that the
principal would most appreciate the flexibility granted by centralization. We show in Theorems
4.3 and 4.4 that the answer depends largely on the convexity of the information cost . If the
information cost is sufficiently convex, the additional gain in information quality from decen-
tralization is at most minor, so it would not be optimal for the principal to transfer the decision
rights to the agents. However, if the cost of information is not too convex, the drop in infor-
8The optimality result of centralized decision-making echoes the recent experimental findings by Brandts
and Cooper (2018). Assigning the subjects with different managerial roles and endowing them with exogenous
information, their experimental design simulates how two parallel divisional decisions are made in an organization.
They find that the subjects are surprisingly honest in communication and that the organizational performance is
higher when decision rights are allocated to a central manager.
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mation quality due to centralization is substantial enough to make decentralization optimal.
Then, given that strong coordination motives widen the gap in information quality between
centralization and decentralization, we arrive at the novel prediction that the importance of co-
ordinating organizational activities can actually strengthen rather than weaken the optimality
of decentralized decision-making.
Our results have direct implications on how formal authority over critical decisions should
be allocated between organizational agents, which is a design architecture central to the stories
of success (or failure) of many modern corporations.9 More broadly, the results are also related
to the core debate in economics on the role of (de)centralized systems in information aggrega-
tion and decision-making. Perhaps most famously and influentially, Friedrich von Hayek argued
that the problem of rapid adaptation to local changes must be solved by “some form of decen-
tralization” (Hayek, 1945, p. 524), since knowledge about local conditions is dispersed among
individual agents rather than existing in concentrated form. However, if adaptation decisions
are interdependent and their relative importance is uncertain, efficient use of information may
also require some centralized coordination. We show that centralized decision-making need not
suffer from the information asymmetry that Hayek criticized, and it is indeed more efficient in
adapting to existing information. However, decentralization can still be optimal once the endo-
geneity of information is taken into account. This suggests that the fundamental advantage of
decentralized systems is in information production.
Our results can shed light on some business cases of multi-divisional corporations. For ex-
ample, it has been widely discussed that Japan’s multinational mobile phone makers perform
very poorly in the overseas markets.10 In particular, many of them, such as NEC and Panasonic,
were already struggling in the global competition in the 2000s, which was even before the smart-
phone era. Their unsatisfactory performance may be explained by the traditional centralized
decision-making process of Japanese multinationals (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002; Bloom et al.,
2012) and the large economies of scale of the mobile phone industry. For instance, from their
entry to China in 1995 until 2002, NEC and Panasonic “released only a few models that were
adapted from their models in Japan” (Marukawa, 2009, p. 428). This practice probably had
a lot to do with the fact that many components of the Japanese phones were manufactured
domestically rather than overseas in low-wage countries, so the cost-saving benefit from coordi-
nating the choices of handset models across borders could be especially significant. But then,
according to our theory it is not surprising that these phone makers were slow in learning some
basic differences in the distribution structures and consumer tastes between Japan and China
(see, e.g., Marukawa, 2009). Both NEC and Panasonic withdrew their mobile phone business
9See, for example, Freeland (2001) on the history of General Motors in the 1920’s - 1960’s. Narrative evidence
supporting the importance of authority allocations for organizational performance includes the reform of decision-
making structure that Louis Gerstner implemented soon after he became the CEO of IBM, which is considered
to be a key factor that lead to the firm’s success in the 1990’s. See, for instance, Gerstner’s memoir of his tenure
in IBM (Gerstner, 2002) as well as the discussion by Malone (2004). Another case in point is the remarkable
failure of the merger of Chrysler and Daimler in 1998. As convincingly argued by Garicano and Rayo (2016), a
fatal problem of the merged company, DaimlerChrysler AG, was its poorly-designed allocation of authority. For
more systematic empirical evidence, see, e.g., Aghion et al. (2017), and Thomas (2011).
10See, e.g., online articles “Why Japan’s cellphones haven’t gone global?”, New York Times, 19 July 2009,
“What happened to Japan’s electronic giants?”, BBC News, 2 April 2013, and “NEC and the sorrow of Japan”,
Boy Genius Report, 17 July 2013.
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from China around 2006, and from the entire global market around 2013.
Of course, centralization is not always inferior to decentralization. For example, for a com-
pany that sells both smartphones and personal computers (e.g., Apple and Microsoft), there
may be very limited benefits from coordinating the design of these two products because they
are supposed to serve different consumer needs. In that case, our theory suggests that it is
unlikely that empowering the product managers would lead to much more informed decision-
making. Thus, it is more important that the allocation of decision rights does not constrain the
company’s ability to react promptly to the changing prospects of different products (e.g., by
allocating resources across divisions). This may help to understand why Steve Ballmer decided
to massively reorganize Microsoft in 2013, moving the governance of the company closer to its
very centralized peer Apple.11
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the related literature. Section 4.3
introduces the model. Section 4.4 characterizes the equilibria under different organizational
structures. Building on the characterization results, Section 4.5 studies the optimal organi-
zational structure. Section 4.6 presents two extensions, one concerning the roles of monetary
transfers (Section 4.6.1), while the other considers imperfectly verifiable information (Section
4.6.2). Section 4.7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix D.
4.2 Related Literature
The organizational problem of coordinated adaptation under dispersed information has a long
intellectual history in organizational theory and economics (see, among many others, Barnard,
1938; Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1947; Williamson, 1975, 1996). Our paper belongs to a
growing strand of this literature, which examines how an organization’s decision-making struc-
ture can determine its ability to coordinate the activities of its sub-units while remaining re-
sponsive to changes in the local environments. Specifically, our model builds on the framework
developed by Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), which are among the first papers to
model strategic information transmission in the context of designing multi-divisional organiza-
tions. They focus on the case where information is “soft”, meaning that communication between
organizational members takes the form of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). One of their
most insightful findings is that as the need for coordination increases, the communication of
decision-relevant information under centralization (decentralization) becomes less (more) infor-
mative. This implies that the comparative advantage of an authority structure need not be
monotone in the importance of coordination (Rantakari, 2008). In addition, if the interests of
the local managers are sufficiently aligned, then the optimality of decentralized decision-making
is not necessarily inconsistent with a large need for coordination (Alonso et al., 2008).12 Our
model departs from theirs mainly by (1) focusing on the case where information is “hard” (Gross-
man, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) or at least is costly to misrepresent (Kartik, 2009; Kartik et al., 2007),
11See “Microsoft overhauls, the Apple way”, New York Times, 11 July 2013.
12While both Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) assume that the private information of the managers
is exogenous, their main results are subsequently shown to be robust to endogenous information acquisition
(Rantakari, 2013). Their models have also been extended to more than two divisions (Yang and Zhang, 2017).
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and (2) relaxing the (implicit) assumption that the local markets where the organization oper-
ates exhibit no uncertainty in their profitability conditions. More important than the modeling
differences, we add to Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008, 2013), and more generally to the
literature of organizational design and coordinated adaptation, by showing that the importance
of coordination can even make decentralized decision-making optimal. In particular, this result
holds despite the fact that in our model the allocation of decision rights does not affect the
informativeness of communication at all, and that the conflicts of interests between the local
managers are maximal (as they only care about their own divisions).
Within the literature on organizational design and coordinated adaptation, our paper is fur-
ther related to Dessein et al. (2010), Friebel and Raith (2010), and Alonso et al. (2015). In
Dessein et al. (2010), the organization can better exploit the benefits of cost-saving standard-
ization by integrating its manufacturing activities. Standardization, however, also comes with
a loss in revenues because it impedes the organization’s ability to tailor its marketing activities
to local conditions. Dessein et al. (2010) find that a more decentralized authority structure can
better incentivize the managerial members of the organization to exert division-specific effort,
but it is still dominated by a more centralized one if the expected value of synergies (akin to the
importance of coordination in our model) is sufficiently large. Thus, unlike in our paper, the
advantage of decentralized decision-making in incentivizing effort provision is thwarted rather
than strengthened by the importance of coordinating activities across organizational units.
In line with Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), both Friebel and Raith (2010) and
Alonso et al. (2015) consider settings where the top management of the organization is con-
strained (and often also harmed) by its informational disadvantage compared to the division
managers. In Friebel and Raith (2010), delegating resource-allocating rights to the division
managers can be optimal since they control the information about the marginal return of their
projects. But delegation can also be sub-optimal because sometimes it is more profitable to
concentrate all resources on a single project. In Alonso et al. (2015), the headquarter may be
better off by letting the division managers choose their production plans independently given
that they know more about the demand conditions of each market, but the opposite may also oc-
cur since the costs of production are interdependent. Nevertheless, if the division managers were
non-strategic in communication, then both the models of Friebel and Raith (2010) and Alonso
et al. (2015) would conclude that it is always optimal to have the decisions centrally made.
In contrast, in our model, even without the help of message-contingent transfers, the division
managers are always incentivized to be truthful when communicating their private information
to the decision-making parties.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on delegation as an instrument to motivate infor-
mation acquisition. The seminal work of Aghion and Tirole (1997) introduces an important
trade-off between employee initiative and the loss of control. In their framework, an agent has
to acquire decision-relevant information and has better incentives to do so when being able to
formally control the decision. With multiple agents and partial coordination motives, the ability
of an agent to influence the decisions is restricted by the optimal behavior of the other agents. In
fact, in our multi-agent setting, absent the uncertainty in the principal’s (interim) decision rule,
the agents’ incentives for information acquisition are always weaker under delegation (Theorem
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1(i)). Nevertheless, we show that this pessimistic view of delegation need not hold once some
uncertainty over the principal’s decision rule is introduced (Theorems 1(ii) and 2). Thus, the
driving force of the motivational advantage of delegation in our model is different from that in
Aghion and Tirole (1997).
Recent contributions show that the incentive effect of delegation can be ambiguous if the
communication between the principal and the agent is strategic.13 For example, in Argenziano
et al. (2016), the principal can benefit from retaining the decision-making authority while del-
egating the task of information acquisition to the agent. This is because the principal may
either threaten the agent with a babbling off-path if information gathering is overt, or obsti-
nately expect the information to be highly precise if it is acquired covertly. The finding that
centralizing the authority to the principal can better motivate the agent to acquire information
compared to delegation is shared by Che and Kartik (2009). A key driving force of their result
is that the principal and the agent hold different priors about the state of nature (“opinions”),
so under centralization whenever the latter fails to provide any evidence the former would make
an adverse inference and take an unfavorable action.14 All papers above focus on settings with a
single agent, whereas ours feature multiple ones.15 This modeling difference is not superfluous.
As we show, the incentive effect of delegation (decentralization) crucially depends on the inter-
action between the need for coordinating the agents’ actions and how their relative performance
is valued by the principal.
4.3 The Model
An organization consists of two operating divisions, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Division i’s performance
(e.g., profits/sales generated, number of patents obtained) is determined by its local conditions,
described by θi ∈ R, and two actions y = (y1, y2) ∈ R2:
pii(y, θi) = K − (yi − θi)2 − δ(y1 − y2)2,
whereK > 0 is some constant, and δ > 0 measures the importance of coordinating actions within
the organization. Each local state θi is independently and identically distributed according to a
commonly known distribution Γ with support Θ ⊆ R. We normalize the mean of the distribution
to zero (E[θi] = 0) and assume that it has a finite variance σ2θ = E[θ2i ] > 0.
Each division i is run by an agent (e.g., a division manager, he), which we will refer to as
agent i. Before any action is taken, each agent i can privately invest effort ei ∈ E = [0, 1] in
13Abstracting from strategic communication, the incentive view of delegation is also discussed by Rantakari
(2012). He shows that formal delgation is unlikely to be optimal when the quality of implementable projects
is determined by both the principal’s and the agent’s effort choices. The reason is that an unconstrained agent
would only be interested in improving the private return of his project. In contrast, under centralization, for his
project to be implemented the agent would also need to make it sufficiently attractive to the principal.
14A similar persuasive motive of information acquisition under centralization is also present in Newman and
Novoselov (2009). In their setting, the principal and the agent share a common prior about the state of nature,
but they differ in the costs of committing different types of statistical errors.
15Kartik et al. (2017) show that if the principal cannot commit to decision rules ex ante, then having multiple
agents compete with each other does not necessarily encourage information acquisition. In their setting, the
efforts of the agents are (endogenously) strategic substitutes, whereas in ours, the equilibrium effort choices are
strategically independent (see Propositions 4.2 and 4.4).
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acquiring information about the local state of his division. Specifically, by choosing an effort
level ei ∈ E, agent i incurs a cost of c(ei) and receives a perfectly revealing signal si = θi with
probability ei. With probability 1− ei, the agent receives a null signal si = ∅. Thus, the agent’s
effort enhances the probability that the true state will be revealed by the signal (Green and
Stokey, 1981).16 The realization of the signal is referred to as the agent’s type. We assume a
twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function c : E → R+. Each agent
cares about the performance of his own division. In particular, the ex post payoff of agent i is
given by
ui(y, θi, ei) = qpii(y, θi)− c(ei),
where q > 0 captures the marginal benefit for the agent to increase his division’s performance
(e.g., price of sales, monetary bonus, promotion opportunities). For analytical convenience, we
assume throughout the paper that the marginal cost of information is sufficiently small at e = 0
(e.g., c′(0) < qσ2θ/2) and is sufficiently large at e = 1 (e.g., c′(1) > qσ2θ) to ensure an interior
solution ei ∈ (0, 1).
The agents are led by a common and uninformed principal (e.g., a headquarter manager, she),
whose payoff depends on the performance of both divisions and a stochastic vector η = (η1, η2):
piP (y,θ,η) = η1pi1(y, θ1) + η2pi2(y, θ2). (4.1)
Thus, ηi measures the marginal benefit for the principal from increasing division i’s performance.
As we have discussed in the introduction, there are many economic scenarios where the principal
may care about the performance of different divisions to different extents (i.e., η1 6= η2). In the
context of multinational corporations, pii can be profits measured in country i’s currency, and
ηi is the currency exchange rate between country i and the country where the headquarter is
located. Another interpretation is that pii is a measure (e.g., market share) which summarizes the
firm’s performance in market i relative to its competitors, while ηi reflects demand uncertainty
such as changes in market size or in preference intensity (“fashion”). Alternatively, if pii and q
are the number and the price of sales in product market i, then we may have ηi = q− γi, where
γi ≥ 0 is the per unit cost for the headquarter to supply division i with necessary resources.
Finally, we may instead assume that ηi = q + γi, and then interpret γi as a parameter that
captures (in reduced-form) the strategic importance of succeeding in product market i (e.g.,
gaining competitive advantage through brand-building or consumer habit-forming).17
We assume that the random variables η1 and η2 are drawn according to some symmetric and
commonly known joint probability distribution F (η1, η2) on the support
[
η, η¯
]2
, where η¯ > η >
0. The values of η1 and η2 are realized and publicly observed after the agents have acquired
16The assumption that an agent’s can only acquire an “all-or-nothing” signal simplifies the analysis, but it is not
crucial. Our main results can be extended to more general settings where the precision of the signal is increasing
in the agent’s effort, in the sense that the expectation of the conditional variance σ2θi|si = E
[
(θi − E[θi|si])2
]
is
decreasing in ei.
17The specification of the utility function (4.1) is also open to the “behavioral” interpretation that the principal
has some intrinsic biases and thus favors the two agents unequally. This interpretation relates our model to the
growing literature on behaviorally biased managers/supervisors. See, e.g., Prendergast and Topel (1996), Giebe
and Gürtler (2012), and Letina et al. (2018).
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Figure 4.1: Timing of Events
information about their local states (θ1, θ2) and before the decisions (y1, y2) are taken.18 The
uncertainty due to (η1, η2) is different from the uncertainty coming from the local states (θ1, θ2).
First, unlike the local states, η1 and η2 are not required to be independently distributed, reflecting
the observation that various economic environments are correlated, possibly in a rather complex
way (e.g., when η1 and η2 are currency exchange rates). Second, from the principal’s perspective,
how the decision rules of different divisions should be optimally interlinked is determined by the
relative value of η1 and η2. If, for example, η1 > η2, the principal would prefer agent 1 to adapt
more aggressively towards his local state and agent 2 to focus more on coordination. In other
words, η1 and η2 determine which actions are globally optimal for the organization rather than
locally optimal for individual divisions. We will therefore refer to them as the global states of
our game. All model parameters are common knowledge.
We complete the model description by specifying how exactly information is communicated
and decisions are taken under centralization and decentralization, respectively. Under central-
ization, the principal takes the decisions (y1, y2) after communicating with both agents.19 Under
decentralization, each agent takes the decision of his own division after communicating with each
other. Figure 4.1 summarizes the timing of events in our model.
Independent of the allocation of decision rights, we assume that in the communication stage
the agents can credibly reveal their findings about the local states if they want to do so. In
particular, conditional on receiving a signal si ∈ S = Θ ∪ {∅}, agent i can send a message
mi ∈ M(si) to either agent j (under decentralization) or the principal (under centralization),
where we denoteM = ∪si∈SM(si) and assume that the signal-dependent message spaces satisfy
the condition below.20
Assumption 4.1. ∅ ∈ M(∅), and ∀si 6= ∅, ∃msi ∈M(si) \ ∪s′i 6=siM(s′i)
The essential requirement of assumption 4.1 is that an informed agent can always certify his
type (Seidmann and Winter, 1997). In particular, whenever the message msi is communicated,
the receiving party will know for sure that agent i has learned the value of the local state θi,
which is equal to si. However, since the message m = ∅ is not necessarily only available to type
18Information about (η1, η2) may also arrive exogenously before the agents have exerted efforts. Here, an
implicit assumption is that such information can be summarized in the common prior F .
19As will become clear in Section 4.4.2, our main results hold regardless of whether the uncertainty of (η1, η2)
resolves before or after the agents communicate with the principal under centralization.
20Games with signal-independent message spaces (Mi(si) = S ∀si ∈ S) and costly lying are studied in Section
4.6.2.
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∅, 4.1 allows the possibility that an agent may not be able to prove that he is uninformed. The
assumption thus accomodates a large class of communication games. For example, it is satisfied
by the evidence game introduced by Dye (1985), whereM(si) = {si, ∅} ∀si ∈ S, i.e., the agents
can always hide but cannot fake their findings about the local conditions. It is also satisfied by
the persuasion game studied by Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and Milgrom and Roberts
(1986b), where M(si) = {S ⊆ S : si ∈ S} ∀si ∈ S, i.e., the agents cannot lie but they may
send “vague” messages about their findings. Finally, while the assumption rules out pure cheap
talk communication, it nevertheless permits the following game of cheap talk with certification:
∅ ∈ M(∅), andM(si) = S ∪ {csi} if si 6= ∅, where csi 6= cs′i ∀si 6= s′i. The interpretation is that
agent i can either send a non-verifiable message to claim that his type is s˜i ∈ S, or provide a
certification to truthfully reveal the signal he has received. However, such a certification is not
necessarily available when the agent has failed to obtain any informative signal.
We are interested in how the overall organizational performance is shaped by the interac-
tion between authority allocation and the model’s primitives, in particular δ and F (i.e, the
coordination motive and the uncertainty/volatility of local market profitability). To answer this
question, we first derive and analyze the respective perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE; Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991, p. 333) of the games under centralization and decentralization (see Section
4.4). We show that under either of the two organizational structures, full revelation of agents’
private signals can always be sustained as part of an equilibrium. Moreover, this is essentially the
unique equilibrium outcome of the communication game. We then characterize (i) the agents’
effort provision and (ii) the principal’s expected payoff in the corresponding PBE, which are
uniquely pinned down given the full-revelation communication, and use them to measure the
performance of the organization. The main results on the optimal allocation of decision rights
are presented in Section 4.5.
4.4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.4.1 Decentralized authority
We first analyze the game under decentralization. As mentioned, decentralization means that
each agent has full control over the decision of his own division. Since the global states (η1, η2)
only affect the principal’s payoff, they are irrelevant for the agents’ incentives under decentral-
ization.
Formally, the strategy of each agent i ∈ {1, 2} is a triple (edi ,mdi , ydi ) where edi ∈ E is his
effort to acquire decision-relevant information, mdi is a mapping that specifies for every given
effort-signal pair (ei, si) which message mdi (ei, si) ∈ M(si) agent i will send to agent j, and
ydi is a decision rule specifying the agent’s action ydi (ei, si,mi,mj) conditional on the effort-
signal pair (ei, si) and the messages (mi,mj). In equilibrium, each agent i’s choices of effort,
messages and actions must be sequentially rational with respect to his beliefs (about θi, ej and
sj), which are formed using Bayes’ rule whenever applicable. In addition, since the message
sets are signal-dependent, we further require that for every mj ∈ M agent i’s posterior belief
about agent j’s signal sj , which we denote by µji (·|mj) ∈ ∆(S), must be consistent (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986b). Mathematically, this requires that µji (Smj |mj) = 1 ∀mj ∈ M, where
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Smj = {sj ∈ S : mj ∈ M(sj)} is the set of signals which could possibly make the message mj
available to agent j.
Our first proposition shows that under decentralization there is essentially a unique equi-
librium outcome of the communication stage: despite the conflicts of interests, both agents are
incentivized to reveal all their private information.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the decentralized authority structure.
(i) Suppose that ∀m ∈ M, Sm is closed. Then, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mdi (ei, si) = msi and mdi (ei, ∅) = ∅, ∀si ∈ Θ, ∀ei ∈ E,∀i = 1, 2.
(ii) If a communication strategy m∗i is part of a PBE, then µij ({si}|m∗i (e∗i , si)) = 1 for almost
all si ∈ S \ {0, ∅} with respect to Γ.
The existence of a fully revealing equilibrium is not obvious. In particular, it is known
that complete voluntary disclosure need not arise in equilibrium when information is costly to
acquire (e.g., Shavell, 1994) and/or when the possibility that the sender is uninformed cannot
be ruled out (e.g., Shin, 1994). To gain the intuition for Proposition 4.1(i), consider an agent i
who observes si > 0 (and thus knows θi) and contemplates a deviation from the fully revealing
strategy mdi . As we require in the proof, agent j always assumes the worst in the spirit of
Milgrom and Roberts (1986b): for every message mi ∈M observed, j would think that i’s type
is for sure smi ∈ argminsi∈Smi
∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣, i.e., the one that minimizes the distance between j’s
posterior and prior expectations about θi among all types who have access to the message mi.
This implies that by deviating to any message mi 6= msi , i could only manipulate j to think
that on average the local state θi is lower than si (i.e., E[θi|mi] ≤ si).
Now imagine, for the sake of the argument, that agent i knows that j has either received a
signal sj = ∅ or sj = θj ≤ θi. Given that the sequentially rational action for agent j is a weighted
average of his posterior expectations of θj and yi, the above manipulation is not profitable for
agent i because it will mislead j to take an action even further away from what would have been
ideal for i. In contrast, if agent j is known to have received a signal sj = θj > θi, deceiving j to
underestimate the value of θi could be tempting for agent i, since it may move j’s action closer
to i’s local state θi than what j would have chosen otherwise. Of course, as the communication
game is simultaneous, when deciding which message to send agent i does not know which of the
above two cases j’s signal falls into. However, since E [θj ] = 0 and θi = si > 0, agent i does
know that either or both of the followings must hold: (i) Pr(θj ≤ θi) ≥ Pr(θj > θi), i.e., a priori
θj ≤ θi is a more likely scenario compared to θj > θi; (ii)
∣∣E[θj |θj ≤ θi]∣∣ ≥ E[θj |θj > θi], i.e.,
the distribution Γ assigns a substantial weight to values that are far smaller than θi. Hence, on
average the losses from mis-coordination and mis-adaptation are minimized when agent i reveals
his type by sending the message msi to j.21
The second part of Proposition 4.1 establishes that full revelation of private information is
essentially the unique prediction of the communication game under decentralization. In any
21One may envision invoking the general results of Hagenbach et al. (2014) to prove the existence of a fully
revealing equilibrium in the current model. But their results are not directly applicable to our problem because
they do not consider endogenous information acquisition.
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equilibrium, after the bilateral communication the agents can always be (almost) sure about
each other’s types, except possibly when the distribution Γ admits an atom at θi = 0 and an
agent may use the same message for types 0 and ∅. However, this exception is not payoff-
relevant because knowing whether si = 0 or si = ∅ will not affect the subsequent decisions
of the agents. If the distribution Γ is discrete, then the result can be proved by adapting the
well-known unraveling argument (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). More specifically, in our
setting, if several types of agent i are using the same message m ∈M, then at least one of them,
say si, would find that his finding is being understated (|E[θi|m]| < |E[θi|msi ]| = si). Thus,
by deviating to the type-revealing message msi agent i could convince j to take decisions that
are more favorable to i in expectation. In the proof, we show how this intuitive argument can
be generalized to arbitrary distributions, including the ones that are partly discrete and partly
continuous.
Given that the private signals are truthfully revealed in equilibrium, the decision rules (yd1 , yd2)
are uniquely pinned down on the equilibrium path. Thus, when calculating the expected payoffs
of the agents, the decision rules can be written as functions of the private signals s = (s1, s2)
only. Taking these action functions and agent j’s effort ej as given, agent i then solves the
following maximization problem at the information acquisition stage:
max
ei∈[0,1]
Udi (ei, ej) = Eθ
[
Es
[
ui
(
yd1(s), yd2(s), θi, ei
] ∣∣ei, ej]] . (4.2)
It turns out that (4.2) admits a unique solution edi ∈ (0, 1), which is independent of the effort
choice of agent j. Hence, the equilibrium outcome at the information acquisition stage is also
unique under decentralization. The findings about the stages of decision-making and information
acquisition are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.2. In any fully revealing PBE under decentralization, the on-path equilibrium
decisions are given by
ydi (si, sj) =
1 + δ
1 + 2δ · E[θi|si] +
δ
1 + 2δ · E[θj |sj ], ∀i, j = 1, 2.
In addition, both agents exert the same effort
ed1 = ed2 = ed ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ
)
.
Thus, the equilibrium effort level ed is increasing in q and σ2θ . Intuitively, this is because
an increase in q or σ2θ leads to a larger expected loss of being uninformed. Further, as formally
shown in Appendix D, ed is decreasing in δ. This is also intuitive: a higher need for coordination
makes adaptation less important from the agents’ perspective and thus decreases the value of
information.
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4.4.2 Centralized authority
In this section, we analyze the game under centralization. Recall that in this case the principal
has full control over the decisions of both divisions. Thus, in contrast to the case of decentral-
ization, when making their effort choices and communicating their signals, the agents take into
account how the global states (η1, η2) may affect the principal’s decisions.
Under centralization, each agent i’s strategy is a pair (eci ,mci ), where eci ∈ E is his effort to
acquire information about his local state θi and mci is a mapping that specifies for every given
effort-signal pair (ei, si) which message mci (ei, si) he reports to the principal. The principal’s
strategy is a pair of mappings (yc1, yc2), where yci (mi,mj , η1, η2) is the action that the princi-
pal takes for division i when receiving messages (mi,mj) from the agents and observing the
global states (η1, η2). In equilibrium, each agent i chooses the effort level and signal-dependent
messages that maximize his expected payoff, and the principal chooses actions that are sequen-
tially rational with respect to his beliefs (about θ, s and e), which are formed using Bayes’
rule whenever applicable. Similar to the case of decentralization, we require that for every
mj ∈ M and j ∈ {1, 2} the principal’s posterior belief about agent j’s type, which we denote
by µjp (·|mj) ∈ ∆(S), must be consistent. That is, µjp (Smj |mj) = 1 ∀mj ∈M.
The next result parallels Proposition 4.1 in the previous section. It shows that the prin-
cipal need not be concerned about the agents strategically manipulating their reports under
centralization, as they are incentivized to fully reveal their private information in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3. Consider the centralized authority structure.
(i) Suppose that ∀m ∈ M, Sm is closed. Then, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mci (ei, si) = msi and mci (ei, ∅) = ∅, ∀si ∈ Θ, ∀ei ∈ E,∀i = 1, 2.
(ii) If a communication strategy m∗i is part of a PBE, then µip ({si}|m∗i (e∗i , si)) = 1 for almost
all si ∈ S \ {0, ∅} with respect to Γ.
The intuition of Proposition 4.3 is similar to that of Proposition 4.1. Together, our full-
revelation results suggest that the allocation of decision rights does not affect the quality of
communication in the organization. This finding can even be extended to settings where the
message sets are type-independent. In Section 6 we show that fully revealing equilibria also arise
in a communication game with M(si) = S ∀si ∈ S and costly exaggeration. Our results are
in sharp contrast to Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), who show that if information
about local states is dispersed and held by agents who communicate via cheap talk, the relative
performance of different authority structures depends crucially on their endogenous quality of
communication. Moreover, our results show that centralized decision-making does not suffer
from the usual problem of information asymmetry, as the principal can elicit all the information
from the agents even without the help of contingent transfers. Thus, different from related
works such as Dessein (2002) and Deimen and Szalay (2018), strategic communication does
not give rise to a trade-off between loss of control under delegation/decentralization and loss of
information under centralization in our setting.
Given that the private signals are truthfully revealed in equilibrium, the principal’s decision
rules (yc1, yc2) are uniquely pinned down on the equilibrium path. Thus, when calculating the
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expected payoffs of the agents, the decision rules can be written as functions of the private
signals s = (s1, s2) only. Especially, the action chosen by the principal for each division will be a
weighted sum of the conditional expectations E[θi|si] and E[θj |sj ], while the weights will depend
on the realization of the global states. Taking the principal’s on-path decision rules and agent
j’s effort ej as given, agent i then solves the following maximization problem at the information
acquisition stage:
max
ei∈[0,1]
U ci (ei, ej) = Eθ [Es [Eη [ui(yc1(s,η), yc2(s,η), θi, ei)] |ei, ej ]] . (4.3)
Similar to the parallel problem under decentralization, (4.3) admits a unique solution eci ∈ (0, 1),
which is independent of ej . Using the symmetry of the distribution of (η1, η2), we then obtain
the following result:
Proposition 4.4. In any fully revealing PBE under centralization, the on-path equilibrium
decisions are given by
yci (si, sj , ηi, ηj) =
ηi
ηi+ηj ·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj + δ
)
E [θi|si] + δηjηi+ηjE[θj |sj ]
ηi
ηi+ηj ·
ηj
ηi+ηj + δ
, ∀i, j = 1, 2.
In addition, both agents exert the same effort
ec1 = ec2 = ecF ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
,
where λ ≡ η1/(η1 + η2).22
Similar to the case of decentralization, the equilibrium effort level ecF is unambiguously
increasing in q and σ2θ . In addition, as we show in Appendix D, ecF is decreasing in δ. Intuitively,
the value of information decreases in the importance of coordination because it makes adaptation
less important from the perspective of all players. It is less clear, however, how the equilibrium
effort level depends on the distribution of the global states (η1, η2). We investigate this question
in the next section as we compare the effort provision under both organizational forms.
4.5 Comparing Organizational Structures
Having analyzed separately the fully revealing equilibria under centralization and decentraliza-
tion, we now ask which allocation of decision rights is optimal for the organization. In our
model, an immediate candidate for the criterion of optimality is the principal’s expected payoff.
Since communication is fully revealing and the principal directly controls the divisional decisions
under centralization, a sufficient (necessary) condition for her to benefit more from a centralized
22Note that the distribution of λ can be derived from the joint distribution of (η1, η2):
Pr(λ ≤ x) =
∫
[η,η¯]2
1{η1/(η1+η2)≤x}dF (η1, η2)∀x ∈ R.
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(decentralized) authority structure is the extent of the agents’ effort provision.23 Hence, com-
paring agents’ efforts under centralization and decentralization provides a useful stepping stone
for answering the question of which allocation of decision rights is optimal for the principal.
Moreover, the comparison of effort provision can be of interest per se, especially if one is con-
cerned that our model may not capture all the benefits of learning for the organization. With
these motivations in mind, in what follows we will start by analyzing the relative performance
of the organization in terms of effort provision (Section 4.5.1). The analysis of the principal’s
expected payoff will then be presented in Section 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Effort provision
Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 directly imply that the equilibrium effort level is higher under decen-
tralization than that under centralization (ed > ecF ) if and only if
D(δ) = δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2 < CF (δ) = E
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
]
, (4.4)
where we recall that λ = η1/(η1+η2), and we drop the subscript λ from the expectation operator
for brevity.
To understand the above condition, note that when choosing his effort, an optimizing agent
balances the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of information. Condition (4.4) is then
equivalent to the statement that the marginal benefit of information is higher under decentral-
ization than that under centralization. More specifically, if the agent had the right to choose
actions for both divisions, he can always make sure that they are perfectly coordinated (yj = yi).
In this case, the expected benefit of exerting an additional unit of effort will be qσ2θ , which
is exactly the payoff difference between taking an informed and ideal decision (yi = θi) and
an uninformed one (yi = E[θi]). When decision rights are decentralized, each agent only has
control over his own division, and coordination is no longer perfect due to conflicting interests
between the agents. Hence, from the agents’ perspective, the value of information is impaired
by the need of coordination, and so the marginal benefit of being better informed decreases
to MBd = (1 − D(δ))qσ2θ . Under centralization, the principal may better coordinate the ac-
tions of the divisions. However, because the relative profitability of the local markets (ηi/ηj)
is uncertain, a forward-looking agent would be concerned that the principal may prioritize the
adaptation problem of the other division and thus pay little attention to his acquired informa-
tion. These effects jointly determine the marginal benefit of information under centralization,
which is MBc = (1 − CF (δ))qσ2θ . It is then straightforward to check that MBd > MBc if and
only if (4.4) holds.
Exploiting the limiting properties of the functions D(δ) and CF (δ) in (4.4), our first theorem
below shows that, except for the knife-edge case where the global states are perfectly and posi-
tively correlated, a decentralized organization outperforms its centralized counterpart in terms
of incentivizing effort provision (or information gathering) whenever coordination is sufficiently
important.
23If the set of feasible effort choices is binary and is given by E = {0, e¯}, where e¯ ∈ (0, 1], then ed > ecF is not
only necessary but also sufficient for concluding that the principal is better off under decentralization.
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Theorem 4.1. Let corr(η1, η2) be the correlation of the global states.
(i) If corr(η1, η2) = 1, then ed < ecF ∀δ > 0.
(ii) If corr(η1, η2) < 1, then ∃ δ¯ ∈ [0,+∞), such that ed > ecF ∀δ > δ¯. In addition, the
difference ed − ecF is increasing in δ ∀δ > δ¯.
To see the intuition, remember that under decentralization the agents are free to adjust
their actions according to the acquired information. However, as in many settings with partial
coordination motives and lack of commitment, the decentralized equilibrium outcome is not
Pareto efficient for the agents. In contrast, whenever the global states are perfectly and positively
correlated, under centralization the principal acts as a neutral party maximizing both agents’
payoffs. In this case, a centralized authority structure effectively allows the agents to commit
to the efficient action plans for any given information acquired. As a result, regardless of
the importance of coordination, from an individual agent’s perspective the marginal benefit of
information is highest when decisions are centrally made by the principal.
However, the picture changes as we move away from the knife-edge case of a perfectly pre-
dictable profitability ratio η1/η2 = 1. Ex post, the performances of the two divisions may not
be equally profitable/important for the principal, so she only aims to maximize a weighted sum
of the agents’ surplus. Thus, even though the principal values both divisions equally on average
(i.e., E[η1]/E[η2] = 1), centralization is less valuable for the agents as a commitment device
because of the uncertainty of the global states. Importantly, this negative uncertainty effect
is further amplified by the need for coordination: as the latter increases, a biased principal
gives substantially less consideration to her unfavored agent’s report. This happens because
she primarily wants the more profitable division to adapt more aggressively to its local state
while minimizing the mis-coordination costs.24 Eventually, the positive commitment effect of
centralized decision-making is dominated by the negative effect due to the volatile profitability
of the local markets, leading to an increasing gap in effort provision between decentralization
and centralization.
Part (ii) of Theorem 4.1 establishes that a decentralized organization induces more efforts
from the agents if the importance of coordination exceeds some cutoff value δ¯ ≥ 0. One may
wonder whether the converse of this statement also holds, i.e., whether it is the case that a
centralized organization is better in terms of effort provision whenever coordination is sufficiently
unimportant. Note that this question is only meaningful if δ¯ 6= 0. In the next subsection, we
show that the lower bound δ¯ = 0 can indeed be achieved by some distributions, implying that
in those cases decentralization outperforms centralization in terms of effort provision whenever
coordination is of any importance. Nevertheless, as we will also show by example in the next
subsection, when the cut-off is strictly positive it is not necessarily the case that ed < ecF
∀δ ∈ (0, δ¯). In particular, while for intermediate values of δ centralization may indeed outperform
24To formalize this intuition, let w = ηi
ηi+ηi
·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
)/(
ηi
ηi+ηj
· ηj
ηi+ηj
+ δ
)
be the strategic weight that
the principal would assign to agent i’s private information when making decision yi under centralization (see
Proposition 4.4). It can be shown that ∂w
∂ηi
> 0 and ∂2w
∂ηi∂δ
> 0 ∀δ > 0 and ∀η1, η2 ∈
[
η, η¯
]
, i.e., the principal’s
decision weights will respond more aggressively to the profitability conditions of the local markets as the need for
coordination increases.
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decentralization in terms of effort provision, it may fail to do so when the need for coordination
is relatively small. The next result shows that this is likely to happen when the profitability
conditions of the local markets are very volatile.
Theorem 4.2. If E
[
1
λ2
]
> E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
− 3, then ∃ δ ∈ (0,+∞], such that ed > ecF ∀δ ∈ (0, δ).
To understand Theorem 4.2, note that its condition is violated if corr(η1, η2) = 1, as this
implies that Pr(λ = 0.5) = 1. By continuity, it must also be violated if η1 and η2 are sufficiently
positively correlated, meaning that the principal is unlikely to strongly bias her decisions in
favor of the more profitable division ex post. As the profitability conditions become less and
less positively correlated, the strategic weights η1 and η2 that the principal assigns to the two
divisions are more likely to be extreme (i.e, λ is more likely to take values that are close to 0 and
1). This makes the condition of Theorem 4.2 more likely to be satisfied.25 Thus, Theorem 4.2
captures the intuition that if the principal is likely to be highly biased ex post, then centralizing
the decision rights can strongly discourage the agents from acquiring valuable information even
when the motive of coordination is small. Therefore, the scope for decentralization to outperform
centralization in effort provision is larger when the profitability conditions of the local markets
are more volatile.
4.5.1.1 Binary distributions: characterizations
In this section, we use a class of binary distributions {Fω}ω∈[0,1) to illustrate our main findings
regarding the effect of decision right allocation on effort provision: for every ω ∈ [0, 1) the
distribution Fω is characterized by
Pr (η1 = 1 + ω, η2 = 1− ω) = Pr (η1 = 1− ω, η2 = 1 + ω) = 12 . (4.5)
Thus, ω can be interpreted as a measure of both the volatility of the local markets’ profitability
conditions and the ex post bias of the principal: the larger ω, the more volatile are the local
markets (since E[(ηi−E[ηi])2] = ω2 and Cov(η1, η2) = −ω2) and the more biased is the principal
ex post (as |(ηi − ηj)/(ηi + ηj)| = ω).
For the above class of binary distributions, we fully characterize when a decentralized organi-
zation outperforms its centralized counterpart in providing incentives to the agents for exerting
costly yet valuable effort. Fixing the volatility of the profitability conditions, or the degree of
the principal’s ex post bias, the next result shows how this regime is shaped by the importance
of promoting synergies in the organization.
Proposition 4.5. Consider any binary distribution Fω with ω ∈ [0, 1).
(i) If ω ≤ √2− 1, then ed > ecF if and only if δ ∈ (0,max{0, δ(ω)}) ∪ (δ¯(ω),+∞), where
δ(ω) ≡ −ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
8ω2 −
(1 + ω2)
√
ω4 − 6ω2 + 1
8ω2 ,
25While both E[ 1
λ2 ] and E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
may increase if the distribution of λ puts more weight toward to endpoints
of the interval [0, 1], the first term increases much faster because of its quadratic form.
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and
δ¯(ω) ≡ −ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
8ω2 +
(1 + ω2)
√
ω4 − 6ω2 + 1
8ω2 ,
with δ(ω) = 0 if and only if ω ≤
√
2
√
3
3 − 1 ≈ 0.393, and limω→0 δ¯(ω) = +∞.
(ii) If ω >
√
2− 1, then ed > ecF ∀δ > 0.
Figure 4.2 provides an illustration of Proposition 4.5 as well as the key messages of Theorems
4.1 and 4.2. For the benchmark case of no uncertainty in the profitability conditions (ω = 0),
Figure 4.1(a) shows that the agents always work harder under centralization (ed−ecF < 0). This
illustrates Theorem 4.1(i) and the asymptotic result limω→0 δ¯(ω) = +∞ from Proposition 4.5(i).
As we start introducing uncertainty to the profitability conditions (η1, η2), both Theorem 4.1(ii)
and Proposition 4.5(i) suggest that a decentralized authority structure is superior in guaranteeing
effort provision (and thus also in information production) whenever the need for coordination
is sufficiently strong. Figure 4.2(b) demonstrates that a strong coordination motive is also
necessary for the equilibrium effort level to be higher under decentralization if the uncertainty
of profitability conditions is sufficiently small. If the degree of uncertainty takes an intermediate
value, then additionally we have ed > ecF when coordination is sufficiently unimportant relative
to adaptation (δ < δ(ω)). As depicted in Figure 4.2(c), in this case centralizing the decision
rights improves the effort provision if and only if the need for coordination is also intermediate.
This echoes the finding of Theorem 4.2.26 Finally, when the degree of uncertainty becomes
sufficiently large (ω >
√
2 − 1), the agents anticipate that the principal will be heavily biased
when making decisions. This substantially impairs the marginal benefit of information under
centralization from the agents’ perspectives. Proposition 4.5(ii) and Figure 4.2(d) show that
in such scenarios decentralization is optimal for guaranteeing effort provision regardless of the
importance of coordination.
26With the binary distributions (4.5), it can be verified that the inequality condition in Theorem 4.2 is equivalent
to ω > ((2
√
3 )/3− 1)1/2, which is also necessary and sufficient for the cutoff δ(ω) in Proposition 4.5 to be strictly
positive.
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0 δ
ed − ecF
(a) ω = 0: δ(ω) = 0, δ¯(ω) = +∞.
0 δ
ed − ecF
(b) ω = 0.2: δ(ω) = 0, δ¯(ω) > 0.
0 δ
ed − ecF
(c) ω = 0.41: δ(ω) > 0, δ¯(ω) > 0.
0 δ
ed − ecF
(d) ω = 0.45: δ(ω) = +∞, δ¯(ω) = 0.
Figure 4.2: The dependence of effort difference on δ, with c(e) = e2.
To further sharpen our understanding of the effort provision under both organizational forms
we next fix the degree of the coordination requirement and ask, how does the effort provision
depend on the volatility of the profitability conditions? As one may already expect, the equi-
librium effort level is higher under decentralization if and only if the profitability conditions
are sufficiently volatile (i.e., ω is sufficiently large). Perhaps less intuitively, the range of the
volatility parameter ω for which decentralization provides more powerful incentives (i.e. the set
{ω ∈ (0, 1) : ed > ecF }) does not change monotonically with respect to the coordination motives.
Starting with a situation where coordination is of little (large) importance, an increase in the
need for coordination makes it more likely that the agents exert more effort under centralization
(decentralization). These observations are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.6. Given a binary distribution Fω with ω ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0, ed > ecF if and
only if ω > ωˆ(δ), where
ωˆ(δ) =
√
(4δ + 2)
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ − 3
4δ + 3 − 2δ.
The cutoff ωˆ(δ) is strictly increasing on
(
0,
√
2−1
2
)
, and it is strictly decreasing on
(√
2−1
2 ,+∞
)
,
with ωˆ
(√
2−1
2
)
=
√
2− 1 and limδ→+∞ ωˆ(δ) = 0.
The insight of Proposition 4.6 is further highlighted in Figure 4.3, where the hatched area
indicates the regime of parameters for which the equilibrium effort level is higher under decen-
tralization. Notably, this graphic representation does not require any specification of the effort
cost function. This shows the generality and robustness of the qualitative results that we have
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0
ed < ecF
ed > ecF
δ
ωˆ(δ)
ω
1
Figure 4.3: The cutoff ωˆ(δ) and the regimes for ed > ecF and ed < eFc .
obtained so far.
4.5.2 The principal’s payoff
In this section, we turn to the question of when the principal can benefit from centralization
(decentralization). The immediate implication of the full-revelation results (Propositions 4.1
and 4.2) is that centralization is optimal for the principal whenever it can better motivate the
agents than decentralization (ed < ecF ), since this allows her to adjust the relevant organizational
activities to better support the (ex post) more profitable division without sacrificing the (ex ante)
informativeness of the decisions. As suggested by the characterization results Propositions 4.5
and 4.6, the principal is more likely to confront such a straightforward comparison between
organizational forms when the need for coordination is small or intermediate and the local
markets are not too volatile.
However, in the previous section we have also shown that the agents’ incentives for informa-
tion gathering are lower under centralization whenever the need for coordination is sufficiently
large and/or the local markets are sufficiently volatile in their profitability conditions. If the
disadvantage of centralization in motivating information gathering is substantial enough, having
the flexibility to adapt decisions to the actual profitability conditions may not be so valuable
for the principal after all.27 The next result provides a sufficient condition under which the gap
in effort provision between centralization and decentralization is large enough for the principal
to prefer the latter. Specifically, we show that decentralization will outperform centralization in
terms of the principal’s expected payoff provided the effort cost function is not too convex and
coordination is sufficiently important.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that corr(η1, η2) < 1. There exists ζ > 0, such that if c′′(e) · e < ζ
∀e ∈ [0, 1], then we have ΠcP < ΠdP for sufficiently large δ.
27This argument can be best understood by considering the extreme case where both agents exert very little
effort under centralization: given the poor quality of information, the principal often have to take the uninformed
decisions (yi = yj = E[θi]). Thus, the option of tailoring decisions to (η1, η2) is not quite useful.
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0
MBd
MBc
c′(e)
cˆ′(e)
e
1eˆdedeˆcF ecF
Figure 4.4: Differences in equilibrium effort levels with c(e) = e2 and cˆ(e) = e1.5.
To understand the above theorem, consider again an individual agent who is deciding on
how much effort to invest in the task of information acquisition. As Theorem 4.1 shows, if
the local markets exhibit any uncertainty in their relative profitability (corr(η1, η2) < 1) and
coordination is sufficiently important, the marginal benefit of effort is higher when decision rights
are allocated to the agents. The gap in the marginal benefits of effort between centralization
and decentralization then translates into a gap in effort provision. Intuitively, this gap in effort
provision will be larger if the derivative c′ does not increase very fast, because the equilibrium
effort levels are chosen to balance the corresponding marginal benefits and marginal costs. Figure
4.4 provides a graphical illustration of this intuition: Consider two cost functions c(e) = e2 and
cˆ(e) = e1.5. The marginal cost is arguably increasing faster (on average) in the former case than
in the latter (since E[c′′(e)] > E[cˆ′′(e)]). As we can see from the figure, for given marginal benefits
of effort under centralization (MBc) and decentralization (MBd) with MBd −MBc > 0, the gap
in effort provision is larger when the cost function is cˆ than when it is c (i.e., eˆd− eˆcF > ed− ecF ).
In fact, in this case, the argument eˆd − eˆcF > ed − ecF also follows from the observation that
the marginal cost function cˆ′(e) is a concave transformation of c′(e). More generally, if the cost
function takes the form c(e) = keα, where k > 0 and α > 1, then the “sufficiently small ζ”
condition in Theorem 4.3 can be replaced by the requirement that the power parameter α is
sufficiently close to one - in other words, the marginal cost function is sufficiently concave.28
However, the proof of Theorem 4.3 shows that what is crucial is not the concavity of the marginal
cost function, but rather the bound of speed at which it grows.
We close this section with a result that parallels Theorem 4.2: if the profitability conditions
of the local markets are sufficiently volatile and the cost function is not too convex, then, even
when the need of coordination is relatively small, the resulting gap in effort provision can be
substantial enough to make decentralization optimal for the principal.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that E
[
1
λ2
]
> E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
− 3. For sufficiently small δ > 0, there exists
ζ(δ) > 0, such that if c′′(e) · e < ζ(δ) ∀e ∈ [0, 1], then ΠcP < ΠdP .
28In fact, one can show that with the cost function c(e) = keα, there exists a cutoff α∗ > 1, such that the
conclusion of Theorem 4.3 holds if and only if α ≤ α∗ (See Figure 4.5 for further illustration). More generally and
similar to Theorem 4.3, if information cost is sufficiently convex, the motivational advantage of decentralization
need not make it optimal for the principal even when coordination is extremely important.
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ω = 0.45
ω = 0.3
0 δ
ΠdP −ΠcP
(a) c(e) = e2, qσ2θ = 1.25.
0 δ
ΠdP −ΠcP
ω = 0.45
ω = 0.3
(b) c(e) = e1.25, qσ2θ = 1.25.
Figure 4.5: The principal’s payoff and cost functions with different degrees of convexity.
Unlike the uniform cutoff ζ in Theorem 4.3, the cutoff ζ(δ) in Theorem 4.4 is δ-specific. From
a technical point of view, this is because regardless of the distribution of the global states, the
expected payoffs of the principal under both authority structures (i.e., ΠcP and ΠdP ) converge to
each other as δ goes to zero. A deeper insight we can gain from this exercise is that the optimal
authority structure is more ambiguous when coordination is not so important and the local
markets are highly volatile in their profitability conditions. In such cases, while decentralization
can lead to more motivated agents (see Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.5), given the large
uncertainty in relative market profitability the principal would also find the power of making
contingent decisions especially valuable.
4.5.2.1 Binary distributions: examples
To sharpen our understanding on the role of the convexity of the cost function in determining the
relative expected payoff of the principal under centralization and decentralization, we consider
again the class of binary distributions {Fω}ω∈[0,1) introduced in section 4.5.1.1. Note that
assuming general cost functions makes it difficult to obtain characterization results that parallel
Propositions 4.5 and 4.6. Thus, we look at particular cost functions and specify the degree of
market volatility (ω) to illustrate how the principal’s optimal organizational form depends on
the coordination requirement.
Consider two cost functions, c(e) = e2 and c(e) = e1.25, and two situations of volatility,
ω = 0.3 and ω = 0.45. The choices of ω are meant to be representative. According to Proposition
4.5, for ω = 0.3 the agents exert higher effort under decentralization if and only if coordination
is sufficiently important. In contrast, for ω = 0.45 decentralization outperforms centralization
for any degree of the coordination requirement.
In Figure 4.5(a), we let the cost function be c(e) = e2. For both cases ω = 0.3 and ω = 0.45,
the principal’s expected payoff is always higher under centralization independent of the coordi-
nation parameter δ. Thus, with the quadratic cost function, the negative uncertainty effect of
centralization on effort provision is not too severe a concern from the principal’s perspective.
Thus, centralization dominates decentralization by its advantage of allowing the principal to
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tailor the organizational activities to the actual profitability conditions across markets. More-
over, as Figure 4.5(a) shows, the value of such flexibility in decision-making is particularly high
for the principal when the volatility of the profitability conditions is large. In the figure, the
dashed curve lies strictly below the non-dashed one, meaning that regardless of the importance
of coordination the payoff difference ΠdP −Πcd is more negative for ω = 0.45 compared to ω = 0.3.
The pattern that centralization is relatively more attractive to the principal when the volatil-
ity/bias measure ω is larger is shared by Figure 4.5(b), where we use a less convex cost function
c(e) = e1.25. However, unlike in the previous case, here the negative effect of centralization on
effort provision is amplified sufficiently by the need for coordination. In both cases ω = 0.3 and
ω = 0.45, as the coordination parameter δ increases, the difference in effort provision (and thus
also in the quality of information) eventually becomes so large that the principal have to take the
uninformed decisions much more often under centralization. Hence, confirming the finding of
Theorem 4.3, when the effort cost is not too convex and the need for coordination is sufficiently
large the principal is worse off by having the decisions centrally made.
4.6 Extensions
4.6.1 Introducing transfers
So far, we have assumed that the agents care only about their own performance. This can
be interpreted as that an agent only get paid based on the performance of his own division.
However, as Athey and Roberts (2001) and Rantakari (2013) point out, due to informational
externalities the organization designer may want to align the incentives of the managerial mem-
bers by tying their compensation to each other’s performance. Indeed, while in extreme cases an
interdependent pay structure may discourage information acquisition (e.g., if agent i’s reward
is primarily determined by j’s performance), an appropriate level of interdependence can lead
to a more efficient use of information (from the principal’s perspective) when decision rights
are decentralized to the divisions. Under centralization, however, there is no room for such
improvement given that a central manager can elicit all information from the local ones for free.
The implication of this analysis is that decentralized decision-making is even more likely to be
optimal when performance-based transfers are available, echoing Milgrom and Roberts (1992)’s
view that the alignment of incentives is complementary to the delegation of authority.
Since the central trade-off of our model comes from strategic information acquisition rather
than strategic communication, one may also envision improving the organization’s performance
by directly rewarding information collection. Formally, suppose that the principal can commit
to pay a fixed bonus b ≥ 0 to an agent provided that he credibly discloses that his information
experiment is successful (si 6= ∅). In general, allowing for such information-based transfers will
make centralization more likely to be optimal. This is because, other things equal, an additional
unit effort of an agent will be more valuable for the principal when she can decide how to use
the resulting information. Thus, in contrast to performance-based transfers, information-based
transfers are complimentary to centralization. However, it is worth to note that ex ante it may
be optimal for the principal not to provide any direct rewards for information collection (i.e.,
b∗ = 0). For instance, under centralization, implementing an effort level e˜ > ecF would require
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the principal to set b = c′(e˜) −MBc > 0, where MBc is an agent’s marginal benefits of effort
under centralization (see Section 4.4.1). Compared to the case where b = 0, this yields a higher
expected payoff for the principal if and only if
[
ΠcP (e˜, e˜)− 2 ·
(
c′(e˜)−MBc) · e˜]−ΠcP (ecF , ecF ) > 0, (4.6)
where ΠcP (e, e) is the principal’s expected payoff under centralization when both agents choose
the effort level e (see Appendix D.10). It is straightforward to check that
ΠcP (e˜, e˜)−ΠcP (ecF , ecF ) = ΞF · (e˜− ecF ),
where
ΞF = 2 ·
E[ηi]− E
δ2 · η1η2η1+η2 + δ · η
2
1η
2
2
(η1+η2)3(
η1η2
(η1+η2)2 + δ
)2

 · σ2θ .
Thus, other things equal, (4.6) is more likely to be violated if the term ΞF is small or if c′(e˜)
is large. In particular, if ΞF is sufficiently small, then (4.6) will not hold for any e˜ > ecF .29 In
those cases, it would be optimal for the principal to choose b = 0 under centralization.
4.6.2 Costly exaggeration
So far, the communication stages under both centralization and decentralization have been
modeled as a game with verifiable information: an agent can always send a certified message
and reveal the finding of his information acquisition experiment to the receiving party. The
crucial implication of this assumption is that in our model, the fundamental difference between
centralization and decentralization is not the endogenous quality of communication - in both
cases the messages communicated by agents will be truthful and fully informative - but rather
the quality of information, which is endogenously determined by the effort of the agents.
The verifiability assumption is intended to capture situations where the decision-relevant
information held by organizational agents is in the form of hard evidence, or at least it can
be supported by objective measures. For instance, a division manager may conduct marketing
research with statistical analysis to convey information about the consumer demand of his
responsible market. However, there are certainly settings where one may view the assumption
of perfect verifiability restrictive. For example, when a specialized manager provides marketing
research showing that the consumer demand is high, others in the organization may not be able
to tell for sure whether the conclusion is driven by a deliberate (and possibly biased) choice of
statistical methods of analysis. If the manager wants to exaggerate the consumer demand by
manipulating his data, the imperfect verifiability of information can be problematic because it
seems conceivable that an exaggerated report may not be caught by his colleagues, especially
when it is not too far away from the truth. In what follows, we will show that the insights from
our full revelation results are robust provided that such exaggeration is not entirely costless.
29To see this, note that the first derivative of the LHS of (4.6) with respect to e˜ is negative for all e˜ > ecF if ΞF
is sufficiently small.
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Specifically, suppose that Θ = R, and when communicating (either with the principal or
with each other) the agents are allowed to send any message mi ∈ M = R ∪ {∅}, irrespective
of the true findings of their experiments. However, given the true signal is si ∈ S = R ∪ {∅},
sending a message mi ∈ M = R ∪ {∅} will incur a non-negative cost z(mi, si) to agent i. This
communication game converges to one with verifiable disclosure when the function z satisfies
z(m, s) = 0 if m ∈ {s, ∅}, and z(m, s) = +∞ otherwise. We now consider general cases which
only require the following less restrictive assumption on the communication cost function z:
Assumption 4.2. Function z :M×S → R+ ∪ {+∞} satisfies
(i) z(s, s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S, and
(ii) z(m, s) = κ(m− s)2 if either m > s > 0 or m < s < 0, where κ > 0.
In words, condition (i) states that telling the truth is always costless. However, as condition
(ii) states, it is costly for the agents to exaggerate their findings. In particular, the further away
an agent’s message is from the truth, the more costly it is to send such a message. It may be
natural to further assume that z(m, s) = 0 if 0 ≤ m < s, s < m ≤ 0 or m = ∅ (i.e., understating
or concealing one’s finding is also costless), and z(m, s) = +∞ if m · s < 0 (i.e., lying about the
sign of the local state is never feasible). One may also want to extend condition (ii) to the case
where s ∈ {0, ∅}. None of these additional assumptions will be necessary for our analysis in this
section.
Although assumption 4.2 rules out pure cheap talk communication, it still provides arbi-
trarily rich possibilities to lie (under consideration of lying costs). The next proposition states
that despite the non-verifiability of agents’ private information, provided that assumption 4.2 is
satisfied the endogenous quality of communication under both centralization and decentraliza-
tion will be identical and maximal: just as in the main model, in either case a fully revealing
equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4.7. Suppose that the communication cost satisfies assumption 4.2.
(i) Under decentralization, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mˇdi (ei, si) =
t
dsi if si ∈ R
∅ if si = ∅
, ∀ei ∈ [0, 1], and ∀i = 1, 2,
where td = 12 +
√
qδ2
κ(1+2δ)2 +
1
4 . In equilibrium, both agents exert the same effort
eˇd ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ − κ(td − 1)2σ2θ
)
.
(ii) Under centralization, there exists a fully revealing PBE in which
mˇci (ei, si) =
t
csi if si ∈ R
∅ if si = ∅
, ∀ei ∈ [0, 1], and ∀i = 1, 2,
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where tc = 12 +
√
E
[
qλ(1−λ)[2δ2+δ(λ2+(1−λ)2)]
2κ(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
+ 14 , and λ = η1/(η1 + η2). In equilibrium,
both agents exert the same effort
eˇcF ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2 (λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ − κ (tc − 1)2 σ2θ
)
.
Proposition 4.7 shows that in equilibrium, the agents “lie” in such a way that their private
signals can be perfectly inferred from the messages communicated. To relate it to our pre-
vious results in Section 4.4 (Propositions 4.1 - 4.4), note that as κ → +∞, both coefficients
td and tc converge to 1. In addition, the total expected communication costs κ(td − 1)2 and
κ(tc − 1)2 converge to zero. This implies that as exaggeration becomes infinitely costly, un-
der both centralization and decentralization the agents simply disclose their acquired signals
(mdi (ei, si),mci (ei, si) → si ∀si ∈ R ∪ {∅}) and exert the same amount of effort as in the main
model (eˇd → ed, eˇcF → ecF ).
Perhaps a more interesting observation is that the equilibria under both centralization and
decentralization feature language inflation (tc, td > 1). This is reminiscent of the findings of
Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) on strategic communication with credulous receivers or
with exogenous lying costs. Compared to the existing papers, a novelty of our language inflation
results is that they hold in settings that feature either bilateral communication (in the case of
decentralization) or competing senders with differentiated private information (in the case of
centralization).30
4.7 Conclusion
When operating in multiple markets which exhibit uncertainty in their relative profitability, how
should an organization optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members?
In this paper we addressed this question in a model where decision-relevant information is
collected and transmitted by strategic and self-interested division managers, and the objective
of the organization is to solve the problem of coordinated adaptation.
Our paper makes two main contributions. The first is that if information is verifiable or if
lying is not costless, then the quality of communication is not affected by where the decision-
making authority is lodged in the organization. Moreover, since the principal of the organization
can elicit all private information from its local delegates, the fact that the principal is not well
informed per se does not make centralized decision-making inferior. However, as a second
contribution, we show that the quality of endogenously acquired information depends crucially
on the allocation of decision rights. In particular, if the local markets exhibit any uncertainty
in their relative profitability, a large coordination motive can strongly discourage information
gathering under centralization, which in turn makes decentralized decision-making optimal. Yet
it is also worth noting that when the need for coordination is small or intermediate, centralized
30Emons and Fluet (2012) were the first to show that the feature of language information can also arise in
a setting with multiple senders. However, the senders in their model (plaintiff and defendant) have perfectly
correlated types (they share the private knowledge about the amount of damages). This is not the case in our
model because the private types θi and θj are independently distributed.
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decision-making is often optimal because it allows the organization to better cope with inter-
market uncertainty, while not necessarily making the division managers less motivated. Overall,
our results call for a more careful examination of the Delegation Principle, which is well-known
in the management literature (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) and emphasizes that “the
power to make decisions should reside in the hands of those with relevant information” (Krishna
and Morgan, 2008, p. 905).
We suggest two venues for future research. First, given that the communication of decision-
relevant information in organizations is often not entirely cheap talk (e.g., marketing reports
must contain survey evidence or data analysis in order to be taken serious, lying to colleagues
may result in retaliation or even being fired), it is worth reconsidering how essential the infor-
mational constraints are in various organizational design problems. A conjecture based on the
analysis of our paper is that in settings with verifiable information, the incentive constraints
for communication can be much less important than the physical or technological ones (Aoki,
1986; Dessein and Santos, 2006). Second, when the uncertainty in the profitability of different
product markets is substantial, the principal of the organization may prefer a more moderate
way to mitigate her commitment problem than unconditionally delegating the decisions to the
division managers. It is an open question whether the principal can benefit from conditional
delegation, e.g., committing to only execute her authority when it is reported that the local
states take extreme values.
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5 On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strat-
egy Implementation for Environments with Non-
Linear Utilities1
Joint with Alexey Kushnir
5.1 Introduction
Fundamental advances in mechanism design have found vast practical applications including
auctions for radio spectrum licenses, carbon emission permits, and online advertising (Siegfried,
2010). One of the most important practical challenges facing mechanism designers is to ensure
that they propose robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are not sensitive to the fine details
of the environment such as the beliefs of the agents. As argued by Bergemann and Morris (2005),
robustness in private value settings is equivalent to dominant strategy incentive compatibility.2
Indeed, dominant strategy implementation has the significant advantage that it only requires
that agents have common knowledge about the specification of the payoff environment, and it
is resistant to deviations from rationality that are often observed in practice.
However, dominant-strategy implementation is arguably a rather strong implementation
concept (compared to, e.g., Bayesian implementation). Thus, an important question is whether
the mechanism designer can benefit from designing possibly more complex mechanisms with
Bayes-Nash equilibria. An important setting where one could ask this question is when the
designer knows that the agents share a common prior and only differ in their payoff types.
As highlighted in recent works by Manelli and Vincent (2010) and Gershkov et al. (2013),
the answer to the above question is negative for many common-prior settings often studied in
applied work. In particular, they show that if agents have linear utilities and independent, one-
dimensional private types, then for any Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism there
exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) mechanism that yields the
same interim expected utilities to all agents and generates the same expected social surplus.3
The main contribution of this paper is to extend the BIC-DIC equivalence result to quasi-
linear environments where agent’s non-linear utility from physical allocations satisfies two as-
1A version of this paper is published as Kushnir, A. and S. Liu (2018): “On the Equivalence of Bayesian and
Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities,” Economic Theory, forthcoming.
2Bergemann and Morris (2005)’s results apply only to quasi-linear environments with unrestricted transfers
and when the mechanism designer seeks to implement a single-valued social choice function that only depends on
agents’ payoff types. We are thankful to a referee for bringing to our attention a more precise statement.
3Goeree and Kushnir (2017) provide an alternative proof of this equivalence result using a novel geometric
approach to mechanism design. Kushnir (2015) extends the result to environments with correlated types. Kushnir
and Liu (2017) explain how the BIC-DIC equivalence problem reduces to a purely mathematical question of when
a linear transformation of intersection of two closed convex sets coincides with the intersection of their images.
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sumptions. The first one demands that each agent’s utility comply with the increasing differences
over distributions property, which is a natural extension of the standard increasing differences
(or supermodularity) property to the space of lotteries. This novel property delineates the set-
tings where all BIC mechanisms can be conveniently described by a monotonicity condition and
an envelope formula. We also fully characterize the set of functions satisfying the increasing
differences over distributions property.
The second assumption demands that the mapping of all agents’ utilities, as a mapping from
the set of feasible allocations to the space of utilities, has a convex image for each profile of
types.4 Though this condition might be restrictive in general, it is trivially satisfied for linear
utilities defined on a convex set (as in Gershkov et al., 2013) and for any symmetric settings.
Assuming the increasing differences over distributions property and the mapping of all agents’
utilities being convex-valued, we establish the BIC-DIC equivalence for non-linear environments.
For settings where our main equivalence theorem does not apply, we provide further conditions
on agents’ utilities when for any given BIC mechanism one could find a DIC mechanism that
yields the same interim expected utilities to all agents and generates at least as large expected
social surplus. The latter requirement captures the economic intuition that one does not need
to insert additional money to achieve a more robust solution concept.
Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of our results by revisiting several important appli-
cations, for which the previous works have little bite (e.g. Gershkov et al., 2013; Manelli and
Vincent, 2010). We first consider the principal-agent problem in a procurement context and il-
lustrate that many influential papers satisfy our main assumptions (e.g. Laffont and Martimort,
1997; Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004). In the same context, we study settings with allocative
externalities, when agents care not only about their own contracts, but also about contracts
received by other agents (e.g. Jehiel et al., 1996; Segal, 1999). If agents face non-decreasing
convex (concave) contracting costs and positive (negative) concave externalities, then for any
BIC mechanism one could find a DIC mechanism yielding the same interim expected utilities
to all agents and generating at least as large social surplus. We also establish that the above
result holds for environmental mechanism design problems (Baliga and Maskin, 2003; Martimort
and Sand-Zantman, 2013, 2016) when agents have linear (concave) benefits and concave (linear)
costs of pollution reduction. We finally consider a problem of public good provision, where
in addition to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints the budget-balance
constraint is of huge importance (e.g. Hellwig, 2003; Ledyard and Palfrey, 1999; Mailath and
Postlewaite, 1990; Norman, 2004). When agents have concave utilities and the cost of public
good provision is convex, we show that for any BIC mechanism that is ex ante budget balanced
there exists an equivalent DIC mechanism that satisfies the same requirement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the model. Section 5.3 introduces
the increasing differences over distributions property. We prove our main equivalence results in
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents applications and Section 5.6 concludes. Appendix E contains
omitted proofs.
4Similar convexity assumptions on the utility possibility set are also made in many seminal papers in the
literature of bargaining theory (e.g. Crawford, 1982; Kalai et al., 1975; Nash, 1950).
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5.2 The Model
We consider environments with a finite set of agents I = {1, 2, .., I} and a compact set of available
alternatives A ⊂ Rk for some natural k. Agent i’s utility when alternative a ∈ A is chosen equals
vi(a, xi) + ti, where xi is agent i’s type that is independently distributed according to some
probability distribution λi with one-dimensional connected support Xi = [xi, xi] ⊂ R, function
vi : A×Xi → R is continuous in a, is absolutely continuous in xi, and has a bounded derivative
with respect to xi (i.e., ∃K1, ...,KI ≥ 0, such that |vix(a, xi)| ≤ Ki, ∀a ∈ A, xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ I), and
ti ∈ R is a monetary transfer. We denote x = (x1, ..., xI), X = ∏i∈I Xi, and λ = ∏i∈I λi.5
We consider only direct mechanisms (q, t), where q : X → A defines an allocation rule
and t = {ti}i∈I , with ti : X → R defines monetary transfers to agents. A mechanism (q, t)
is Bayesian incentive compatible or BIC (dominant strategy incentive compatible or DIC) if
truthful reporting by all agents constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (a dominant strategy
equilibrium). We also say that an allocation rule q is BIC (DIC) if there exists a payment
rule t such that mechanism (q, t) is Bayesian incentive compatible (dominant strategy incentive
compatible).
When all agents report their types truthfully and agent i’s type is xi, we denote his utility
by ui(x) = vi(q(x), xi) + ti(x) and his interim expected utility by Ui(xi) = Ex−i(vi(q(x), xi) +
ti(x)). The expected social surplus is defined as Ex (
∑
i∈I vi(q(x), xi)) or, equivalently, as the
sum of agents’ ex ante expected utilities minus the sum of agents’ ex ante expected transfers.
As in Gershkov et al. (2013), we employ the following notion of equivalence.
Definition 5.1. Two mechanisms (q, t) and (q˜, t˜) are equivalent if and only if they yield the
same interim expected utilities to all agents and generate the same expected social surplus.
5.3 The Increasing Difference over Distributions
In this section, we introduce and characterize the increasing differences over distributions prop-
erty. We use this novel property to characterize Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in
terms of a monotonicity condition and an envelope formula, which is similar to how the standard
increasing differences property is used to characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible
mechanisms.
To motivate our novel property, let us first consider the standard property of increasing
differences or supermodularity (see Topkis, 1998).
Definition 5.2. Function vi satisfies the increasing differences property if for any pair of alter-
natives a, a′ ∈ A the difference vi(a, x)− vi(a′, x) is either increasing, decreasing, or constant in
x.6
Assuming that vi satisfies the increasing differences property for each i ∈ I, Mookherjee and
Reichelstein (1992) showed that dominant strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized
5Our main results Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 can also be extended to discrete types similar to Gershkov et al.
(2013).
6Throughout the paper, “increasing” (“decreasing") refers to a strictly increasing (decreasing).
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by a monotone-marginal condition and an envelope formula.7
Proposition 5.1. (Mookherjee and Reichelstein 1992) Suppose vi satisfies the increasing dif-
ferences property for each i ∈ I. A mechanism (q, t) is DIC if and only if for each i ∈ I and
x ∈ X: (i) vix(q(s,x−i), xi) is non-decreasing in s and (ii) agent i’s utility can be expressed as
ui(xi,x−i) = ui(xi,x−i) +
∫ xi
xi
vix(q(s,x−i), s)ds.8 (5.1)
Proposition 5.1 is a powerful result as it provides a tractable analysis of incentive compatibil-
ity constraints in many important applications (e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 1997; Segal, 2003).
In Appendix E, we further show that the increasing differences property is a necessary condition
for the characterization of Proposition 5.1. In particular, if some agent’s function vi does not
satisfy the increasing differences property then one can always construct a DIC mechanism that
does not have non-decreasing marginals (see Proposition E.1).
To obtain a similar characterization for BIC mechanisms, we first need an appropriate exten-
sion of the increasing differences property to Bayesian settings. Note that from the perspective
of each agent, who knows only the distribution of the types of other agents, every allocation rule
induces a probability distribution over possible outcomes. This logically leads to the following
definition.
Definition 5.3. Function vi satisfies the increasing differences over distributions property if
for any pair G,F ∈ ∆(A), the difference ∫ vi(a, x)dG(a) − ∫ vi(a, x)dF (a) is either increasing,
decreasing, or constant in x.
The following proposition shows that, given the increasing differences over distributions prop-
erty, BIC mechanisms can be indeed characterized by a monotone-expected-marginal condition
and an envelope formula.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose vi satisfies the increasing differences over distributions property
for each i ∈ I. A mechanism (q, t) is BIC if and only if for each i ∈ I and xi ∈ Xi: (i)
Ex−ivix(q(s,x−i), xi) is non-decreasing in s and (ii) agent i’s interim expected utility can be
expressed as
Ui(xi) = Ui(xi) +
∫ xi
xi
Ex−ivix(q(s,x−i), s)ds, ∀xi ∈ Xi and i ∈ I.9 (5.2)
Parallel to the result of Proposition 5.1, the increasing differences over distributions is a
necessary condition for the characterization of Proposition 5.2 (see Proposition E.2 in Appendix
E).
7The result below follows from Propositions 1, 2, and 3 of Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), because when
vi is differentiable with respect to its second argument the increasing differences property is equivalent to the
weak single-crossing property used in their paper.
8See also Milgrom and Segal (2002). The sufficiency part holds even without imposing the increasing differences.
9As in Proposition 5.1, the sufficiency part holds even without imposing increasing differences over distribu-
tions.
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Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 are connected to the literature on monotonicity and incentive com-
patibility. For general quasi-linear environments, Rochet (1987) showed that incentive com-
patibility constraint can be characterized by a condition called cycle-monotonicity. For convex
type-spaces, Saks and Yu (2005) advanced Rochet (1987)’s result by establishing that it is suffi-
cient to consider only two-cycle monotonicity.10 The two-cycle monotonicity condition reduces
to the standard monotonicity of the allocation rule when agents have dot product valuations
(e.g., A ⊂ R and vi(a, xi) = a · xi). When agents have non-linear differentiable valuations (and
one-dimensional types), the two-cycle monotonicity is equivalent to the monotone-marginal con-
dition (see Proposition 5.1). Thus, Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, together with Propositions E.1
and E.2, determine the largest set of differentiable quasi-linear utility functions that permit
the characterization of incentive compatibility with the two-cycle monotonicty condition for
one-dimensional types.
The increasing differences over distributions property gives us a readily workable character-
ization of Bayesian incentive compatibility. This property is, however, novel, and we want to
understand how it restricts agents’ utilities before proceeding with further analysis. First of all,
if the feasible set A is the set of all possible lotteries over some set of alternatives, increasing
differences over distributions and increasing differences properties are equivalent, because in this
case any probability distribution over A simply defines a compound lottery over the underlying
set of alternatives. In general, however, the increasing differences over distributions property
only implies the increasing differences property. To see this, simply note that one can always
consider a pair of deterministic distributions in the definition of the increasing differences over
distributions. Finally, we provide a full characterization of utility functions that satisfy the
increasing differences over distributions property.
Proposition 5.3. Function vi : A ×Xi → R satisfies increasing differences over distributions
if and only if there exist functions fi, gi : A → R and Mi,mi : Xi → R, where fi and gi are
continuous and Mi is increasing, such that for all a ∈ A and xi ∈ Xi,
vi(a, xi) = fi(a)Mi(xi) +mi(xi) + gi(a). (5.3)
In a concurrent paper, Kartik et al. (2018) study a less demanding property of the single-
crossing expectational differences, which extends the standard single-crossing differences prop-
erty to the space of lotteries. They show that their novel property admits the characterization
vi(a, xi) = fi(a)Mi(xi) + gi(a)Mˆi(x) + mi(xi), where fi, gi : A → R and Mi, Mˆi,mi : Xi → R
with Mi and Mˆi being each single crossing and ratio ordered. The ratio-ordered requirement
reduces to Mi being increasing function when Mˆi ≡ 1. Celik (2015) also employs a weaker
version of increasing differences over distributions condition to analyze the implementation with
gradual-revelation. These weaker properties, however, do not allow a convenient characterization
of Bayesian incentive compatibility as Proposition E.2 in Appendix highlights.
10See also Ashlagi et al. (2010) and Bikhchandani et al. (2006) for the analysis of incentive compatibility in
convex domains. Mishra et al. (2014) and Kushnir and Galichon (2017) analyze two-cycle monotonicity condition
in important non-convex domains.
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Liu and Pei (2018) also consider a related but more demanding property of the increasing
absolute differences over distributions. They show that this property together with monotone-
supermodularity are sufficient to guarantee the monotonicity of sender’s equilibrium strategy
with respect to her type in signaling games.
The increasing differences over distributions property is also related to the aggregation of
the single-crossing property analyzed by Quah and Strulovici (2012). They consider function
v(a, x, t) that satisfies the single-crossing differences property in (a, x) for each t. They ask
under what conditions the aggregate function
∫
v(a, x, t)dF (t) will also satisfy the single-crossing
differences property for all distributions F . While this question is not trivial, the answer to the
parallel question for the increasing differences property is rather straightforward if one fixes the
direction of monotonicity: If for given a and a′ the difference v(a′, x, t)− v(a, x, t) is increasing
in x for each t, the aggregate difference has to be increasing.11 However, requiring the increasing
differences property to hold in the space of lotteries is different from requiring it to be preserved
under aggregation, as Proposition 5.3 shows.
Given the result of Proposition 5.3, we assume in the rest of the paper that agent i’s value
function vi takes the form of (5.3). With this specification, for each i ∈ I, the monotonicity con-
ditions in the characterizations of DIC and BIC mechanisms are now equivalent to fi(q(s,x−i))
being non-decreasing in s for x−i ∈ X−i and Ex−ifi(q(s,x−i)) being non-decreasing in s, re-
spectively.12
5.4 The BIC-DIC Equivalence
We use the following logic to prove the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy
implementation. The characterizations of DIC and BIC mechanisms (Propositions 5.1 and
5.2) imply that the interim expected utilities of agents are determined by the allocation rule
(up to a constant). Therefore, to match agents’ interim expected utilities, we need to match
Ex−ifi(q(xi,x−i)) for each xi ∈ Xi and i ∈ I. To respect the incentive compatibility, we need to
satisfy the monotone-marginal condition, i.e. fi(q(·,x−i)) is non-decreasing for each x−i ∈ X−i
and i ∈ I. Finally, we need to make sure that the equivalent mechanisms generate the same
expected social surplus.
To state our main result, we introduce first the notion of convex-valued mappings. A mapping
f : A → RI with f(a) = (f1(a), ..., fI(a)) is convex-valued if its image is convex, i.e., for any
a, b ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1] there exists c ∈ A such that f(c) = αf(a) + (1 − α)f(b). We also
note a useful property of mappings g = (g1, ..., gI) and f = (f1, ..., fI) in (5.3): If g is a linear
transformation of f , i.e., g ≡M f for some I × I matrix M , then f is convex-valued if and only
if the mapping of all agents utilities (v1(·, x1) + t1, ..., vI(·, xI) + tI) is convex-valued for each
(x1, ..., xI) ∈ X.13
11We thank Navin Kartik, SangMok Lee, and Daniel Rappoport for pointing out this connection to us.
12In specification (5.3) we could redefine types x˜i ∼ Mi(xi) and drop function mi(xi) because it does not
interact with allocation. We cannot, however, modify gi and fi as it becomes clear from applications of Section
5.5.
13The necessity part actually holds only under an additional mild condition. If we denote the matrix trans-
forming f to g as A and the diagonal matrix with elements Mi(xi) as M(x) with x = (x1, ..., xI), the additional
condition states that the sum of matrices M(x) +A has a full rank.
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Theorem 5.1. Assume mapping f is convex-valued, and g is a linear transformation of f . Then
for any BIC mechanism (q˜, t˜) there exists an equivalent DIC mechanism (q, t).
The main part of the argument proving the theorem establishes that for a given BIC alloca-
tion rule q˜ there exists a feasible allocation q that satisfies
Ex−ifi(q(xi,x−i)) = Ex−ifi(q˜(xi,x−i)), ∀xi ∈ Xi,∀i ∈ I, (5.4)
and that has non-decreasing marginals fi(q(·,x−i)) for all x−i ∈ X−i and i ∈ I. We establish
this statement for discrete and uniformly distributed types in Lemma 5.1 below. In particu-
lar, we develop an algorithm that finds a feasible allocation that satisfies (5.4) and that has
non-decreasing marginals.14 We then extend the proof to continuous types and arbitrary distri-
butions (see Lemmas E.1 and E.2). Finally, we construct transfers that lead to the same interim
expected utilities and generate the same expected social surplus using the envelope formula (see
Proposition 5.1).
Lemma 5.1. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi is a finite discrete set and λi is the uniform distribu-
tion on Xi. For any BIC allocation q˜ there exists a feasible allocation q satisfying (5.4) and
fi(q(·,x−i)) being non-decreasing for all x−i ∈ X−i and i ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Consider an arbitrary BIC allocation q˜, and let us assume fj(q˜(·,x−j))
is not non-decreasing for some j and x−j ; otherwise the statement is trivial. Then, there exists
some x′j > xj such that fj(q˜(x′j ,x−j)) < fj(q˜(xj ,x−j)). Since agent j’s expected marginal
Ex−jfj(q˜(·,x−j)) is non-decreasing there also exists X′−j ⊂ X−j such that fj(q˜(x′j ,x′−j)) >
fj(q˜(xj ,x′−j)) for all x′−j ∈ X′−j . Now consider a new allocation qˆ 6= q˜ such that
f(qˆ(xj ,x−j)) =
1
2 f(q˜(xj ,x−j)) +
1
2 f(q˜(x
′
j ,x−j)),
f(qˆ(x′j ,x−j)) =
1
2 f(q˜(x
′
j ,x−j)) +
1
2 f(q˜(xj ,x−j)),
f(qˆ(xj ,x′−j)) = (1− δ)f(q˜(xj ,x′−j)) + δf(q˜(x′j ,x′−j)),
f(qˆ(x′j ,x′−j)) = (1− δ)f(q˜(x′j ,x′−j)) + δf(q˜(xj ,x′−j)),
for all x′−j ∈ X′−j and qˆ(x) = q˜(x) for all other x ∈ X, where
δ = 12 ·
fj(q˜(xj ,x−j))− fj(q˜(x′j ,x−j))∑
x′−j∈X′−j (fj(q˜(x
′
j ,x′−j))− fj(q˜(xj ,x′−j)))
. (5.5)
Since Ex−jfj(q˜(·,x−j)) is non-decreasing we have 0 ≤ δ ≤ 12 . In addition, a feasible allocation
qˆ with qˆ(x) ∈ A, for each x ∈ X, is guaranteed to exist, because mapping f is convex-valued.
Equation (5.5) guarantees that the equal expected marginal condition (5.4) is satisfied for agent j
having types xj and x′j . For agent j having other types, condition (5.4) follows trivially. For agent
i, i 6= j, condition (5.4) follows from f(qˆ(xj ,x−j)) + f(qˆ(x′j ,x−j)) = f(q˜(xj ,x−j)) + f(q˜(x′j ,x−j))
14Gershkov et al. (2013) use a minimization problem to find a feasible allocation that satisfies (5.4) and that
has non-decreasing marginals. Their approach could also be adapted to our settings. We use an algorithmic proof
because of its convenience in the proofs of our Theorem 5.2 and the applications presented in Section 5.5.
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and f(qˆ(xj ,x′−j)) + f(qˆ(x′j ,x′−j)) = f(q˜(xj ,x′−j)) + f(q˜(x′j ,x′−j)).
Let us now define sˆ = Ex(||f(qˆ(x)||2) and s˜ = Ex(||f(q˜(x)||2), where || · || denotes the Eu-
clidean norm ||f(q(x))||2 = ∑i∈I fi(q(x))2. Taking into account that λi is uniformly distributed,
we have
sˆ− s˜ = − 12|X| ||f(q˜(xj ,x−j))− f(q˜(x
′
j ,x−j))||2
− 2δ(1− δ)|X| ||f(q˜(x
′
j ,x′−j))− f(q˜(xj ,x′−j))||2 < 0.
If fj(qˆ(·,x−j)) is not non-decreasing for some j and x−j , we repeat the above procedure. Iterating
the procedure, we finally obtain a sequence of allocations qn ∈ A and a sequence of values sn ≥ 0
for n = 1, 2, .... If for some n we find that fj(qn(·,x−j)) is non-decreasing for all j and x−j ,
we set qn+1 ≡ qn and sn+1 ≡ sn. By construction, sn is a weakly decreasing sequence that is
bounded below by 0. Hence, sn has a limit that we denote as s. Since set A is compact, there
also exists a convergent subsequence of qn with a limit q such that q(x) ∈ A for all x ∈ X. By
construction, s = Ex(||f(q(x)||2).
We argue for the limit allocation q that fj(q(·,x−j)) has to be non-decreasing for each
j and x−j . Suppose, in contradiction, that for some j ∈ I and x−j ∈ X−j fj(q(·,x−j)) is
not non-decreasing. Using the above construction, we can obtain an allocation q′ with s′ =
Ex(||f(q′(x)||2) < s. This contradicts to the fact that s is a limit of decreasing sequence sn
constructed above.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Lemmas E.1 and E.2 (postponed to Appendix E) extend Lemma
5.1 to show that, given any set Xi ⊂ R and any distribution λi, for any BIC allocation q˜ there
exists a feasible allocation q satisfying (5.4) with non-decreasing marginals fi(q(·,x−i)) for all
i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i. To complete the construction of an equivalent DIC mechanism we consider
transfers t defined by
ti(xi,x−i) = ti(xi,x−i) + vi(q(xi,x−i), xi)
− vi(q(xi,x−i), xi) +
∫ xi
xi
vix(q(s,x−i), s)ds, (5.6)
for all x ∈ X, i ∈ I, where ti(xi,x−i) = Ex−i
(
vi(q˜(xi,x−i), xi) + t˜i(xi,x−i)
)− vi(q(xi,x−i), xi).
Proposition 5.1 guarantees that mechanism (q, t) is DIC. In addition, mechanism (q, t) leads to
the same interim expected utilities as in BIC mechanism (q˜, t˜). In particular,
Ui(xi) = Ex−i(t˜i(xi,x−i) + vi(q˜(xi,x−i), xi)) +
∫ xi
xi
Ex−ivix(q(s,x−i), s)ds
= Ex−i(t˜i(xi,x−i) + vi(q˜(xi,x−i), xi)) +
∫ xi
xi
Ex−ivix(q˜(s,x−i), s)ds
= U˜i(xi), (5.7)
where the first equality follows from (5.6), the second one from (5.4), and the third one from
the characterization of BIC mechanisms (Proposition 5.2). When mapping g is a linear trans-
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formation of f , the equal expected marginal conditions in (5.4) also imply Ex[
∑
i∈I gi(q(x))] =
Ex[
∑
i∈I gi(q˜(x))]. Hence, both mechanisms also generate the same social surplus.
Theorem 5.1 extends the BIC-DIC equivalence result to non-linear environments where each
agent’s utility satisfies the increasing differences over distributions property and the mapping of
all agents’ utilities is convex-valued. The convex-valued assumption is generally indispensable
for the equivalence result as Example E.4 in Appendix shows. In addition, the new proof requires
only that the set of feasible allocations A is compact instead of being a simplex as in Gershkov
et al. (2013).
The requirement that g is a linear transformation of f is satisfied, for example, if gi ≡ 0 ∀i ∈ I
as in some applications of Section 5.5. For general g, the constructed DIC mechanism, however,
does not necessarily match the expected social surplus of the BIC mechanism.15 We now analyze
the conditions when for any BIC mechanism one could find a DIC mechanism that produces
the same interim expected utilities and generates at least as large expected social surplus. In
addition to being more flexible than the equivalence, this way of comparing the implementation
concepts better captures the economic intuition that one does not need to insert additional
money to achieve a more robust solution concept.
For this purpose, we consider environments where the set of feasible allocations A is a convex
and compact subset of RI with q = (q1, ..., qI), where qi ∈ R for each i ∈ I. We also assume
that functions fi depend on different components of allocations, i.e., fi(q) = fˇi(qi), for all i ∈ I,
q ∈ A.
Theorem 5.2. Assume mapping f is convex-valued. For any BIC mechanism there exists a
DIC mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents. In addition, the
DIC mechanism generates at least as large expected social surplus, if
(i) for each i ∈ I fˇi(qi) is non-decreasing and concave (or non-increasing and convex) and
gi(q) is continuous, non-increasing, and concave in each component, or
(ii) for each i ∈ I fˇi(qi) is non-increasing and concave (or non-decreasing and convex) and
gi(q) is continuous, non-decreasing, and concave in each component.
The theorem also extends to settings where the set of feasible allocations A is compact, map-
ping f is convex-valued, and the utility of each agent satisfies the following condensation prop-
erty: Functions fi and gi can be written as fi(q) = fˇi(hi(q)) and
∑
i gi(q) = G(h1(q), ..., hI(q))
for all q ∈ A, where hi : A → R, fˇi is non-decreasing and concave (or non-increasing and
convex), and the aggregate function G : RI → R is continuous, non-increasing, and concave in
each component.16 The proof of this extension repeats the steps of the proof of Theorem 5.2
presented in Appendix E, and we omit it to avoid repetition. We exploit this observation when
we consider the environmental mechanism design applications in Section 5.5.
The requirement of Theorem 5.2 that the DIC mechanism produces only at least as large
expected social surplus compared to the original BIC mechanism is less demanding than the one
15For general g the constructed DIC mechanism still delivers the same interim expected utilities.
16Similar to condition (ii) in Theorem 5.2, the result also extends to settings when fˇi is non-increasing and
concave (or non-decreasing and convex) and G is continuous, non-decreasing, and concave in each component.
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of mechanisms equivalence (see Definition 5.1). Hence, it also has a broader range of meaningful
economic applications, which we illustrate in Section 5.5.
5.5 Applications
In this section, we demonstrate that Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 apply to many important environ-
ments where previous works have little bite (e.g. Manelli and Vincent 2010; Gershkov et al.
2013). In addition, they produce several novel implications that are of independent interest.
5.5.1 Principal-Agent Problem with Allocative Externalities
Consider a standard contracting setting where a principal needs to procure I goods from I
agents. Assume the principal chooses a production plan q = (q1, ..., qI) ∈ A ≡ ΠIi=1[qi, qi] ⊆ RI
and a transfer scheme (t1, ..., tI) ∈ RI . The payoff of agent i is then given by −ci(qi)xi + ti,
where ci : [qi, qi] → R is some continuous non-decreasing function with an interpretation of
ci(qi)xi being agent i’s cost of supplying qi units of good i. Many influential papers analyzing
the optimal procurement contracts fall into this setting (e.g. Duenyas et al., 2013; Laffont and
Martimort, 1997; Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004; Severinov, 2008). In this setting, we have
fi(q) = −ci(qi) and gi(q) = 0 for each i ∈ I. Since functions ci are continuous, the Intermediate
Value Theorem implies that mapping f(·) = (−c1(·), ...,−cI(·)) is convex-valued. Thus, Theorem
5.1 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Consider the standard procurement setting. If ci is continuous for i ∈ I, then
for any BIC mechanism there exists an equivalent DIC mechanism.
In many contracting situations, agents may not only care about their own contracts with the
principal, but also have preferences about contracts received by other agents. For instance, a
country may prefer its ally rather than its enemy to receive a weapon contract (see Jehiel et al.,
1996). Similar concerns arise in the presence of downstream competition among firms (Segal,
1999). Within the current framework, type-independent allocative externalities can be captured
by incorporating an additional term into agent’s utility function, i.e., −ci(qi)xi + gi(q) + ti.
Assuming that the cost and externality functions satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5.2, we
establish the following result.
Corollary 5.2. Consider a procurement setting with allocation externalities. If ci is continuous
for each i ∈ I, then for any BIC mechanism there exists a DIC mechanism that delivers the
same interim expected utilities for all agents. If ci is also non-decreasing and convex (concave)
and gi is continuous, non-decreasing (non-increasing), and concave in each component for each
i ∈ I, then the DIC mechanism generates at least as large expected social surplus as the BIC
mechanism.
Corollary 5.2 identifies environments with allocative externalities where a mechanism de-
signer can rely on dominant strategy implementation and gains nothing from designing more
complex BIC mechanisms. This is in sharp contrast to results pertaining to environments with
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both allocative and information externalities, where more robust solution concepts appear to be
much more restrictive (see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) for an excellent survey).
5.5.2 Environmental Mechanism Design
Let us first consider the environmental mechanism design model of (Martimort and Sand-
Zantman, 2013, 2016), who analyze feasible agreements in reducing the aggregate pollution
of I countries. Each country i can exert effort qi ∈ [q, q] ⊆ R+ that has both local benefits of
size αqi (with α ∈ [0, 1)) and global benefits of size (1 − α)qi, which accrue worldwide. The
countries differ in their costs of effort q2i xi/2, with xi being country i’s efficiency parameter.
Efficiency parameters are drawn independently from the same cumulative distribution λ with
support [x, x] ⊆ R. Overall, country i’s payoff is given by −q2i xi/2 + αqi + (1− α)Q+ ti, where
Q = ∑Ii=1 qi is aggregate global benefits and ti is a monetary transfer to country i. Taking
into account that function −q2i /2 is non-increasing and concave and the externality function
αqi + (1− α)Q is non-decreasing and linear (and, hence, concave), the following result directly
follows from Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 5.3. Consider the setting of (Martimort and Sand-Zantman, 2013, 2016). Then, for
any BIC mechanism there exists a DIC mechanism producing the same interim expected utilities
to all agents and generating at least as large expected social surplus.
Baliga and Maskin (2003) also study feasible agreements to efficiently reduce the aggregate
pollution level, but consider a slightly different model. Although they assume that agents’ costs
are type-independent, agents have private information about their value of the pollution reduc-
tion. More specifically, agent i’s utility equals xiQ1/2− qi+ ti, where xiQ1/2 is the gross benefits
to agent i from aggregate reduction Q. Though Theorem 5.2 does not formally apply to this
environment, each agent i’s benefits and costs from pollution reduction satisfy the condensa-
tion property defined in the remark after Theorem 5.2. In particular, agent i’s benefits equal
fˇi(hi(q)) =
√
hi(q) and the aggregate costs equal
∑
i∈I qi =
∑
i∈I qi = −G(h1(q), ..., hI(q)),
where the condensation function hi(q) =
∑
i∈I qi, i ∈ I, is the same for all agents. The mapping
f = (f1(·), ..., fI(·)) is symmetric and, hence, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that it is
convex-valued. In addition, fˇi is non-decreasing and concave, and function G is non-increasing
and linear (and, hence, concave). Hence, the following result is implied by the extension dis-
cussed in the remark after Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 5.4. Consider the environmental mechanism design setting of Baliga and Maskin
(2003). Then, for any BIC mechanism there exists a DIC mechanism producing the same
interim expected utilities to all agents and generating at least as large expected social surplus.
Corollaries 5.3 and 5.4 imply that the mechanism designer would lose nothing by restricting
himself/herself to DIC mechanisms for environmental design problems, if he/she wanted to
maintain the same level of agents’ interim expected utility without the influx of additional
money into the system. This result, however, may no longer hold when additional constraints
- such as ex post budget balance - are imposed, as thoroughly discussed in Baliga and Maskin
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(2003). Though Bayesian implementation is more permissive when ex post budget balance is
imposed, the mechanism designer can still rely only on DIC mechanisms if the budget balance
constraint needs to be satisfied in expectations. We show this result in the next application.
5.5.3 Public Good Provision
Consider a standard setting of public good provision with I ≥ 2 agents. If q ∈ A = [q, q] units
of public good are provided, agent i’s utility is given by f(q)xi + ti, where f(q)xi is agent i’s
valuation of the public good and ti ∈ R is the units of private good that he receives. Many
influential papers on public good provision fall into this setting (e.g. Hellwig, 2003; Ledyard and
Palfrey, 1999; Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990; Norman, 2004). If f : A→ R is continuous in q,
it again follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that the mapping f(·) = (f(·), ..., f(·)) is
convex-valued and, hence, Theorem 5.1 can be applied here.
Corollary 5.5. Consider the public good provision setting. If f is continuous, then for any BIC
mechanism there exists an equivalent DIC mechanism.
While the equivalent DIC mechanism, constructed in Theorem 5.1, inherits interim individual
rationality from the BIC mechanism,17 there is no guarantee that other constraints imposed on
the BIC mechanism will remain satisfied as well. For example, when designing a mechanism
for public good provision, it is typical to require that the private goods raised from the agents
are enough to cover the cost of the public good. Formally, a direct mechanism (q, t) is ex ante
budget balanced if ∫
x∈X
[
K(q(x)) +
I∑
i=1
ti(x)
]
dλ(x) ≤ 0, (5.8)
where K : A → R is the cost function of producing the public good. The following corollary
of Theorem 5.2 provides a sufficient condition under which the equivalent DIC mechanism con-
structed in Theorem 5.1 also inherits ex ante budget balance from the original BIC mechanism.18
Corollary 5.6. Suppose f is continuous, non-decreasing, and concave and K is continuous, non-
decreasing, and convex. For any BIC mechanism that is ex ante budget balanced, the equivalent
DIC mechanism, constructed in Theorems 5.1, is also ex ante budget balanced.
Intuitively, the monotonicity and concavity of utility functions imply that the provision of
public good is more balanced across states in the equivalent DIC mechanism than that in the BIC
mechanism. Consequently, the expected cost of providing the public good is lower. Since the
expected transfers remain unchanged in the equivalent DIC mechanism constructed in Theorem
5.1, the property of ex ante budget balance is preserved.
Our result thus suggests that for a quite general class of public good provision problems it
is without loss of generality to insist on dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, even when
17The constructed DIC mechanism satisfies even a stronger notion of ex post individual rationality.
18The result of Corollary 5.6 extends without any change to non-symmetric settings with mapping f =
(f1(·), ..., fI(·)) being convex-valued and functions fi, i ∈ I, being continuous, non-decreasing, and concave.
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the additional ex ante budget balance constraint is imposed.19 For example, the second-best
allocation rule in Hellwig (2003) can be equivalently implemented in dominant strategies without
violating the ex ante budget balance condition if functions f and K are concave and convex
respectively.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper extends the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
to environments where each agent’s utility satisfies the increasing differences over distributions
property and the mapping of all agents’ utilities is convex-valued. These assumptions are satisfied
by many important models that are studied in the literature on principal-agent problems with
allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision. Since the
results of the previous papers (Manelli and Vincent 2010; Gershkov et al. 2013) do not apply to
these environments, the current paper significantly enlarges the set of settings where the mecha-
nism designer can rely on a more robust solution concept of dominant strategy implementation.
In this paper, we also provide sufficient conditions when for a given BIC mechanism there
exists a DIC mechanism that yields the same interim expected utilities to all agents and generates
at least as large social surplus (see also Kushnir, 2015). Using this result, we provide several novel
implications for the above-mentioned environments. In addition, being less demanding than the
notion of equivalence due to Gershkov et al. (2013), this way of comparing two implementation
concepts broadens the set of environments when the mechanism designer could insist on a more
robust notion of implementation without sacrificing his/her objectives. Hence, we believe this
notion will be useful for future studies.
Our proof of the BIC-DIC equivalence result relies heavily on the characterization of incentive
compatibility using the novel increasing differences over distributions property. We show that
increasing differences over distributions is necessary and sufficient for Bayesian incentive com-
patibility to be conveniently characterized in terms of a monotone-expected-marginal condition
and an envelope formula.20 The equivalence result could potentially hold in environments where
the above properties are not satisfied. The proof should then employ quite different techniques.
One possible approach has been discussed in our recent work. In Kushnir and Liu (2017),
we explain how the BIC-DIC equivalence reduces to a purely mathematical question when a
linear transformation of intersection of two closed convex sets coincides with the intersection
of their images. Another possible approach has been proposed by Goeree and Kushnir (2017)
who develop a novel geometric approach to mechanism design using basic tools from convex
analysis. Applying these techniques to the question of the BIC-DIC equivalence in non-linear
environments without increasing differences over distributions condition and environments with
multidimensional types is an exciting prospect for future research.
19For some applications, it is natural to require mechanisms to be ex post budget balanced, i.e., inequality (5.8)
holds for each x ∈ X. Börgers and Norman (2009) show that for every ex ante budget balanced DIC mechanism
(q, t) there exist transfers t′ such that (q, t′) is (i) BIC for all agents and DIC for all but one agent and (ii) ex post
budget balanced. Agents also have the same interim expected payments in both mechanisms (see also Börgers,
2015).
20We also establish that the standard increasing differences property is necessary for dominant strategy incentive
compatibility to be conveniently characterized in terms of a monotone-marginal condition and an envelope formula.
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
In this appendix, we establish Proposition 1.1 by proving a series of equivalence statements.
Lemma A.1. u1 has IADD if and only if for every a1 ∈ A1 and every α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2), we have
∃ θ˜ ∈ Θ, u1(θ˜, a1, α2) > u1(θ˜, a1, α′2) =⇒ u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a1, α′2) is increasing in θ. (A.1)
Proof. The only-if part of the lemma is straightforward. Let us focus on the if part. To show
that (A.1) implies IADD, it suffices to show that if u1(θ˜, a1, α2) > u1(θ˜, a1, α′2) for some θ˜, then
u1(θ, a1, α2) ≥ u1(θ, a1, α′2) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Suppose towards a contradiction that there exist a1 ∈ A1, α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2), and θ˜, θˆ ∈ Θ,
such that u1(θ˜, a1, α2) > u1(θ˜, a1, α′2) and u1(θˆ, a1, α2) < u1(θˆ, a1, α′2). Then, condition (A.1)
implies that we have both u1(θ, a1, α2) − u1(θ, a1, α′2) and u1(θ, a1, α′2) − u1(θ, a1, α2) being
increasing in θ. Hence, u1(θ, a1, α2)− u1(θ, a1, α′2) must be constant for every θ, which leads to
a contradiction.
Next, notice that an immediate implication of u1 satisfying IADD is that for every a1 ∈ A1
and α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2), the expected payoff difference u1(θ, a1, α2)−u1(θ, a1, α′2) is monotone in θ.
The following lemma fully characterizes this necessary condition of IADD.
Lemma A.2. u1(θ, a1, α2)−u1(θ, a1, α′2) is monotone in θ for every (a1, α2, α′2) ∈ A1×∆(A2)×
∆(A2) if and only if the sender’s payoff has the following representation:
u1(θ, a1, a2) = f(a1, a2)v(θ, a1) + c(θ, a1) + g(a1, a2), (A.2)
where v : Θ×A1 → R is an increasing function of θ.
The proof of Lemma A.2 is omitted as it immediately follows from the characterization
results in Kartik et al. (2018) and Kushnir and Liu (2018). Therefore, it is without loss of
generality to assume u1 taking the functional form in (A.2), which we will do for the rest of the
proof.
We now proceed to characterize condition (A.1). To do this, let us first introduce some useful
notation. Let A2 ≡ {a12, .., an2} with n ≥ 2. For every a1 ∈ A1, let
va1 ≡ min
θ∈Θ
v(θ, a1) ∈ R,
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and
fa1 ≡ (f(a1, a12), ..., f(a1, an2 )), ga1 ≡ (g(a1, a12), ..., g(a1, an2 )) ∈ Rn.
Finally, let Γ ≡ {γ ∈ Rn|1 ·γ = 0}, where 1 ≡ (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ Rn and ‘·’ denotes the inner product
of two vectors. We establish the following result.
Lemma A.3. Suppose that u1 has representation (A.2). Then, u1 satisfies (A.1) if and only if
∀ (a1, γ) ∈ A1 × Γ, (va1fa1 + ga1) · γ > 0 =⇒ fa1 · γ ≥ 0. (A.3)
Proof. (If statement) First, note that given the representation (A.2), condition (A.1) is
equivalent to the requirement that for every (a1, γ) ∈ A1×Γ and every v ≥ va1 , (vfa1 +ga1)·γ > 0
⇒ fa1 ·γ ≥ 0. Suppose towards a contradiction that this does not hold for some (a1, γ) ∈ A1×Γ
and some v ≥ va1 . That is, we have (vfa1 + ga1) · γ > 0 but fa1 · γ < 0. Then, (A.3) implies
that (va1fa1 + ga1) · γ ≤ 0. Hence, we have
0 < (vfa1 + ga1) · γ = (va1fa1 + ga1) · γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ (v − va1)fa1 · γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ 0,
which leads to a contradiction.
(Only-if statement) Suppose that (A.3) is violated for some (a1, γ) ∈ A1 × Γ, i.e. (va1fa1 +
ga1) · γ > 0 but fa1 · γ < 0. Let ξ > 0 be small enough such that:
max{|ξγ1|, ..., |ξγn|} < 1/n.
Consider two probability distributions α2, α′2 ∈ ∆(A2), where α2 ≡
∑n
i=1
1
nδai2
, α′2 ≡
∑n
i=1( 1n −
ξγi)δai2 , and δai2 denotes the Dirac measure on a
i
2 ∈ A2. Let θ be the smallest element in Θ, which
exists since Θ is a complete lattice. By construction, when playing a1, type θ sender strictly
prefers α2 to α′2. However, since fa1 · γ < 0, u1(·, a1, α2)− u1(·, a1, α′2) is strictly decreasing in
θ. Hence, condition (A.1) is violated.
Next, consider the linear operator τ : Rn → Rn−1 with
τ(w) ≡ (w1 − wn, ..., wn−1 − wn), ∀w ∈ Rn.
By construction, τ(w) = 0 if and only if w is a constant vector. In addition, for every γ ∈ Γ
and w ∈ Rn, we have w · γ = ∑n−1i=1 (wi − wn)γi = τ(w) · γ. Our next lemma provides a further
characterization of condition (A.1) via the linear mapping τ .
Lemma A.4. Suppose that u1 has the representation (A.2). Then, u1 satisfies condition (A.3)
if and only if for every a1 ∈ A1, there exist λ, µ ∈ [0,+∞) with (λ, µ) 6= (0, 0) such that
λτ(fa1) = µτ(va1fa1 + ga1) (A.4)
Proof. For every w ∈ Rn, let us partition Γ into Γ+(w),Γ−(w),Γ0(w), such that w · γ > 0
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(resp., w · γ < 0) for every γ ∈ Γ+(w) (resp., γ ∈ Γ−(w)), and Γ0(w) = Γ \ (Γ+(w) ∪ Γ−(w)).
Now we can equivalently state condition (A.3) as
Γ+(va1fa1 + ga1) ⊂ Γ0(fa1) ∪ Γ+(fa1), ∀a1 ∈ A1. (A.5)
(If statement) Pick any a1 ∈ A1 and suppose there exist λ and µ such that (A.4) holds. If
either λ or µ is 0, then since (λ, µ) 6= (0, 0), we have either τ(fa1) = 0 or τ(va1fa1 + ga1) = 0. In
both cases, (A.5) is satisfied. If λµ 6= 0, then by (A.4) we have for every γ ∈ Γ+(va1fa1 + ga1),
fa1 · γ = τ(fa1) · γ = µ
λ
τ(va1fa1 + ga1) · γ = µ
λ
(va1fa1 + ga1) · γ > 0.
Hence, γ ∈ Γ+(fa1).
(Only-if statement) Pick any a1 ∈ A1 and consider the two n− 1 dimensional vectors τ(fa1)
and τ(va1fa1 +ga1). Suppose that the required λ and µ do not exist. Then, there exists no κ ≥ 0
such that κτ(fa1) = τ(va1fa1 + ga1). By Farkas’ Lemma, there exists γ˜ ≡ (γ˜1, ..., γ˜n−1) ∈ Rn−1
such that
τ(fa1) · γ˜ < 0 but τ(va1fa1 + ga1) · γ˜ > 0.1
Let γ ≡ (γ˜1, ..., γ˜n−1, γ˜n), where γ˜n ≡ −∑n−1i=1 γ˜i. The construction of γ˜ implies that γ ∈
Γ+(va1fa1 + ga1) but γ ∈ Γ−(fa1). This violates (A.5) and thus also violates (A.3).
To conclude the proof of Proposition 1.1, we derive (1.14) from (A.4). According to the
definition of τ , Lemma A.4 implies that for every (a1, a2) ∈ A1 ×A2,
λ (f(a1, a2)− f(a1, an2 )) = µ
[
(va1f(a1, a2) + g(a1, a2))− (va1f(a1, an2 ) + g(a1, an2 ))
]
,
or, equivalently,
µg(a1, a2) = (λ− µva1)f(a1, a2) + h(a1),
where
h(a1) = µ(va1f(a1, an2 ) + g(a1, an2 )− λf(a1, an2 ).
On the one hand, if µ 6= 0, let
vˆ(θ, a1) ≡ v(θ, a1) + (λ− µva1)/µ and cˆ(θ, a1) ≡ c(θ, a1) + h(a1),
which obtains representation (1.14). Note that by construction, minθ∈Θ vˆ(θ, a1) = λ/µ ≥ 0.
On the other hand, if µ = 0, then we must have λ 6= 0 and f(a1, a2) = h(a1)/λ. In this case,
1Farkas’ Lemma implies the existence of γˆ ∈ Rn−1 such that τ(fa1) · γˆ ≤ 0 and τ(va1fa1 + ga1) · γˆ > 0. But
given that τ(fa1) 6= 0, if τ(fa1) · γˆ = 0, there must exist γ˜ ∈ Rn−1 close to γˆ such that τ(fa1) · γ˜ < 0 and
τ(va1fa1 + ga1) · γ˜ > 0.
118 Appendix: Chapter 1
let
fˆ(a1, a2) ≡ g(a1, a2), vˆ(θ, a1) ≡ 1 and cˆ(θ, a1) ≡ c(θ, a1) + h(a1)v(θ, a1)/λ,
which obtains representation (1.14).
A.2 Characterizing the Quasiconcavity-Preserving Property
In this appendix, we provide a characterization of the quasiconcavity-preserving property based
on the primitives of the model. We first introduce a strict version of the signed-ratio monotonicity
condition in Quah and Strulovici (2012).
Definition A.1. (Strict Signed-Ratio Monotonicity). A pair of functions γa1θ , γ
a1
θ′ : I → R obeys
strict signed-ratio monotonicity (or SSRM) if
(1) for every i such that γa1θ (i) < 0 and γ
a1
θ′ (i) > 0, we have
−γ
a1
θ (i)
γa1θ′ (i)
> −γ
a1
θ (j)
γa1θ′ (j)
for every j > i, and
(2) for every i such that γa1θ (i) > 0 and γ
a1
θ′ (i) < 0, we have
−γ
a1
θ′ (i)
γa1θ (i)
> −γ
a1
θ′ (j)
γa1θ (j)
for every j > i.
The next result characterizes the quasiconcavity-preserving property in our setting, which is
a straightforward extension of Theorem 1 in Quah and Strulovici (2012):
Proposition A.1. The receiver’s payoff is quasiconcavity-preserving if and only if (i) γa1θ sat-
isfies SSCP for every (θ, a1) ∈ Θ× A1, and (ii) γa1θ and γa1θ′ obey SSRM for every a1 ∈ A1 and
every θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
Proof. (Only-if statement) Suppose that the receiver’s payoff is quasiconcavity-preserving, i.e.,
Γθp˜i has the strict single-crossing property for every (a1, p˜i) ∈ A1 ×∆(Θ). Then, (i) immediately
follows by taking the degenerate distributions over ∆(Θ). For (ii), pick any pair of functions
γa1θ and γ
a1
θ′ . Suppose that γ
a1
θ (i) < 0 and γ
a1
θ′ (i) > 0. Let
β = −γ
a1
θ (i)/γ
a1
θ′ (i)
1− γa1θ (i)/γa1θ′ (i)
,
so that β ∈ (0, 1) and βγa1θ (i) + (1 − β)γa1θ′ (i) = 0. Since βγa1θ + (1 − β)γa1θ′ has the strict
single-crossing property, we have βγa1θ (j) + (1− β)γa1θ′ (j) > 0 for all j > i. Given that γa1θ′ must
satisfy SSCP and thus γa1θ′ (j) > 0, we can further obtain
1− β
β
= −γ
a1
θ (i)
γa1θ′ (i)
> −γ
a1
θ (j)
γa1θ′ (j)
.
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Hence, γa1θ and γ
a1
θ′ must obey SSRM for every a1 ∈ A1 and every θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
(If-statement) Let Θ ≡ {θ1, ..., θK}. We need to show that ∀µ ≡ (µ1, ..., µK) ∈ [0, 1]K such
that ∑Kk=1 µi = 1, the function Γa1µ : I → R with Γa1µ (i) ≡ ∑Kk=1 µkγa1θk (i) satisfies the strict
single-crossing property. Since SSCP is preserved under positive scalar multiplication, and if
γa1θ and γ
a1
θ′ obey SSRM then so do βγ
a1
θ and γ
a1
θ′ for all β ≥ 0, it suffices for us to show that
Γa1 ≡∑Kk=1 γa1θk satisfies SSCP.
Suppose that Γa1(i) ≥ 0. We want to show that Γa1(j) > 0 for every j > i. If γa1θk (i) ≥ 0 for
all k = 1, ...,K, then we are done because each γa1θk satisfies SSCP. Now suppose that γ
a1
θk
(i) < 0
for some θk ∈ Θ. In this case, let us partition Θ into three subsets, Θ+, Θ0 and Θ−, such that
θk′ ∈ Θ+ if γa1θk′ (i) > 0, θk′ ∈ Θ
0 if γa1θk′ (i) = 0, and θk′ ∈ Θ
− if γa1θk′ (i) < 0. Hence, we have
∑
θk∈Θ+∪Θ−
γa1θk =
L∑
`=1
γa1` ,
where each function γ` : I → R is a positive linear combination of at most two functions γa1θk , γ
a1
θk′
such that θk, θk′ ∈ Θ+ ∪Θ−, and γ`(i) ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, ..., L.
To complete the proof, it now suffices to show that for every ` = 1, ..., L, if γa1` = αγ
a1
θk
+βγa1θk′
for some α, β > 0 and γa1θk , γ
a1
θk′
such that γa1θk (i) < 0 and γ
a1
θk′
(i) > 0, we would then obtain
γa1` (j) > 0 for every j > i. This is true because by SSRM, we have
β
α
≥ − γ
a1
θk
(i)
γa1θk′
(i) > −
γa1θk (j)
γa1θk′
(j) for every j > i,
and hence γa1` (j) = αγ
a1
θk
(j) + βγa1θk′ (j) > 0.
A.3 Strongly Monotone Equilibria
Theorems 1.1 - 1.3 in the main text provide sufficient conditions under which the sender uses
a monotone strategy in every Nash equilibrium. As discussed in section 1.2, our notion of
monotonicity can be strengthened in environments when A1 is multi-dimensional. This leads to
the definitions of strongly monotone strategy and strongly monotone equilibrium:
Definition A.2. σ1 is a strongly monotone strategy if mina1{supp(σθ1)}  maxa1{supp(σθ
′
1 )}
for every θ  θ′. An equilibrium (σ1, σ2) is strongly monotone if σ1 is strongly monotone.
In words, a strategy is strongly monotone if a high type sender always plays a higher action
than a low type. Plainly, strong monotonicity is strictly more demanding than monotonicity
when A1 is multi-dimensional. In what follows, we use an example to illustrate why it is
fundamentally more challenging to establish a result stating that all equilibria are strongly
monotone.
Let Θ = A2 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and A1 = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. All sets are endowed with
the product order. Note that A1 is two-dimensional, and the sender’s actions are only partially
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ordered. For all θ ∈ Θ, a1 = (a11, a12) ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2, the sender’s payoff is given by
u1(θ, a1, a2) =
√
a2 − c(θ, a1),
where
c(θ, a1) =

3a11 + 3a22 if θ = 0,
0.9a11 + 2a22 if θ = 1,
0.8a11 + a22 if θ = 2,
0.2a11 + 0.2a22 if θ = 3.
The receiver’s payoff is given by u2(θ, a1, a2) = 1 if a2 = θ, and u2(θ, a1, a2) = 0 otherwise. We
leave the receiver’s prior belief pi unspecified as it plays no role.
In this example, the sender’s payoff is separable and monotone-supermodular, which is suf-
ficient to guarantee that she will use a monotone strategy in every equilibrium (Theorem 1.3).
However, even the sender’s payoff takes such a simple form, one cannot assert that all equilibria
are strongly monotone. In particular, consider the following strategy profile: Type θ = 0 sender
chooses a1 = (0, 0), type 1 chooses a1 = (1, 0), type 2 chooses a1 = (0, 1), and type 3 chooses
a1 = (1, 1). The receiver plays a2 = 0 if he observes a1 = (0, 0), 1 if he observes a1 = (1, 0), 2 if
he observes a1 = (0, 1), and 3 if a1 = (1, 1) is observed. One can check that this strategy profile
constitutes a sequential equilibrium, in which every action of the sender is played with positive
probability, and the players’ incentives are strict. The sender’s strategy is monotone but not
strongly monotone, because the action (0, 1) taken by type 2 is not higher than the action (1, 0)
taken by type 1.
In sum, the above example suggests that strong assumptions on the players’ payoffs would
need to be made if we want to further strengthen the robust monotonicity prediction about the
sender’s equilibrium strategies. In particular, the difficulty due to the incompleteness of the
order on A1 cannot be easily bypassed even in the simplest settings where the sender’s payoff is
separable.
A.4 Generalized Results with Infinite A2
In this appendix, we generalize our monotonicity results to cases where A1 is infinite. For
simplicity, we shall assume that A1 ⊂ Rn with n ≥ 1 and it is a complete lattice with to the
product order on the Euclidean space. With infinite A1, a technical difficulty is that some of
the actions in the support of σθ1 can be suboptimal. Therefore, the notion of monotonicity in
Definition 1.2 does not apply.
For every a1 ∈ A1 and α1 ∈ ∆(A1), let Pr(α1  a1) be the probability that the realization
of α1 is strictly higher than a1. To accommodate the above-mentioned technical difficulty, we
introduce the following weaker version of monotonicity:
Definition A.3. σ1 is an almost surely monotone strategy if for every θ  θ′ and a1 ∈ supp(σθ1),
we have Pr(σθ′1  a1) = 0. An equilibrium (σ1, σ2) is almost surely monotone if σ1 is almost
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surely monotone.
We establish the following result, which generalizes Theorem 1.1.
Theorem A.1. If |A2| = 2 and the sender’s payoff is monotone-supermodular, then every Nash
equilibrium is almost surely monotone.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1.1 implies the following lemma.
Lemma A.5. Given the receiver’s strategy σ2, for every θ  θ′ and a1  a′1, if a′1 is a best
response to σ2 for type θ, then a1 is not a best response to σ2 for type θ′.
For every x ∈ Rn and r > 0, let B(x, r) be the open ball around x with radius r. For every
θ  θ′ and a1 ∈ supp(σθ1), we have σθ1(B(a1, r)) > 0 for every r > 0. That is to say, there exists
a′1 ∈ B(a1, r) such that a′1 is optimal for type θ. Let ar1 be the smallest element that is above
every element in B(a1, r). Lemma A.5 implies that Pr(σθ
′
1  ar1) = 0 for every r > 0. For every
strictly positive decreasing sequence {ri}∞i=1 with limi→∞ ri = 0, we have:
lim
i→∞
{a′1|a′1  ari1 } = {a′1|a′1  a1} and {a′1|a′1  ari1 } ⊃ {a′1|a′1  arj1 } for every i > j.
The monotone convergence theorem implies that:
Pr(σθ′1  a1) = Pr(σθ
′
1  lim
i→∞
ari1 ) = limi→∞Pr(σ
θ′
1  ari1 ) = 0.
The statement of the theorem then immediately follows.
The corresponding generalizations of Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 are similar and, therefore, omit-
ted.
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B.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
We first show that ga(0) > 0 ∀a ∈ A, and hence p∗a is well-defined. If εa is degenerate, this
follows directly from (A2.1.3). Now suppose that εa is non-degenerate. By (A2.1.5), Γa then
has a density γa which is log-concave on its support. By definition, it follows that supp(γa) must
be a convex set, i.e., an interval on R. It then follows from (A2.1.4) that 0 ∈ supp(γa), for if
0 /∈ supp(γa) then supp(γa) must reside entirely either in (−∞, 0) or in (0,∞), contradicting the
symmetry of Γa at zero. Symmetry of Γa further assures that supp(γa) is an interval symmetric
around zero. By (A2.1.3), g0 is continuous and strictly positive at the point x = 0. Hence, there
must exist δ > 0 such that g0(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [−δ, δ]. In particular, we can choose this δ > 0 so
small to assure that [−δ, δ] ⊂ supp(γa). Accordingly, we have
ga(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
g0(−ε)γa(ε)dε ≥
∫ δ
−δ
g0(−ε)γa(ε)dε > 0.
Now consider the profit maximization problems of the firms. As G0 is non-degenerate,
choosing pi = 0 would never be optimal for any firm. For every p2 > 0, let
p(p2) ≡ sup {p1 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 1} , and p¯(p2) ≡ inf {p1 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 0} .
Similarly, for every p1 > 0, define
p(p1) ≡ sup {p2 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 0} , and p¯(p2) ≡ inf {p2 ∈ R |Ga(p2 − p1) = 1} .
Taking firm j’s price pj as given, it is clear that, from firm i’s perspective, any pi < p(pj) is
strictly dominated by p(pj), and any pi > p¯(pj) is strictly dominated by p¯(pj). Hence, when
solving the firms’ optimization problems, we can assume without loss of generality that, by taking
pj > 0 as given, each firm i will only choose a price pi from the interval
[
max{p(pj), 0}, p¯(pj)
]
.
This leads to the following first-order conditions of the firms:
∂Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
= Ga(p2 − p1)− p1ga(p2 − p1) = 0,
∂Π2(p1, p2)
∂p2
= 1−Ga(p2 − p1)− p2ga(p2 − p1) = 0.
By (A2.1.1) and (A2.1.4), it is easy to verify that Ga is symmetric for all a ∈ A. Hence, by
plugging p1 = p2 into the first-order conditions, we obtain the unique candidate for a symmetric
123
124 Appendix: Chapter 2
equilibrium in the pricing subgame:
p1 = p2 = p∗a ≡
Ga(0)
ga(0)
= 12ga(0)
,
where the last equality follows again the symmetry of Ga.
Finally, we argue that the log-concavity assumptions (A2.1.2) and (A2.1.5) guarantee that
the price profile (p1, p2) = (p∗a, p∗a) indeed constitutes an equilibrium. To see this, first note that
∀a ∈ A, the distribution function Ga is log-concave on supp(ga). This is trivial if Ga = G0,
i.e., if εa is degenerate at zero. If εa is non-degenerate, the claim holds since both G0 and γa
are log-concave ((A2.1.2) and (A2.1.5)), and the convolution of log-concave functions is also
log-concave.1 Since the function f(p) = p is strictly log-concave on [0,+∞), the profit function
Πi(pi, pj) is strictly log-concave (and hence strictly quasi-concave) in pi on
[
max{p(pj), 0}, p¯(pj)
]
for all pj > 0. Since Πi(p(pj), pj) = Πi(p¯(pj), pj) = 0, strict quasi-concavity implies that p1 = p∗a
must be a global maximum of the function Π1(p1, p∗a). Hence, when firm j plays pj = p∗a, it is
a best response for firm i to choose the same price pi = p∗a. Thus (p∗a, p∗a) constitutes a unique
symmetry equilibrium for the pricing subgame where firms choose a ∈ A in the first-stage.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Part (i): The claim is trivial if εa is degenerate for all a ∈ A, so suppose otherwise. Then, for
any a ∈ A such that εa is non-degenerate, we have
ga(0) =
∫
supp(γa)
g0(−ε)γa(ε)dε >
∫
supp(γa)
g0(0)γa(ε)dε = g0(0),
where the inequality follows from supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ] and that the true preferences are weakly
polarized. Hence, by Lemma 2.1 we can conclude that p∗a < p∗0 = 12g0(0) for all such a ∈ A. It
immediately follows that any choice of a ∈ A which leaves εa degenerate must be an equilibrium
of the marketing stage, followed by p∗1 = p∗2 = 12g0(0) in the pricing stage. In this SPE, marketing
strategies are thus chosen such that no consumer confusion results. Part (ii) of the theorem can
be proven analogously.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Part (i): By Theorem 2.1, for this part of the proof it is without loss to assume that 0 /∈ A,
since even if it is available the marketing profile a = 0 will not be chosen in any SPE anyway.
Consider first the case where (a) holds. Take any a,a′ ∈ A such that a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′. By the
1For an overview of the properties of log-concave distributions, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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MPS assumption, εa′ has the same distribution as εa + η, where η 6= O. Thus
ga′(0) =
∫ δ
−δ g0(−e)dΓa′(e) = E [g0(εa′)]
= E [E [g0 (εa′) |εa]]
= E [E [g0 (εa + η) |εa]]
< E [g0 (E[εa + η|εa])]
= E [g0 (εa)] =
∫ δ
−δ g0(−e)dΓa(e) = ga(0).
(B.1)
The second line follows from the law of iterated expectations, the third because εa′ and εa + η
are equal in distribution, and the forth line follows from Jensen’s inequality because g0 is strictly
concave on [−δ, δ] ⊃ supp(γa). Hence, ga(0) achieves its minimum on A if and only if a = (a¯, a¯).
By Lemma 2.1, this also maximizes the equilibrium price and the expected profits of the firms.
For this reason, the marketing profile (a¯, a¯) is part of an SPE. Moreover, (a¯, a¯) is the only
possible equilibrium outcome, because for any alternative (a1, a2) ∈ A, the firm with ai < a¯
would always deviate to a¯.
Now suppose that (b) holds. Take any a,a′ such that a 6= a′ and a ≤ a′. Let supp(γa) =
[−ωa, ωa] and supp(γa′) = [−ωa′ , ωa′ ]. Condition (A2.3.2) implies that there exists a unique
eˆ ∈ (0, ωa′), such that γa′(e)− γa(e) < 0 ∀e ∈ [0, eˆ), and γa′(e)− γa(e) > 0 ∀e ∈ (eˆ, ωa′ ]. Since
g0 is strictly decreasing on [0, ωa′ ] ⊂ [0, δ], we further have∫ ωa′
eˆ
g0(e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de <
∫ ωa′
eˆ
g0(eˆ) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de
=
∫ eˆ
0
g0(eˆ)(γa(e)− γa′(e))de
<
∫ eˆ
0
g0(e)(γa(e)− γa′(e))de, (B.2)
where the equality makes use of the fact that, by symmetry and ωa ≤ ωa′ , we have
1
2 =
∫ ωa′
0
γa′(e)de =
∫ ωa
0
γa(e)de =
∫ ωa′
0
γa(e)de.
Exploiting again the symmetry of g0, γa and γa′ , we further have∫ ωa′
−ωa′
g0(−e)γa′(e)de−
∫ ωa
−ωa
g0(−e)γa(e)de
=
∫ ωa′
−ωa′
g0(−e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de
= 2
∫ ωa′
0
g0(−e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de
= 2
[∫ eˆ
0
g0(−e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de+
∫ ωa′
eˆ
g0(−e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de
]
= 2
[∫ eˆ
0
g0(e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de+
∫ ωa′
eˆ
g0(e) (γa′(e)− γa(e)) de
]
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from (B.2). We have thus shown that ga′(0) < ga(0) for any
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feasible a 6= a′ with a ≤ a′. Hence, if preferences are δ-indecisive, ga(0) must be uniquely
minimized at a∗ = (a¯, a¯). By arguments analogous to the case with MPS ordering, we can
conclude that there exists a unique SPE, and a∗ = (a¯, a¯) is the unique equilibrium outcome in
the first stage.
Part (ii): As the proof with (b) is similar, we only provide arguments for the case that (a)
holds. Since now g0 is strictly convex, the inequality in (B.1) is reversed. By Lemma 2.1, any εa′
which is MPS of εa therefore is payoff dominated by εa. Further, any εa 6= O trivially is an MPS
of O. Thus, regardless of whether 0 ∈ A or not, a∗ = (a, a) is the only possible equilibrium
outcome. Indeed, setting ai = a is a dominant action for each firm i, because for any given
aj ∈ A, with any alternative ai > a the resulting ε(ai,aj) is a MPS of ε(a, aj), which can only lead
to a lower equilibrium price in the second stage.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 2.3
For every ω ≥ 0, let
gω(0) ≡
∫ ω
−ω
g0(ε)dΓω,
where Γω is the uniform distribution on [−ω, ω]:
Γω(x) =

1 if x > ω,
x+ω
2ω if x ∈ [−ω, ω],
0 otherwise.
Note that under the assumption of the theorem, we have Γa(x) = Γωa(x) ∀x ∈ R,a ∈ A.
Consider first case (i). We start by showing that gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω on [0,+∞).
Since preferences are indecisive on supp(g0) and g0(x) = 0 ∀x /∈ supp(g0), we have g0(ε) < g0(0)
∀ε 6= 0. It then follows that, ∀ω > 0,
gω(0) =
∫ ω
−ω
g0(ε)Γω <
∫ ω
−ω
g0(0)dΓω = g0(0).
Furthermore, since the partial derivative of gω(0) with respect to ω exists for all ω > 0, we have
∂gω(0)
∂ω
= g0(−ω)2ω +
g0(ω)
2ω −
∫ ω
−ω
1
2ω2 g0(−ε)dε
= g0(ω)
ω
−
∫ ω
−ω
1
2ω2 g0(ε)dε
<
g0(ω)
ω
−
∫ ω
−ω
1
2ω2 g0(ω)dε
= g0(ω)
ω
− g0(ω)
ω
= 0,
where the inequality follows that preferences are indecisive on supp(g0), g0 is zero-symmetry,
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and g0(x) = 0 ∀x /∈ supp(g0).
By Lemma 2.1, in every pricing subgame there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in
which both firms choose the price p∗ = 12gωa (0) . Since gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω, gωa is
minimized at ωa = ω¯. Therefore, the subgame equilibrium price is maximized at ωa = ω¯, which
implies that there must exist an SPE with maximal obfuscation.2
Next, consider case (ii). We first prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma B.1. If supp(g0) is bounded, then limω→+∞ gω(0) = 0.
Proof. Since supp(g0) is bounded, we must have supp(g0) ⊂ [−ω, ω] for sufficiently large ω.
As a result,
lim
ω→+∞ gω(0) = limω→+∞
∫ ω
−ω
g0(ε)
2ω dε = limω→+∞
∫
supp(g0)
g0(ε)
2ω dε = 0. 
Lemma B.2. If supp(g0) is bounded, then gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω for all ω > sup supp(g0).
Proof. Since supp(g0) is bounded, we must have sup supp(g0) < +∞, and g0(ω) = 0 for all
ω > sup supp(g0). It then follows that, for every ω > sup supp(g0),
∂gω(0)
∂ω
= g0(ω)
ω
−
∫ ω
−ω
g0(ε)
2ω2 dε = −
∫ ω
−ω
g0(ε)
2ω2 dε < 0. 
Now consider any preference distribution that is polarized on supp(g0). By definition, g0 is
strictly decreasing on (inf supp(g0), 0] and is strictly increasing on [0, sup supp(g0)). This implies
that the support of g0 must be bounded, as otherwise we would have∫
supp(g0)
g0(x)dx =
∫ +∞
−∞
g0(x)dx ≥
∫ +∞
−∞
g0(0)dx = +∞,
contradicting the definition of g0 as a density function. Applying Lemmas B.1 and B.2, we can
conclude that limω→+∞ gω(0) = 0 and that gω(0) is strictly decreasing in ω on (sup supp(g0),+∞).
Hence, using g0(0) > 0 there must exist ωˆ > 0, such that if ω ≥ ωˆ, then gω(0) ≤ g0(0). Moreover,
gω(0) can be arbitrarily small for sufficiently large ω. Therefore, if ω¯ is sufficiently large, the
subgame equilibrium price is maximized at ωa = ω¯, which implies that there must exist an SPE
with maximal obfuscation. 
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let η ≡ sup supp (g0). We can write the expected welfare loss from mismatch as a function of
the degree of confusion:
L(ω) = 2
∫ min{ω,η}
0
[
x · −x+ ω2ω · g0(x)
]
dx =
∫ min{ω,η}
0
[
x
(
1− x
ω
)
g0(x)
]
dx.
2By Theorem 2.2, this SPE will be unique if we further assume that ωa = ϕ(a1, a2) ∀a ∈ A, where ϕ : A → R+
is strictly increasing in both a1 and a2.
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Taking the first derivative, we obtain
L′(ω) =
∫ η
0
[
x2
ω2
]
dG0(x)
if ω ≥ η, and
L′(ω) =
∫ ω
0
[
x2
ω2
]
dG0(x) + ω
(
1− ω
ω
)
g0(ω) =
∫ ω
0
[
x2
ω2
]
dG0(x)
if ω < η. Since by assumption G0 is a non-degenerate distribution, L′(ω) > 0 ∀ω > 0. Hence,
the expected welfare loss is strictly increasing in ω.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.2
We start by arguing that if α ≤ αˆ, then (A2.1.2) holds, that is, G is log-concave on its support.
To show this, we will make use of the Lemma B.3 below, which states that H is log-concave on
its support if α ≤ αˆ.
Lemma B.3. If α ≤ αˆ, then H is log-concave on [−λ, λ].
Proof. If α ≤ 0, the statement of the lemma immediately follows because in these cases the
density function h is log-concave, which is sufficient (but not necessary) for the distribution
function H to be log-concave on [−λ, λ].
Suppose now that α ∈ (0, αˆ]. We will show that H remains to be log-concave despite that
the density function h is actually log-convex. By continuity, it suffices to show that H is log-
concave on the open interval (−λ, λ). Since h is differentiable on (−λ, λ), H is log-concave on
this interval if and only if for all θ ∈ (−λ, λ),
h′(θ)H(θ)− (h(θ))2 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ 2αθ ·
(1
3αθ
3 + βθ + 12
)
≤
(
αθ2 + β
)2
⇐⇒ 23α
2θ4 + 2αβθ2 + αθ ≤ α2θ4 + β2 + 2αβθ2
⇐⇒ − 13α
2θ4 + αθ ≤
(
1
2λ −
αλ2
3
)2
. (B.3)
Given that α > 0, the inequality obviously holds when θ ≤ 0. But given that θ > 0, the LHS of
(B.3) is increasing in θ on [0, λ], since
(1
3α
2θ4 + αθ
)′
= −43α
2θ3 + α ≥ −43α
2λ3 + α > 0,
where the last inequality holds as αˆ < 3/(4λ3). Hence, inequality (2.3) holds for all θ ∈ (−λ, λ)
if and only if
− 13α
2λ4 + αλ ≤ 14λ2 +
α2λ4
9 −
αλ
3
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⇐⇒ − 49α
2λ4 + 43αλ ≤
1
4λ2
⇐⇒ − α2λ4 + 3αλ ≤ 916λ2
⇐⇒
(
αλ2 − 32λ
)2
≥ 2716λ2 . (B.4)
Since λ > 0 and αˆ ≤ 3/(2λ3), (B.4) is further equivalent to α ≤ 6−3
√
3
4λ3 = αˆ. 
Since G(x) = Pr(4λθ ≤ x) = Pr (θ ≤ x4λ) = H ( x4λ) ∀x ∈ R, and the function t(x) = x/(4λ)
is increasing and concave in x, G is log-concave on [4λa, 4λb] if H is log-concave on [a, b] ⊂ R.
Hence, by Lemma B.2, G is log-concave on [−4λ2, 4λ2] provided that α ≤ αˆ.
It is straightforward to check that all conditions in Assumption 2.1 are satisfied. Hence,
by Lemma 2.1, we can conclude that there exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in every
pricing subgame, where each firm chooses the same price p∗a = 12ga(0) ∀a ∈ A. The statements
of the proposition then immediately follow from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Since G(x) = H
(
x
4λ
) ∀x ∈ R, the density function of G, which we denote as g, is given by
g(x) = 14λh
(
x
4λ
)
=

1
4λ ·
(
α
(
x
4λ
)2 + 12λ − αλ23 ) if x ∈ [−4λ2, 4λ2],
0 otherwise.
The welfare loss can now be written as a function of α:
L(α) =
∫ min{ω,4λ2}
0
[
x
(
1− x
ω
)
· 14λ · h0
(
x
4λ
)]
dx
= 14λ
∫ min{ω,4λ2}
0
[
x
(
1− x
ω
)(
α
(
x
4λ
)2
+ 12λ −
αλ2
3
)]
dx.
Taking derivative with respect to α, we have
L′(α) = 14λ
∫ min{ω,4λ2}
0
[
x
(
1− x
ω
)((
x
4λ
)2
− λ
2
3
)]
dx.
First, suppose that ω ≤ 4λ2. In this case, we obtain
L′(α) = 14λ
∫ ω
0
[
x
(
1− x
ω
)((
x
4λ
)2
− λ
2
3
)]
dx
= 14λ
[∫ ω
0
(
x3
16λ2 −
λ2x
3
)
dx−
∫ ω
0
(
x4
16λ2ω −
λ2x2
3ω
)
dx
]
= 14λ
( x4
64λ2 −
λ2x2
6
) ∣∣∣∣∣
ω
0
−
(
x5
80λ2ω −
λ2x3
9ω
) ∣∣∣∣∣
ω
0

= 14λ
[
ω4
64λ2 −
ω4
80λ2 −
λ2ω2
6 +
λ2ω2
9
]
.
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Hence, provided that ω ∈ (0, 4λ2], we further have
L′(α) < 0 ⇐⇒
( 1
64λ2 −
1
80λ2
)
ω2 <
λ2
6 −
λ2
9 ⇐⇒ ω <
4
√
10
3 λ
2.
Since (4
√
10/3) ≈ 4.22 > 4, it follows that L′(α) < 0 whenever ω ≤ 4λ2.
Next, consider the case where ω > 4λ2. Expanding the equation L′(α) again, we have
L′(α) = 14λ
∫ 4λ2
0
[
x
(
1− x
ω
)((
x
4λ
)2
− λ
2
3
)]
dx
= 14λ
( x4
64λ2 −
λ2x2
6
) ∣∣∣∣∣
4λ2
0
−
(
x5
80λ2ω −
λ2x3
9ω
) ∣∣∣∣∣
4λ2
0

= 14λ
[(
44λ8
64λ2 −
42λ6
6
)
− 1
ω
(
45λ10
80λ2 −
43λ8
9
)]
= 4λ5
[(16
64 −
1
6
)
− λ
2
ω
(64
80 −
4
9
)]
.
Hence, provided that ω > 4λ2, we further have
L′(α) > 0 ⇐⇒ λ
2
ω
(4
5 −
4
9
)
<
1
4 −
1
6 ⇐⇒ ω >
64
15λ
2.
Note that 64/15 ≈ 4.27 > 4. We can now conclude that L′(α) < 0 whenever ω < ωˆ ≡ 64λ2/15,
and L′(α) > 0 whenever ω > ωˆ.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 2.4
The demand function of firm 1 is given by
D(p1, p2) =
∫
Pr
(
v˜k1 − p1 ≥ max{v˜k2 − p2, 0}
)
dΓa
=
∫
Pr (υ ≥ p1 − p2 − ε, υ ≥ 2p1 −m− ε) dΓa
=
∫
min {Pr (υ ≥ p1 − p2 − ε) ,Pr (υ ≥ 2p1 −m− ε)} dΓa
=1−
∫
max {G0 (p1 − p2 − ε) , G0 (2p1 −m− ε)} dΓa.
Recall that, for all x ∈ R, we write
Ga(x) =
∫
G0(x− ε)dΓa, and ga(x) =
∫
g0(x− ε)dΓa
Note that
D(p, p) =

1
2 if p ≤ m2 ,
1−Ga(2p− 1) if p > m2 .
Let Π1(p1, p2) = p1D(p1, p2). For every p2 > 0, function Π1 is differentiable in p1 almost
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everywhere. In particular, if p1 < m− p2, we have
∂Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
= 1−Ga(p1 − p2)− p1ga(p1 − p2),
which is also the left derivative of Π1(p1, p2) at p1 = m− p2. Similarly, if p1 > m− p2, we have
∂Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
= 1−Ga(2p1 −m)− 2p1ga(2p1 −m),
which is also the right derivative of Π1(p1, p2) at p1 = m− p2.
Finally, let pMa be the solution to the monopoly problem
max
p≥0
ΠMa (p) ≡ p (1−Ga(2p−m)) .
Note that the log-concavity of G0 and Γa implies that the above objective function is strictly
quasi-concave. Therefore, a unique pMa exists for every a ∈ A.
Since log-concavity is preserved under convolution, the function Ga is log-concave on its
support supp(ga). In addition, since Ga is a distribution function, its log-concavity also holds
on [0,+∞). Hence, for all p2 > 0 and a ∈ A, the demand function D must be log-concave in
p1 on both [0,m− p2] and [m− p2,+∞). Note that we are not claiming that D is log-concave
in p1 on the entire interval [0,+∞). In what follows, we will show that although the global
log-concavity of the demand function is not guaranteed, Assumption 2.1 is still sufficient to
guarantee the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium in every pricing subgame.
First, suppose that ga(0) > 1m . Suppose also that firm 2 is choosing p2 =
1
2ga(0) <
m
2 . In
this case, the whole market is guaranteed to be covered (i.e., every consumer will buy from one
of the firms) if p1 ≤ m/2. In addition, since
∂Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
∣∣∣∣∣
p1=p2= 12ga(0)<
m
2
= 1−Ga(0)− 12ga(0) · ga(0) = 0,
and the function Π1
(
p1,
1
2ga(0)
)
is strictly quasi-concave in p1 on
[
0,m− 12ga(0)
]
, and ga(0) > 1m
implies that p1 = 12ga(0) is a maximum of the function Π1
(
p1,
1
2ga(0)
)
over the range
[
0,m− 12ga(0)
]
.
We now argue that, in addition,
Π1
(
p1,
1
2ga(0)
)
≤ Π1
( 1
2ga(0)
,
1
2ga(0)
)
∀p1 > m− 12ga(0) .
To see this, note that p1 > m− 12ga(0) implies that the market will no longer be fully covered and,
in particular, there will be consumers who choose to stick to their outside options even though
they prefer firm 1 over firm 2. Therefore, a deviation to p1 > m− 12ga(0) must be less profitable
than it would have been in the case without outside option. But then, as we have shown in
Theorem 2.1, in the absence of the outside option, choosing p1 = 12ga(0) actually maximizes
firm 1’s expected profits over [0,+∞) given that its competitor plays p2 = 12ga(0) . This implies
that deviating to p1 > m − 12ga(0) cannot be profitable either in the presence of the outside
option. Therefore, p1 = 12ga(0) must be a global maximum of the function Π1
(
p1,
1
2ga(0)
)
, and
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(p1, p2) =
(
1
2ga(0) ,
1
2ga(0)
)
indeed constitutes an equilibrium in the pricing subagme. It is easy to
see that this is the only symmetric equilibrium with a price strictly less than m2 . In addition,
since
∂ΠM (p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣∣
p=m2
= 12 −m · ga(0) <
1
2 − 1 < 0
and ΠM (p) is strictly quasi-concave, even a monopoly will not choose a price p ≥ m2 . Hence,
when ga(0) > 1/m, there cannot be any symmetric equilibrium in which both firms choose a
price larger than m2 . As a result, (p1, p2) =
(
1
2ga(0) ,
1
2ga(0)
)
is the unique symmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium when ga(0) > 1/m.
Next, consider the case ga(0) ∈ [ 12m , 1m ]. Taking p2 = m2 as given, we will show that p1 = m2
is a best response for firm 1. As mentioned, the profit function Π1(p1, p2) is semi-differentiable
at the point p1 = m− p2. In particular, we have
∂−Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
∣∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=m2
= 1−Ga(0)− m2 · ga(0) =
1
2 −
m
2 · ga(0) ≥ 0,
and
∂+Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
∣∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=m2
= 1−Ga(0)− ga(0) = 12 −m · ga(0) ≤ 0.
Since Π1
(
p1,
m
2
)
is strictly quasi-concave on both
[
0, m2
]
and [m2 ,+∞), the above inequalities
show that p1 = m2 is a maximum of Π1
(
p1,
1
2
)
on each of these two intervals. This immediately
implies that p1 = m2 is a global maximum of Π1
(
p1,
m
2
)
on [0,+∞). Hence, if ga(0) ∈ [ 12m , 1m ],
the pricing subgame admits a symmetric equilibrium with p1 = p2 = m2 . Since
1
2ga(0) ≥ m2 , a
symmetric equilibrium with p1 = p2 < m2 cannot exist. In addition, because
∂ΠM (p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣∣
p=m2
= 12 −m · ga(0) ≤
1
2 −
1
2 = 0
and ΠM (p) is strictly quasi-concave, even a monopoly will not choose a price strictly higher
than m2 . Hence, no symmetric equilibrium with p1 = p2 >
m
2 can exist either. As a result,
(p1, p2) =
(
m
2 ,
m
2
)
is the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium when ga(0) ∈
[
1
2m ,
1
m
]
.
Finally, suppose that ga(0) < m2 . Observe that in this case, we must have pMa >
m
2 , since
∂ΠM (p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣∣
p=m2
= 12 −m · ga(0) > 0
and ΠM (p) is strictly quasi-concave on [0,+∞). Now suppose that firm 2 plays p2 = pMa , and
consider firm 1’s profit function Π1(p1, pMa ). Given the formula of the demand function and
pMa > m− pMa , we have
Π1(pMa , pMa ) = ΠM (pMa ) ≥ ΠM (p1) ≥ Π1(p1, pMa ) ∀p1 ∈ [0,+∞),
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which further implies that p1 = pMa is a best response for firm 1. Hence, (p1, p2) = (pma , pma )
indeed constitutes an equilibrium in the pricing subgame where ga(0) < m2 . Moreover, given
1
2ga(0) >
m
2 , there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium with p1 = p2 <
m
2 . Since
∂−Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
∣∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=m2
>
∂+Π1(p1, p2)
∂p1
∣∣∣∣∣
p1=p2=m2
= 12 −m · ga(0) > 0,
p1 = p2 = m2 does not constitute an equilibrium either. In conclusion, (p1, p2) =
(
pMa , p
M
a
)
is
the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium when ga(0) < m2 .
N
B.9 Competition for Voters
Given a ∈ A an interior symmetric second stage equilibrium necessarily solves
∂Πj(s, s;a)
∂sj
= 0
with solution s(a). Finally, we suppose that for any a ∈ A the payoff function Πj(s1, s2;a)
is strictly quasiconcave in sj , such that the above condition is also sufficient, and assures that
(s1, s2) = (s(a), s(a)) is a symmetric equilibrium in any second stage subgame induced by
a ∈ A.3
Proposition B.1. Consider the political economy application.
(i) If there exists δ > 0 with supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ] ∀a ∈ A such that preferences are weakly
δ-polarized, then there exists an SPE without voter confusion.
(ii) If there exists δ > 0 with supp(γa) ⊂ [−δ, δ] ∀a ∈ A such that preferences are δ-indecisive,
then no SPE without voter confusion exists.4
Proof. Part (i): As the commitment case is isomorphic to the oligopoly model, the result
follows by direct application of Theorem 2.1. (ii) Now consider the case
Πj(s1, s2;a) = Pr(v˜i∆ ≤ si∆ + εa)− c(si).
Given that Πi(s1, s2;a) is strictly quasiconcave in s1 for each a ∈ A, the second stage symmetric
equilibrium is described by ∫
g0(e)γa(e)de = c′(si), (B.5)
with equilibrium profits
Π∗i = 1/2− c(si).
3In the commitment example, strict quasiconcavity follows from the convexity assumptions imposed on c(·).
In the advertising example, this may additionally require that c is sufficiently convex.
4In the knife-edge case where g0 is constant on [−δ, δ], obfuscation has no effect and there are SPE both with
and without voter confusion.
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Hence each firm benefits from an equilibrium which involves a lower s. By the proof of Theorem
2.1, ∫
g0(e)γa(e)de > g0(0)
with weakly δ-polarized preferences whenever εa is non-degenerate. Hence the choice of a such
that εa is degenerate constitutes a SPE.
The proof for Part (ii) of the proposition is omitted because it is analogous.
B.10 Marketing Decisions
In this section, we provide a more technical discussion of the idea that our framework provides
a suitable reduced-form approach which is consistent with various forms of confusion marketing
that have been recognized by the marketing literature (Kasabov, 2015; Walsh et al., 2007) (see
Section 2.4.2).
For convenience, we illustrate the following arguments by means of a general random utility
model. Suppose that the (real-valued) utilities that the consumers associate with a product
j ∈ {1, 2}, net of prices, is determined by a general random utility model Uj = Vj +εj(a), where
Vj is the distribution of true valuations for product j over the consumer population, and εj(a)
is a random variable for any a ∈ A. Absent a binding outside option, the difference distribution
U∆ ≡ U2 − U1 alone is relevant for the firm pricing decisions, where
U∆ = V∆ + εa
with εa ≡ ε2(a)− ε1(a). This decomposition of εa is suggested by some but not all examples we
elaborate below. In this respect, it is helpful to realize that expressing the effects of marketing
activities in terms of εa directly, instead indirectly via ε2(a)−ε1(a), is without loss of generality
in thus that any zero-symmetric random variable can always be expressed as the sum of two
zero-symmetric random variables (Rubin and Sellke, 1986).
For easier reference, we let Hˆ denote the set of all random variables with a 0-symmetric and
log-concave density function. As before, O denotes the constant random variable that yields
x = 0 with probability one, and H ≡ Hˆ ∪O.
B.10.1 Product complexity and information overload
To tie the above discussion of product complexity as quantified by the number of attributes
into the model, suppose that each firm can choose on a number of features to implement in the
marketing process. Each feature needs separate information processing, which results in a noisy
attribution of the product’s valuation. Assuming that each such feature has an iid effect on
consumer evaluation of the product, determined by a random variable Zs ∈ Hˆ, the number of
features nj implemented corresponds to the marketing activity of firm j. If firm j implements
nj features, the perception noise is determined as
εj(nj) =
∑nj
s=0
Zs, (B.6)
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where εj(nj) ∈ H if nj > 0,5 and εj(0) = O . The intuition captured by (B.6) is that a more
complex product, in the sense of coming with more features, increases the difficulty of evaluation
and hence also the spread of opinions across consumers. If ε1, ε2 are determined in the above
way, we have ε(n1, n2) ≡ ε1(n1) − ε2(n2) ∈ H, and ε(n1, n2) ∈ Hˆ iff n1 + n2 > 0. Because
ε(n′1, n′2) is a mean-preserving spread of ε(n1, n2) whenever n′1 + n′2 > n1 + n2, the type of
obfuscation process captured by (B.6) has the additional feature that the resulting distributions
ε can be ordered in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance.6
B.10.2 Heterogeneous effects and interactions
The simple i.i.d model (B.6) does not capture the main observation stated above that different
features may affect consumer perception differentially, possibly with dependencies. However, the
model can be readily generalized to such a case. Let Z = {Z1, ...Zk} denote a a set of random
variables, where the random vector (Z1, ..., Zk) has a joint density function f(z1, ..., zk) that is
coordinate-wise symmetric, meaning that
f(z1, ..., zs, ..., zk) = f(z1, ...,−zs, ..., zk), ∀(z1, ..., zk) ∈ supp(f), ∀s = 1, ..., k.
The non-empty selection Mj ⊂ Z corresponds to the set of features implemented by firm j,
which affects the product valuation according to
εj(Mj) =
∑
s∈Mj
Zs. (B.7)
Formulation (B.7) can capture that the combination of different features affect consumer percep-
tions differentially, or that some features are more confusing than others. The set of marketing
strategies A corresponds to all possible selections, i.e., any marketing activity aj belongs to the
power set of Z, where aj = ∅ means that no feature is chosen and εj is degenerate. If the density
of Z is log-concave and coordinate-wise symmetric, so is the density of any non-empty selection
Mj , meaning that εj(Mj) is symmetric and log-concave as well. Assuming independent product
evaluation implies that ε(a1, a2) = ε1(a1) − ε2(a2) ∈ H and ε(a1, a2) ∈ Hˆ iff aj 6= ∅ for some
j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, the ordering between distributions with the above marketing technology is
such that ε(a′1, a′2) is a mean-preserving spread of ε(a1, a2) whenever aj ( a′j , j = 1, 2.
It is easy to verify that (B.6) is a special case of (B.7). The model (B.7) could be further
extended, e.g., to capture that confusion occurs only once a sufficient number of features have
been implemented. This could be achieved by introducing a threshold value k ∈ N such that
εj(Mj) =
∑
s∈Mj Zs if |Mj | > k and εj(Mj) = O if |Mj | ≤ k.
5This follows because an independent sum of random variables with log-concave and symmetric densities again
produces a random variable with symmetric and log-concave density.
6Note that (B.6) also allows for a non-cognitive explanation, where the “features” are perfectly perceived but
of heterogeneous valuations to consumers, where some consumers like certain features that others dislike in a way
that these features do not correspond to an increase in product quality on average.
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C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We prove a more general version of Proposition 3.1 by allowing the prior distribution of the state
to be non-uniform and the accuracy of the private signals to be state-dependent. Specifically, we
assume Pr(θ = 0) = 1− Pr(θ = 1) = pi ∈ (0, 1), and each of the private signals is independently
drawn according to the conditional probability distribution characterized by Pr(si = 0|θ = 0) =
α0 and Pr(si = 1|θ = 1) = α1, where α0, α1 ∈ (1/2, 1). The results in the main text will then
follow by letting pi = 1/2 and α0 = α1 = α.
For every signal profile s = (s1, ..., sn), let ms =
∑n
i=1 si. As an auxiliary result, note that
conditional on observing the whole profile of private signals and the public signal, the posterior
belief pi(s, sp) that a Bayesian agent would assign to the event θ = 1 is given by:
pi(s, sp) =
Pr(s, sp|θ = 1) Pr(θ = 1)
Pr(s, sp|θ = 1) Pr(θ = 1) + Pr(s, sp|θ = 0) Pr(θ = 0)
= α
ms
1 (1− α1)n−msβ1sp=1(1− β)1sp=0(1− pi)
αms1 (1− α1)n−msβ1sp=1(1− β)1sp=0(1− pi) + (1− α0)msαn−ms0 (1− β)1sp=1β1sp=0pi
= 1
1 +
(
1−α0
α1
)ms ( α0
1−α1
)n−ms (1−β
β
)
1sp=1
(
β
1−β
)
1sp=0
(
pi
1−pi
) ,
where the first equality follows from Bayes rule and the second equality follow from the inde-
pendence assumption of the signals.
We will show that under a given k-voting rule gk, the informative voting equilibrium exists
if and only if
∀i ∈ I, qi ∈
 1
1 +
(
1−α0
α1
)k−1 (
α0
1−α1
)n−k+1 (1−β
β
) (
pi
1−pi
) , 1
1 +
(
1−α0
α1
)k (
α0
1−α1
)n−k ( β
1−β
) (
pi
1−pi
)
 .
Suppose all agents j 6= i play σj(sj , sp) = sj . Firstly, note that if σi(1, 0) = 1 is rational
for agent i, so is σi(1, 1) = 1; similarly, if σi(0, 1) = 0 is rational for agent i, so is σi(0, 0) = 0.
Hence, we only need to consider the optimality of the informative voting strategy in the cases
where si 6= sp. Secondly, agent i is decisive when and only when there are k − 1 agents who
observe a positive signal (sj = 1) and each of the remaining n− k agents observes an opposite
signal (sj = 0). Therefore, given si = 1, sp = 0 and being pivotal, the posterior probability that
agent i assigns to the event θ = 1 is:
pi01 =
1
1 +
(
1−α0
α1
)k (
α0
1−α1
)n−k ( β
1−β
) (
pi
1−pi
) .
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Similarly, given si = 0, sp = 1 and being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i assigns
to the event θ = 1 is:
pi10 =
1
1 +
(
1−α0
α1
)k−1 (
α0
1−α1
)n−k+1 (1−β
β
) (
pi
1−pi
) .
Hence, to have informative voting as an equilibrium, it is both necessary and sufficient to have
∀i ∈ I, qi ∈ [pi10, pi01]. By letting pi = 1/2 and α0 = α1 = α, we immediately obtain condition
(3.2).
C.2 Proof of Corollary 3.1
Note that the interval [pi10, pi01] as defined in the proof of Proposition 3.1 is non-empty if and only
if(1− α0
α1
)k−1 ( α0
1− α1
)n−k+1 (1− β
β
)(
pi
1− pi
)
≥
(1− α0
α1
)k ( α0
1− α1
)n−k ( β
1− β
)(
pi
1− pi
)
,
which is equivalent to
(
α0
1− α0
)(
α1
1− α1
)
≥
(
β
1− β
)2
. (C.1)
If the accuracy of the private signals is state-independent, i.e., α0 = α1 = α, (C.1) is further
equivalent to α ≥ β.
C.3 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Suppose that pi = 1/2, α0 = α1 = α and there exists a k-voting rule under which the informative
voting equilibrium exists. According to the proof of Proposition 3.1, the preferences of agents i
and j must satisfy
qi, qj ∈
 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n−2 1−β
β
,
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n β
1−β
 . (C.2)
Moreover, (C.2) and qi < 11+ α1−α 1−ββ
implies
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n−2 1−β
β
<
1
1 + α1−α
1−β
β
⇐⇒ k < n+ 12 . (C.3)
Similarly, (C.2) and qj > 11+ 1−α
α
β
1−β
implies
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n β
1−β
>
1
1 + 1−αα
β
1−β
⇐⇒ k > n+ 12 . (C.4)
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Clearly, (C.3) and (C.4) are mutually exclusive. Hence, we can conclude that the informative
voting equilibrium does not exist under any k-voting rule.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Given that each agent i observes sˆi = si + sp, we let Sˆi ≡ {0, 1, 2} be each agent’s signal
space. Therefore, agent i’s strategy is now a mapping σi : Sˆi → [0, 1], where σi(sˆi) denotes the
probability that agent i will vote vi = 1 when observing sˆi ∈ Sˆi.
Fix an arbitrary sequence of preference profiles {qn}n∈N. Suppose, in contradiction, that
there exists a sequence of k-voting rules {gkn}n∈N that aggregates information asymptotically.
Let {gkn(τ)}τ∈N and {σkn(τ)}τ∈N be the corresponding convergent subsequences of voting rules
and equilibria, where limτ→∞ kn(τ)/n(τ) = κ ∈ [0, 1]. Since for any agent i her posterior belief
about the state being 1 is strictly increasing in sˆi, we must have for all i = 1, ..., n(τ) and for all
τ ∈ N, σkn(τ)i (0) ≤ σ
kn(τ)
i (1) ≤ σ
kn(τ)
i (2). Let Y τ ≡
∑n(τ)
i=1 vi. For each τ ∈ N, we can decompose
the conditional expectation of Y τ as follows:
E
[
Y τ
∣∣θ, sp] = Pr (Y τ ≥ kn(τ)∣∣θ, sp)E [Y τ ∣∣Y τ ≥ kn(τ), θ, sp]
+ Pr
(
Y τ < kn(τ)
∣∣θ, sp)E [Y τ ∣∣Y τ < kn(τ), θ, sp] .
Now consider the case θ = 1 and sp = 0, which occurs with probability (1 − β)/2 > 0. In
this case, along the sequence of the equilibria σkn(τ) agent i will cast the right vote (vi = 1) with
probability ασkn(τ)i (1) + (1−α)σ
kn(τ)
i (0). Therefore, given the sequences of equilibria and voting
rules, we have
E
[
Y τ
∣∣θ = 1, sp = 0] = n(τ)∑
i=1
[
ασ
kn(τ)
i (1) + (1− α)σ
kn(τ)
i (0)
]
.
Thus, for the probability of reaching the right decision (d = 1) converging to 1 along this path,
that is Pr
(
Y τ ≥ kn(τ)
∣∣θ = 1, sp = 0)→ 1, we must have
lim
τ→∞ E [Y
τ |θ = 1, sp = 0] = lim
τ→∞ E
[
Y τ |Y τ ≥ kn(τ), θ = 1, sp = 0
]
.
Together with the monotonicity condition σkn(τ)i (0) ≤ σ
kn(τ)
i (1), this further implies that
lim
τ→∞
∑n(τ)
i=1 σ
kn(τ)
i (1)
n(τ) ≥ limτ→∞
kn(τ)
n(τ) = κ. (C.5)
Next, consider the case θ = 0 and sp = 1, which also occurs with probability (1− β)/2 > 0.
In this case, along the sequence of the equilibria σkn(τ) agent i will cast the right vote (vi = 0)
with probability α(1− σkn(τ)i (1)) + (1− α)(1− σ
kn(τ)
i (2)). Hence, similar the previous case, for
the probability of reaching the right decision (d = 0) converging to 1 along this path, that is,
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Pr
(
Y τ < kn(τ)
∣∣θ = 0, sp = 1)→ 1, it is necessary to have
lim
τ→∞
∑n(τ)
i=1 (1− σ
kn(τ)
i (1))
n(τ) > limτ→∞
(
1− kn(τ)
n(τ)
)
= 1− κ ⇐⇒ lim
τ→∞
∑n(τ)
i=1 σ
kn(τ)
i (1)
n(τ) < κ. (C.6)
Clearly, (C.5) and (C.6) cannot hold simultaneously. We thus reach a contradiction. There-
fore, ex ante there must be some non-vanishing probability that the committee will reach a
wrong decision even its size goes to arbitrarily large. In other words, no sequence of k-voting
rules can aggregate information asymptotically.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Recall that we write pi(s, sp) as the posterior belief that a Bayesian agent will assign to the
event θ = 1 when she knows that the actual signal profile is (s, sp). Since the function pi(s, sp)
is clearly symmetric in every private signal, we also use pi(m, sp) to denote the posterior belief
of a Bayesian agent when observing any signal profile (s, sp) with ms ≡∑ni=1 si = m.
We first establish a lemma that fully characterizes ex post incentive compatibility.
Lemma C.1. A mechanism f is ex post incentive compatible if and only if ∀(s−i, sp) ∈ S−i×Sp
and ∀i ∈ I,
(i) f(1, s−i, sp) ≥ f(0, s−i, sp), and
(ii) pi(0, s−i, sp) > qi or pi(1, s−i, sp) < qi =⇒ f(0, s−i, sp) = f(1, s−i, sp).
Proof of Lemma C.1. Given the specification of the agents’ payoff functions, the ex post
incentive compatibility constraints can be equivalently rewritten as follows:
(
f(si, s−i, sp)− f(s′i, s−i, sp)
)
(pi(si, s−i, sp)− qi) ≥ 0, (C.7)
for all si, s′i ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i, sp ∈ Sp and i ∈ I. The sufficiency part of the lemma then
immediately follows.
Let us now prove the necessity part. For (i), suppose, in contradiction, that there exist some
i ∈ I, s−i ∈ S−i and sp ∈ Sp such that f(0, s−i, sp) > f(1, s−i, sp). By (C.7), we must have
pi(1, s−i, sp)− qi ≤ 0 ≤ pi(0, s−i, sp)− qi,
which contradicts to pi(1, s−i, sp) > pi(0, s−i, sp). Hence, f(1, s−isp) ≥ f(0, s−i, sp) ∀si, s′i ∈ Si,
s−i ∈ S−i, sp ∈ Sp and i ∈ I. As for (ii), note that together with (C.7) either pi(0, s−i, sp) > qi
or pi(1, s−i, sp) < qi would imply that f(0, s−i, sp) ≥ f(1, s−i, sp). By implication (i) of EPIC,
we further have f(0, s−i, sp) = f(1, s−1, sp). 
For every m ∈ {1, ..., n} and sp ∈ Sp, let us define
I(m, sp) ≡ {i ∈ I : pi(m, sp) ≥ qi ≥ pi(m− 1, sp)}.
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The next lemma shows that in an EPIC mechanism, if two agents have very different preferences,
then their pivotality cannot depend on each other’s report.
Lemma C.2. Suppose that f is EPIC. ∀sp ∈ Sp and i, j ∈ I, if there does not existm ∈ {1, ..., n}
such that {i, j} ⊆ I(m, sp), then ∀s−i,−j ∈ S−i,−j, we have either
f(1, sj , s−i,−j , sp) > f(0, sj , s−i,−j , sp) ∀sj ∈ Sj ,
or
f(1, sj , s−i,−j , sp) = f(0, sj , s−i,−j , sp) ∀sj ∈ Sj .
Proof of Lemma C.2. We shall prove the lemma by contraposition. Consider any sp ∈ Sp
and i, j ∈ I. Suppose that there exists s−i,−j ∈ S−i,−j such that
f(1, sj , s−i,−j , sp) > f(0, sj , s−i,−j , sp), and f(1, s′j , s−i,−j , sp) = f(0, s′j , s−i,−j , sp),
where sj , s′j ∈ {0, 1} and sj 6= s′j . Consider first the case where sj = 1 and s′j = 0. By Lemma
C.1(i), f must be monotone in every agent’s report, and we thus have
f(1, 1, s−i,−j , sp) > f(0, 1, s−i,−j , sp) ≥ f(0, 0, s−i,−j , sp) = f(1, 0, s−i,−j , sp).
Since f(1, 1, s−i,−j , sp) > f(0, 1, s−i,−j , sp) and f(1, 1, s−i,−j , sp) > f(1, 0, s−i,−j , sp), by Lemma
C.1(ii) we must have
pi(1, 1, s−i,−j , sp) ≥ qi ≥ pi(0, 1, s−i,−j , sp), and
pi(1, 1, s−i,−j , sp) ≥ qj ≥ pi(1, 0, s−i,−j , sp).
It then follows that {i, j} ⊆ I(m, sp), where m = m(1,1,s−i,−j) ∈ {1, ..., n}. For the case where
sj = 0 and s′j = 1, the proof is analogous. 
For every sp ∈ Sp, let
I∗(sp) ≡ {i ∈ I : ∃s−i ∈ S−i, s.t. f(1, s−i, sp) > f(0, s−i, sp)}
be the set of agents who can possibly be pivotal when the public signal is sp. The next lemma
states that in any EPIC mechanism, pivotality can only be granted to a subset of agents who
share similar preferences.
Lemma C.3. Suppose that f is EPIC. Then, ∀sp ∈ Sp, ∃m ∈ {1, ..., n} such that I∗(sp) ⊆
I(m, sp).
Proof of Lemma C.3. Consider any sp ∈ Sp. Without loss of generality, assume that
∃i, j ∈ I∗(sp) such that qi > qj . We claim that there must exist m ∈ {1, ..., n}, such that
{i, j} ⊆ I(m, sp).
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Suppose that such an integer m does not exist. Together with the assumption that i, j ∈
I∗(sp), Lemma C.2 implies that there must exist s−i,−j , s′−i,−j ∈ S−i,−j such that
f(1, sj , s−i,−j , sp) > f(0, sj , s−i,−j , sp) ∀sj ∈ Sj , and
f(si, 1, s′−i,−j , sp) > f(si, 0, s′−i,−j , sp) ∀si ∈ Si.
By Lemma C.1(ii), this further implies that
pi(1, 1, s−i,−j , sp) ≥ qi ≥ pi(1, 0, s−i,−j , sp), pi(1, 0, s−i,−j , sp) ≥ qi ≥ pi(0, 0, s−i,−j , sp), and
pi(1, 1, s′−i,−j , sp) ≥ qj ≥ pi(1, 0, s′−i,−j , sp), pi(0, 1, s′−i,−j , sp) ≥ qj ≥ pi(0, 0, s′−i,−j , sp).
It then immediately follows that qi = pi(1, 0, s−i,−j , sp) and qj = pi(1, 0, s′−i,−j , sp). Since qi > qj
and there does not exist m ∈ {1, ..., n} such that {i, j} ⊆ I(m, sp), we must have m(1,0,s−i,−j) >
m(1,0,s′−i,−j) + 1.
We discuss two possible cases separately. First, suppose that m(1,0,s−i,−j) > m(1,0,s′−i,−j) + 2.
Consider the profile s′′−i,−j , which is obtained as follows: ∀` 6= i, j such that pi(1, 1, s−i,−j) ≥ q` ≥
pi(0, 0, s−i,−j), we let s′′` = s`. Otherwise, we let s′′` = s′`. By construction, whenever s′′` 6= s`,
there cannot exist m ∈ {1, ..., n} such that {i, `} ⊆ I(m, sp). It then follows from Lemma C.2
that
f(1, sj , s′′−i,−j , sp) > f(0, sj , s′′−i,−j , sp) ∀sj ∈ Sj .
Similarly, given that m(1,0,s−i,−j) > m(1,0,s′−i,−j) + 2, we have if s
′′
` 6= s′`, then there does not exist
m ∈ {1, ..., n} such that {j, `} ⊆ I(m, sp). It again follows from Lemma C.2 that
f(si, 1, s′′−i,−j , sp) > f(si, 0, s′′−i,−j , sp) ∀si ∈ Si.
But then, we must have qi = qj = pi(1, 0, s′′−i,−j , sp). We thus reach a contradiction.
Next, suppose that m(1,0,s−i,−j) = m(1,0,s′−i,−j) + 2. Since n is odd, there must exist ` 6= i, j,
such that s` = 0. Together with qj < qi = pi(1, 0, s`, s−i,−j,−`, sp), Lemma C.1(ii) implies that
f(1, 1, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(1, 0, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp)
> f(0, 1, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(0, 0, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp).
If q` ≤ pi(0, 0, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp), Lemma C.1(ii) will further imply that
f(1, 1, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(1, 1, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp)
and
f(0, 1, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(0, 1, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp).
Hence, we have f(1, 1, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp) > f(0, 1, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp). This means that agent i is pivotal
given the public signal is sp and the other agents’ signals are s−i = (1, 1, s−i,−j,−`). However, this
contradicts to that f being EPIC because qi = pi(1, 0, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) < pi(0, 1, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp).
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If q` > pi(0, 0, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp), we can consider the signal profile s′−i,−j = (s′`, s′−i,−j,−`) in-
stead. Since m(1,0,s−i,−j) = m(1,0,s′−i,−j) + 2 and s` = 0, we must have pi(0, 0, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) =
pi(1, 1, s′`, s′−i,−j,−`, sp). Given that q` > pi(1, 1, s′`, s′−i,−j,−`, sp), if s′` = 1, we can simply replicate
the previous argument and reach a contradiction to the incentive compatibility of f . We thus
focus on the case where s′` = 0. Together with qi > qj = pi(1, 0, s′`, s′−i,−j,−`, sp), Lemma C.1(ii)
implies that
f(1, 1, s′`, s′−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(0, 1, s′`, s′−i,−j,−`, sp)
> f(1, 0, s′`, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(0, 0, s′`, s−i,−j,−`, sp).
Since q` > pi(1, 1, s′`, s′−i,−j,−`, sp), Lemma C.1(ii) further implies that
f(1, 1, 1, s′−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(1, 1, 0, s′−i,−j,−`, sp)
and
f(1, 0, 1, s′−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(1, 0, 0, s′−i,−j,−`, sp).
Hence, we have f(1, 1, 1, s′−i,−j,−`, sp) > f(1, 0, 1, s′−i,−j,−`, sp). This again contradicts to the in-
centive compatibility of f , because s′` = 0 and qj = pi(1, 0, 0, s′−i,−j,−`, sp) < pi(1, 0, 1, s′−i,−j,−`, sp).
In sum, we have shown that ∀i, j ∈ I∗(sp), there must exist m ∈ {1, .., n} such that {i, j} ⊆
I(m, sp), because otherwise there will be a contradiction to the assumption that f being EPIC.
Since for each i ∈ I∗(sp) there can be at most one pair of integers m′,m′′ ∈ {1, ..., n} such that
i ∈ I(m′, sp)∩I(m′′, sp) and, provided they exist, m′ and m′′ must be adjacent, we can conclude
that there must exist m ∈ {1, ..., n} such that I∗(sp) ⊆ I(m, sp). 
Note that the no-indifference condition is not needed for Lemmas C.1 - C.2. Our last lemma
below shows if this condition is further assumed, then any EPIC mechanism must be symmetric
respect to the reports of the agents.
Lemma C.4. Suppose that ∀i ∈ I, @(s, sp) ∈ S × Sp such that qi = pi(s, sp). Then, for any
EPIC mechanism f , there exists fˆ : {1, ..., n} × Sp → [0, 1], such that f(s, sp) = fˆ(ms, sp)
∀(s, sp) ∈ S × Sp.
Proof of Lemma C.4. Consider any sp ∈ Sp. We first argue that we must have either
I∗(sp) = ∅ or I∗(sp) = I. Suppose, in contradiction, that there exist i ∈ I∗(sp) and j ∈
I \ I∗(sp). By definition, there must exist s−i,−j ∈ S−i,−j , such that f(1, sj , s−i,−j , sp) >
f(0, sj , s−i,−j , sp) ∀sj ∈ Sj . Lemma C.1(ii) then implies that we must have qi = pi(1, 0, s−i,−j , sp),
which contradicts to the assumption of the lemma.
If I∗(sp) = ∅, then f(s, sp) = f(s′, sp) ∀s, s′ ∈ S, and the statement of the lemma trivially
holds. Let us now consider the case where I∗(sp) = I. By Lemma C.3, there exists m ∈
{1, ..., n} such that I∗(sp) ⊆ I(m, sp). Because I∗(sp) = I and I(m, sp) ⊆ I, we further
have I(m, sp) = I. In addition, the no-difference condition assumed in the lemma guarantees
that I(m′, sp) ∩ I(m′′, sP ) = ∅ ∀m′,m′′ ∈ {1, ..., n}, and hence the above integer m is unique.
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Therefore, there cannot exist i ∈ I and s−i ∈ S−i such that m(1,s−i) 6= m and f(1, s−i, sp) >
f(0, s−i, sp). That is, an agent i can be pivotal only if there are exactly m− 1 other agents are
reporting sj = 1.
Since I∗(sp) = I, for every i ∈ I there must exist s−i ∈ S−i such that f(1, s−i, sp) >
f(0, s−i, sp) and m(1,s−i) = m. We claim that for all s′−i ∈ S−i such that m(1,s′−i) = m, we must
have
f(1, s−i, sp) = f(1, s′−i, sp) > f(0, s′−i, sp) = f(0, s−i, sp). (C.8)
The claim is trivial if m = n, so let us assume that m < n. This implies that in the profile s−i,
there must exist j, ` ∈ I, such that sj = 1 and s` = 0. We have
f(1, 1, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(1, 1, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(1, 0, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp),
where the equalities follow that no agent can be pivotal when there are m other agents reporting
strictly positive signals. Similarly, we also have
f(0, 1, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(0, 0, 0, s−i,−j,−`, sp) = f(0, 0, 1, s−i,−j,−`, sp).
In addition, since m(1,s−i) = m(1,s′−i), s
′−i,−j can be obtained by swapping the 0 and 1 signals in
the profile s−i,−j . We can therefore conclude that (C.8) must hold.
The above claim shows that if an agent i is pivotal at some profile s−i, then it must be
pivotal whenever the profile of other agents’ signals is equal to a permutation of s−i. Moreover,
conditional on agent i is pivotal, the probability of choosing d = 1 can only depend on her
report. Since I∗(sp) = I(m, sp) = I, this further implies that
f(s, sp) = f(sˆ, sp) > f(s′, sp) = f(sˆ′, sp)
for all s, s′, sˆ, sˆ′ ∈ S that satisfy ms = msˆ = m and ms′ = msˆ′ = m− 1.
Finally, take any s, s′ such that ms = m and ms′ = m− 1. Since no agent can be pivotal at
any profile s˜ ∈ S such that ms˜ /∈ {m,m − 1}, we must have f(s˜, sp) = f(s, sp) if ms˜ ≥ m, and
f(s˜, sp) = f(s′, sp) if ms˜ < m. The statement of the lemma then immediately follows. 
Given Lemma C.4, let us use f(m, sp) to denote the allocation rule for an EPIC mechanism,
where m is the number of agents who report si = 1. Lemma C.1 can then be restated as
follows: a mechanism f : {1, ..., n} × Sp → [0, 1] is ex post incentive compatible if and only
if ∀m ∈ {1, ..., n} and ∀sp ∈ Sp, we have (i) f(m, sp) being non-decreasing in m, and (ii)
f(m, sp) = f(m− 1, sp) if either pi(m− 1, sp) > maxi∈I qi or pi(m, sp) < mini∈I qi. In addition,
given the no-indifference condition, for every EPIC mechanism f one can find a unique threshold
msp ∈ {0, 1, ..., n, n+ 1} for every sp ∈ Sp, such that ∀m,m′ ∈ {1, ..., n}, f(m, sp) > f(m′, sp) if
and only if m ≥ msp > m′.
Now consider the set of optimal EPIC mechanisms, F∗. We first argue that, provided
that it is non-empty, F∗ must contain a deterministic mechanism, i.e., ∃f∗ ∈ F∗, such that
f∗(m, sp) ∈ {0, 1} ∀m ∈ {1, ..., n} and ∀sp ∈ Sp. To see this, take any f∗ ∈ F∗ and consider any
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sp ∈ Sp. If msp ∈ {0, n+ 1}, then we must have f(m, sp) = f(m′, sp) ∀m,m′ ∈ {1, ..., n}, i.e., f∗
does not make use of the agents’ private information at all given the public signal sp. Thus, in
this case for f∗ to be optimal we must have f∗(m, sp) = 1 ∀m ∈ {1, ..., n} if Pr (θ = 1|sp) > 12 ,
and f∗(m, sp) = 0 ∀m ∈ {1, ..., n} if Pr (θ = 1|sp) < 12 . If Pr(θ = 1|sp) = 12 (which would be
the case if β = 12), then all mechanisms that only depend on the public signal will lead to the
same precision of the collective decision, and hence we can assume without loss of generality
that either f∗(m, sp) = 1∀m ∈ {1, ..., n} or f∗(m, sp) = 0∀m ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Next, suppose that in an optimal EPIC mechanism f∗ we have msp ∈ {1, ..., n}. Since
α ≥ 12 , we have Pr(θ = 1|ms ≥ msp , sp) ≥ Pr(θ = 1|ms < msp , sp). If Pr(θ = 1|ms ≥ msp , sp) ≥
Pr(θ = 1|ms < msp , sp) ≥ 12 . In this case, conditional on the public signal sp, the mechanism
f∗ will not perform strictly better than a mechanism f ′ with f ′(m, sp) = 1 ∀m ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Similarly, If 12 ≥ Pr(θ = 1|ms ≥ msp , sp) ≥ Pr(θ = 1|ms < msp , sp), the mechanism f∗ will
not perform strictly better than a mechanism f ′ with f ′(m, sp) = 0 ∀m ∈ {1, ..., n}. Finally,
suppose that Pr(θ = 1|ms ≥ msp , sp) > 12 > Pr(θ = 1|ms < msp , sp). In this case, we must
have f∗(m, sp) = 1 ∀m ≥ msp and f∗(m, sp) = 0 ∀m < msp . Otherwise, we can either further
increase f∗(m, sp) ∀m ≥ msp or further decrease f∗(m, sp) ∀m < msp , which will strictly increase
Pr(d = θ | f∗) without violating any incentive compatibility constraint. Clearly, this contradicts
to that f∗ ∈ F∗.
We thus have shown that in the search of optimal EPIC mechanisms, it is without loss to
focus on mechanisms that are deterministic. Since the set of feasible deterministic mechanisms
is finite, an optimal EPIC mechanism exists.
To complete the proof, let us fix a preference profile q and consider any optimal EPIC
mechanism f∗ that is deterministic and is characterized by the two threshold values m0, m1 ∈
{0, 1, ..., n, n + 1}. Let gk0,k1 be the contingent k-voting rule with k0 = m0 and k1 = m1. It is
straightforward to check that gk0,k1 implements informative voting, since the corresponding di-
rect mechanism f∗ is EPIC. The fact that k0 = m0 and k1 = m1 makes sure that the informative
voting equilibrium under gk0,k1 will achieve the same Pr(d = θ | s, sp) for every (s, sp) ∈ S × Sp
as the truth-telling equilibrium under mechanism f∗. The construction of k0 and k1 also makes
it clear that gk0,k1 is responsive if and only if f∗ is responsive. 
C.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4
To prove (i), fix a conflict-preserving sequence {qτ}τ∈N and pick any element qτ from it. From
Proposition 3.5, we know that for the preference profile qτ , there exists a responsive contingent
k-voting rule that implements informative voting if and only if there exists a pair of integers
kτ0 , k
τ
1 ∈ {1, ..., n+ 2τ} such that
kτ0 ∈ Kτ0 =
[
(pi01)−1τ (q¯τ ), (pi00)−1τ (qτ )
]
, and kτ1 ∈ Kτ1 =
[
(pi11)−1τ (q¯τ ), (pi10)−1τ (qτ )
]
,
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where
(pi00)−1τ (qτ ) =
1
2
 ln
(
1−qτ
qτ
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2τ + 2 + r
 , (pi01)−1τ (q¯τ ) = 12
 ln
(
1−q¯τ
q¯τ
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2τ + r
 ,
(pi10)−1τ (qτ ) =
1
2
 ln
(
1−qτ
qτ
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2τ + 2− r
 , (pi11)−1τ (q¯τ ) = 12
 ln
(
1−q¯τ
q¯τ
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2τ − r
 .
Let q0 ≡ q and suppose that there exists k0 ∈ {1, ..., n} ∩K00 . Since ln
(
1−q
q
)
≤ ln
(
1−qτ
qτ
)
≤
ln
(
1−q¯τ
q¯τ
)
≤ ln
(
1−q¯
q¯
)
, we have k0 + τ ∈ {1, ..., n + 2τ} ∩ Kτ0 . Similarly, if there exists k1 ∈
{1, ..., n} ∩K01 , then k1 + τ ∈ {1, ..., n+ 2τ} ∩Kτ1 . Moreover, since
(pi00)−1τ (qτ )− (pi01)−1τ (q¯τ ) =
ln
(
1−qτ
qτ
)
− ln
(
1−q¯τ
q¯τ
)
2 ln
(
1−α
α
) + 1, and
(pi10)−1τ (qτ )− (pi11)−1τ (q¯τ ) =
ln
(
1−qτ
qτ
)
− ln
(
1−q¯τ
q¯τ
)
2 ln
(
1−α
α
) + 1,
it is clear that both (pi00)−1τ (qτ ) − (pi01)−1τ (q¯τ ) and (pi10)−1τ (qτ ) − (pi11)−1τ (q¯τ ) are strictly less than
one if qτ < q¯τ . This implies that whenever qτ < q¯τ , both the intervals Kτ0 and Kτ1 can contain at
most one integer. Hence, in this case the contingent k-voting rule that can be used to implement
informative voting is unique.1
We now proceed to prove (ii). Consider the threshold values
kτ0 =
1
2
 ln
(
1−q¯
q¯
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2τ + r
+ , kτ1 =
1
2
 ln
(
1−q¯
q¯
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2τ − r
+ ,
where [x]+ denotes the smallest integer that is larger or equal to x ∈ R. Since for the preference
profile q0 = q there exists a responsive contingent-k voting rule that implements informative
voting, from our analysis for (i) we can conclude that for every τ ∈ N and preference profile
qτ , the voting rule gkτ0 ,kτ1 implements informative voting. By Proposition 3.6, for an efficiency-
maximizing social planner who can observe all the n+ 2τ private signals and the public signal,
it would be optimal to implement d = 1 if either sp = 0 and there is more than kτ∗0 = n+2τ+12 +[
r−1
2
]+
private signals equal to 1, or sp = 1 and there is more than kτ∗1 = n+2τ++12 −
[
r−1
2
]+
private signals equal to 1. Otherwise implementing d = 0 would be optimal. Now consider the
1The intervals Kτ0 and Kτ1 will contain at least one integer (and at most two) if q¯τ = qτ = q. In particular,
Kτ0 will contain exactly two integers if and only if (pi01)−1τ (q) is an integer. Similarly, there will be two integers in
Kτ1 if and only if (pi11)−1τ (q) is an integer.
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differences
∆0τ ≡
kτ0 − kτ∗0
n+ 2τ =
[
ln
( 1−q¯
q¯
)
2 ln( 1−αα )
+ r−12
]+
−
[
r−1
2
]+
n+ 2τ ,
and
∆1τ ≡
kτ1 − kτ∗1
n+ 2τ =
[
ln
( 1−q¯
q¯
)
2 ln( 1−αα )
− r+12
]+
+
[
r−1
2
]+
n+ 2τ .
Both ∆0τ and ∆1τ are decreasing in τ , and we have limτ→∞∆0τ = limτ→∞∆1τ = 0. This implies
that as τ increases and goes to ∞, the ex ante probability that the collective decision made
in the informative voting equilibria under gkτ0 ,kτ0 coincide with the social planner’s choice is
increasing and converges to 1. Finally, for any preference profile qτ in the sequence, whenever a
non-responsive contingent k-voting rule gkτ0 ,kτ1 with {kτ0 , kτ1} ∩ {0, n+ 2τ + 1} 6= ∅ is used all the
private information in the committee would be entirely disregarded for at least some realization
of the public signal. This implies that the efficiency of the informative voting equilibrium under
any non-responsive contingent k-voting rule would be strictly dominated by the social planner’s
solution.2 Hence, for sufficiently large τ , it will also be dominated by the informative voting
equilibrium under the responsive contingent k-voting rule that we constructed above. Since the
preference profile q is assumed to be generic, we can apply Proposition 3.3 to conclude that
the above responsive contingent k-voting rule is equivalent to an optimal EPIC mechanism.
Therefore, the threshold τ∗ ∈ N described in the current proposition must exist.
Finally, we prove (iii). Note that ∀q ∈ (0, 1),
lim
τ→∞
(pi01)−1τ (q)
n+ 2τ = limτ→∞
(pi00)−1τ (q)
n+ 2τ = limτ→∞
(pi11)−1τ (q)
n+ 2τ = limτ→∞
(pi10)−1τ (q)
n+ 2τ =
1
2 .
Hence, after adding sufficiently many members to the committee, the probability that the col-
lective decisions made in the informative voting equilibria under the corresponding responsive
contingent k-voting rules coincide with that in the informative voting equilibrium under the
simple majority rule becomes arbitrarily close to 1. Since the informative voting equilibrium
under the simple majority rule is asymptotically efficient when α > 1/2, so are the informative
voting equilibria under a responsive contingent k-voting rules.
C.7 Proof of Proposition 3.5
We start from establishing a lemma that characterizes when informative voting can be imple-
mented by a given contingent k-voting rule with k0, k1 ∈ {1, ..., n}, which is in fact a counterpart
to Proposition 3.1.
Lemma C.5. A contingent k-voting rule with k0, k1 ∈ {1, ..., n} implements informative voting
2The assumption of the proposition implies that the public signal would not be so precise that it would be
optimal for the social planner to always follow the public signal. Otherwise, for the preference profile q there
cannot be a responsive contingent k-voting rule that implements informative voting.
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if and only if
∀i ∈ I, qi ∈
[
max{pi00, pi10},min{pi01, pi11}
]
, (C.9)
where
pi00 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n−2 β
1−β
, pi01 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n β
1−β
,
pi10 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n−2 1−β
β
, pi11 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n 1−β
β
.
Proof of Lemma C.5. Suppose sp = 1. Given a responsive contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1 ,
the threshold value for choosing d = 1 is k1 ∈ {1, ..., n}. Assume all agents j 6= i are playing the
informative voting strategy. Conditional on being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent
i would assign to the event θ = 1 if si = 0 or si = 1 are, respectively:
pi10 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)k1−1 ( α
1−α
)n−k1+1 1−β
β
andpi11 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)k1 ( α
1−α
)n−k1 1−β
β
= 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n−2 1−β
β
= 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n 1−β
β
.
Now suppose sp = 0. Under the contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1 , the threshold value for
choosing the decision d = 1 is k0 ∈ {1, ..., n}. Assume all agents j 6= i are playing the informative
voting strategy. Conditional on being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i would assign
to the event θ = 1 if si = 0 or si = 1 are, respectively:
pi00 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n−2 β
1−β
and pi01 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n β
1−β
.
Hence, the voting rule gk0,k1 implements informative voting if and only if ∀i ∈ I, qi ≥
max{pi00, pi10} and qi ≤ min{pi01, pi11}.
Lemma C.5 implies that for the existence of a responsive contingent k-voting rule that
implements informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient that there exist k0, k1 ∈ {1, ..., n}
satisfying (C.9). To check whether such integers k0 and k1 exist, we first invert the functions
pi00 and pi01 of k0 and the functions pi10 and pi11 of k1 that are defined in the above lemma. This is
feasible because all these are strictly increasing functions. We then apply the inverse functions
(pi00)−1 and (pi10)−1 to q¯ and (pi01)−1 and (pi11)−1 to q. It is straightforward to check that if
there exist k0, k1 ∈ {1, ..., n} such that k0 ∈ K0 ≡ [(pi01)−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)] and k1 ∈ K1 ≡
[(pi11)−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)], then k0 and k1 will also satisfy condition (C.9).
C.8 Proof of Corollary 3.3
From Proposition 3.5, we know that for a given preference profile q, there exists a responsive
contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1 that implements informative voting if and only if there exist
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k0 ∈ {1, ..., n} ∩ K0 and k0 ∈ {1, ..., n} ∩ K1. When q¯ = q = q ∈ (0, 1), we have (pi00)−1(q) −
(pi01)−1(q¯) = (pi10)−1(q) − (pi11)−1(q¯) = 1. Thus, in this case both the intervals K0 and K1 will
contain at least one integer. It remains to show that for sufficiently large n, it is guaranteed
that {1, ..., n} ∩K0 6= ∅ and {1, ..., n} ∩K1 6= ∅. This is not trivial because the intervals K0 and
K1 actually also depend on n. Given the remark in footnote 1 and since (pi11)−1(q) ≤ (pi01)−1(q)
and (pi10)−1(q) ≤ (pi11)−1(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1) and r ≥ 0, the intersections {1, ..., n} ∩ K0 and
{1, ..., n} ∩K1 are non-empty if
(pi11)−1(q) ≥ 0⇐⇒
1
2
 ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n− r
 ≥ 0⇐⇒ n ≥ r − ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
)
and
(pi00)−1(q) ≤ n+ 1⇐⇒
1
2
 ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) + n+ 2 + r
 ≤ n+ 1⇐⇒ n ≥ r + ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) .
Let
n¯(q) =
max {r − ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) , r + ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
)}
+ .
We can now conclude that when agents’ preference are perfectly aligned, there exists a threshold
value n¯(q), such that for all n ≥ n¯(q), there exists a responsive contingent k-voting rule that
implements informative voting.
C.9 Proof of Corollary 3.4
Plugging k0 = (n+ 1)/2 + [(r− 1)/2]+ in the formulas of pi00 and pi01 that we obtained in Lemma
C.5, one can easily verify that for all r ≥ 0,
max{pi00, pi01} =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|−1 .
Similarly, with k1 = (n+ 1)/2− [(r − 1)/2]+, we have for all r ≥ 0,
min{pi01, pi11} =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)−|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|+1 .
The result of the corollary thus immediately follows Lemma C.5.
C.10 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Consider a social planner who observes the whole profile of private signals s = (s1, ..., sn) and
the public signal sp. Suppose the public signal is r-times as informative as the private signal,
where r ≥ 0. Again we let ms = ∑ni=1 si. To maximize the accuracy of his decision, the social
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planner would choose the following optimal decision rule:
d∗(s, sp) =

1 if ms − (n−ms) + r1sp=1 − r1sp=0 > 0,
{0, 1} if ms − (n−ms) + r1sp=1 − r1sp=0 = 0,
0 if ms − (n−ms) + r1sp=1 − r1sp=0 < 0.
Under the contingent majority rule, k(sp) = n+12 −
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 1 and k(sp) = n+12 +
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 0. First, suppose that r > n. In this case, the public signal is so precise that the social
planner would find it optimal to always follow it and entirely ignore the private signals, i.e.,
d∗(s, sp) = sp ∀s ∈ S and sp ∈ Sp. Meanwhile, we have k(1) > n and k(0) < 1, which means
that the agents’ votes would never count and the contingent majority rule simply replicates the
outcome of the obedient voting equilibrium. The statement of the proposition then immediately
follows.
Next, suppose r ≤ n. When sp = 1, in the informative voting equilibrium, d = 1 if and only
if
ms ≥ n+ 12 −
[
r − 1
2
]+
⇐⇒ (n−ms)−ms ≤ 2
[
r − 1
2
]+
− 1 ≡ R1,
while when sp = 0, d = 1 if and only if
ms ≥ n+ 12 +
[
r − 1
2
]+
⇐⇒ ms − (n−ms) ≥ 2
[
r − 1
2
]+
+ 1 ≡ R0.
There are four possible scenarios:
1. r is an even integer: R1 = r − 1 < r + 1 = R0.
2. r is an odd integer: R1 = r − 2 < r = R0.
3. r is not an integer and [r]+ is even: R1 = [r]+ − 1 < [r]+ + 1 = R0.
4. r is not an integer and [r]+ is odd: R1 = [r]+ − 2 < [r]+ = R0.
Since |ms− (n−ms)| is odd, the above four inequalities jointly show that the decision achieved
by the contingent majority rule always coincides with the planner’s choice.
C.11 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Consider the following strategy profile of the agents in the two-stage voting game. In the first
stage, all agents vote for k0 if sp = 0, and they all vote for k1 if sp = 1. In the second stage, if
either sp = 0 and k∗ = k0, or sp = 1 and k∗ = k1, then all agents vote informatively. Since an
unilateral deviation from the above first-stage voting strategy will not change the threshold k∗
that will be selected to be used in the second stage, we need not specify the agents’ contingent
strategies for any other case.
We thus need only to check whether the agents indeed have the incentive to vote informatively
whenever (sp, k∗) ∈ {(0, k0), (1, k1)}. This is the case because the informative voting strategy
profile actually constitutes an ex post Nash equilibrium under gk0,k1 , which implies that no
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agent would have the incentive to unilaterally deviate from informative voting regardless of how
she updates her beliefs after observing the first stage voting outcome. Hence, in the two-stage
voting game there must exist a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the agents first vote
to agree on choosing either k0 or k1 (depending on whether sp = 0 or sp = 1), and then they all
vote informatively in the second stage.
C.12 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Since the signal sp is only observed to the controller and the vote takes place after the agents
receive the message from the controller, we have a dynamic game of incomplete information. We
look for sequential equilibria, which require the beliefs and the strategies of the players to be
sequentially rational and consistent (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Note that since the biased
of the controller is not (directly) payoff-relevant to the agents, we need to keep track of agents’
beliefs about the state only.
First, consider the scenario where m = sp is sent. No agent would have the incentive to
deviate from obedient voting given all other agents are following the public signal revealed by
the controller. This is always the case regardless of the relative precision of the signals.3
Now consider the information set where m = ∅ is sent and the controller’s disclosure policy
is to withhold his information if and only if he observes sp = 1. Conditional all other agents are
voting informatively, voting informatively is optimal for agent i if and only if
Pr(θ = 1|si = 1,m = ∅) =
1
2α(λ+ (1− λ)(1− β))
1
2α(λ+ (1− λ)(1− β)) + 12(1− α)(λ+ (1− λ)β)
≥
1
2(1− α)(λ+ (1− λ)β)
1
2α(λ+ (1− λ)(1− β)) + 12(1− α)(λ+ (1− λ)β)
= Pr(θ = 0|si = 1,m = ∅)
and
Pr(θ = 0|si = 0,m = ∅) =
1
2α(λ+ (1− λ)β)
1
2α(λ+ (1− λ)β) + 12(1− α)(λ+ (1− λ)(1− β))
≥
1
2(1− α)(λ+ (1− λ)(1− β))
1
2α(λ+ (1− λ)β) + 12(1− α)(λ+ (1− λ)(1− β))
= Pr(θ = 1|si = 0,m = ∅).
Since α, β ≥ 1/2 and λ > 0, the second inequality always holds. It can be also checked that
the first inequality holds if and only if (β − (1 − α))λ ≥ β − α. Hence, whenever λ ≥ λˆ, the
informative voting strategy profile and the beliefs that are formed according to Bayes rule are
sequentially rational for the agents at the information set m = ∅. By the same token, if the
controller only reveals sp = 0 to the agents, no agent can profitably deviate from the proposed
strategy profile as long as λ ≥ λˆ and beliefs are formed according to Bayes rule.
3In contrast, as implied by Corollary 3.1 informative voting does not constitute an equilibrium in these sub-
games whenever β > α.
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Given the strategies of the agents, suppose the controller observes sp = 1. By revealing
this information to the agents, his expected payoff is given by U rc (1) = −qc(1 − β). On the
other hand, withholding this information from the agents yields him an expected payoff of
Unrc (1) = −qc(1− β)P − (1− qc)βP , where
P =
n∑
k=n+12
Ckn(1− α)kαn−k
is the probability that the committee reaches a wrong decision when all agents vote informatively.
Similarly, by revealing sp = 0 to the agents, the controller’s expected payoff is U rc (0) = −(1 −
qc)(1−β), while concealing this information yields him an expected payoff of Unrc (0) = −qcβP −
(1 − qc)(1 − β)P . Hence, the controller would find it optimal to reveal sp = 1 and withhold
sp = 0 if U rc (1) ≥ Unrc (1) and Unrc (0) ≥ U rc (0), which, after some rearrangements, are equivalent
to
qc ≤ qˆ = min
{
βP
(1− β)(1− P ) + βP ,
(1− β)(1− P )
(1− β)(1− P ) + βP
}
.
Similarly, revealing sp = 0 and withholding sp = 1 is optimal for the controller if
qc ≥ 1− qˆ = max
{
βP
(1− β)(1− P ) + βP ,
(1− β)(1− P )
(1− β)(1− P ) + βP
}
.
The threshold value qˆ achieves its supremum at P = 1 − β, which equals to 1/2. Also, since
α > 1/2, it is straightforward to check that P < 1/2 and, hence, qˆ ≥ min{β, 1− β} = 1− β.
In conclusion, if λ ≥ λˆ and qc ≤ qˆ (or qc ≥ 1 − qˆ), the strategy profile stated in the
proposition together with the beliefs formed according to Bayes rule constitute a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. Since the signal sp is verifiable and the information set with m = ∅ can be reached
with positive probability, it is also a sequential equilibrium.
C.13 Proof of Proposition 3.9
First, consider the scenario where m = sp is sent. By the same reasoning as in Corollary 3.4,
no agent would have the incentive to deviate from informative voting given all other agents are
voting informatively.
Next, consider the information set where m = ∅ is sent and suppose the strategy of con-
troller is such that he never withholds information. In this case, the controller’s message is not
informative at all and given that the agents are unbiased and the voting threshold corresponds
to the simple majority rule, the informative voting strategy profile along with the beliefs formed
according to Bayes rule are clearly sequentially rational for the agents. Now suppose the con-
troller’s strategy is such that he will reveal his information to the agents if and only if sp = 1
(or sp = 0). By Proposition 3.8, we know that in this case no agent can profitably deviate from
informative voting provided that λ ≥ λˆ.
Given that the agents will always vote informatively, suppose that the controller observes
sp = 1. By withholding the signal, the controller obtains an expected payoff of Unrc (1) =
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−qc(1− β)P − (1− qc)βP , while revealing yields U rc (1) = −qc(1− β)P ′ − (1− qc)βP˜ , where
P ′ =
n∑
k=n+12 −[ r−12 ]
+
Ckn(1− α)kαn−k, P˜ =
n∑
k=n+12 +[ r−12 ]
+
Ckn(1− α)kαn−k.
Similarly, by concealing sp = 0 from the agents, the controller’s expected payoff is given by
Unrc (0) = −qcβP − (1 − qc)(1 − β)P , while revealing yields him an expected payoff of U rc (0) =
−qcβP˜ − (1 − qc)(1 − β)P ′. Hence, the controller would find it optimal to always share his
information with the agents if U rc (1) ≥ Unrc (1) and U rc (0) ≥ Unrc (0). Note that these inequalities
trivially hold for all qc ∈ [0, 1] if [(r − 1)/2]+ = 0 or, equivalently, β ≤ α. Now suppose
[(r − 1)/2]+ ≥ 1. Then, it is straightforward to check that these two inequalities are satisfied if
and only if qc ∈ [q∗, 1− q∗], where
q∗ = (1− β)(P
′ − P )
β(P − P˜ ) + (1− β)(P ′ − P ) ≥ 0.
Since α ≥ 1/2 and Ckn = Cn−kn , we have
P − P˜
P ′ − P =
∑n+12 +[ r−12 ]+−1
k=n+12
Ckn(1− α)kαn−k∑n+12 −1
k=n+12 −[ r−12 ]
+ Ckn(1− α)kαn−k
≤ 1
and, hence, q∗ ≤ 1 − β. Clearly, together with the beliefs formed according to Bayes rule, the
proposed strategies for the controller (always share his information) and the agents (always vote
informatively) constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It is also a sequential equilibrium since
all information set can be reached with positive probability in equilibrium. We thus have proven
the first part of the proposition. The proof of the second part of the proposition is analogous,
and we omit it here to avoid repetition.
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D Appendix: Chapter 4
D.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Part (i) First, consider agent i’s incentives in the decision-making stage. Taking (ei, si,mi,mj)
as given, in the decision-making stage agent i solves:
max
yi∈R
q
(
K − E
[
(yi − θi)2 |si
]
− δE
[
(yi − ydj (ej , sj ,mi,mj))2|mi,mj
])
.
Sequential rationality then implies that agent i’s should take the following action:
yi =
E [θi|si] + δE
[
ydj (ej , sj ,mi,mj)|mi,mj
]
1 + δ .
Note that the best response of the agent does not depend on his sunk effort ei. From now on, we
drop (ei, ej) from the functions (ydi , ydj ) as they play no role. Solving the best response functions
through repeated substitution, we obtain the following decision rules which must be satisfied in
any equilibrium:
ydi (si,mi,mj) =
E [θi|si]
1 + δ +
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ) +
δE[θj |mj ]
1 + 2δ , ∀i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (D.1)
where the conditional expectations E[θi|si] and E[θj |mj ] (E[θj |sj ] and E[θi|mi], resp.) are taken
according to the agent i’s (agent j’s, resp.) posterior beliefs about the local states.
Now suppose that agent i anticipates that agent j will exert some arbitrary effort ej ∈ [0, 1],
communicate his finding truthfully according to the strategymdj specified in the proposition, and
choose his action according to the mapping ydj specified in (D.1). Taking the the sequentially
rational decision rule ydi as given, we consider agent i’s incentive in the communication stage.
Since by construction (mdi ,mdj ) are effort-independent, we drop the variables (ei, ej) from them.
To ease notation, we also assume without loss of generality that msi = si ∀si ∈ Θ.
Let si ∈ S be the signal received by agent i. For any message mi ∈M(si), we have
ELda(si,mi) =Esj
[
E
[(
ydi (si,mi,mdj (sj))− θi
)2 ∣∣∣si]]
=Esj
E
(E[θi|si]
1 + δ +
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ) +
δE[θj |mdj (sj)]
1 + 2δ − θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si

=E
(E[θi|si]
1 + δ +
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ) − θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
+ Esj
[(
δE[θj |sj ]
1 + 2δ
)2]
, (D.2)
where the last equality follows that Esj [E[θj |sj ]] = E[θj ] = 0.
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Similarly, for the expected loss of mis-coordination resulted by any message mi, we have
ELdc(si,mi)
=Esj
[
E[(ydi (si,mi,mdj (sj))− ydj (sj ,mi,mdj (sj)))2|si]
]
= Esj
E
(E[θi|si]
1 + δ −
δE[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ) −
E[θj |sj ]
1 + δ +
δE[θj |mdj (sj)]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣sj

=E
[(E[θi|si]
1 + δ −
δE[θi|mi]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
+ Esj
[(E[θj |sj ]
1 + δ −
δE[θj |sj ]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2]
=E
[((1 + δ)E[θi|si] + δ(E[θi|si]− E[θi|mi])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
+ Esj
[(E [θj |sj ]
1 + 2δ
)2]
. (D.3)
Since for every (si,mi) ∈ S ×M(si) the (interim) expected payoff of agent i is given by
Πˆdi (si,mi) = q
(
K − ELda(si,mi)− δELdc(si,mi)
)
,
communicating according to mdi is incentive compatible for agent i if under some consistent
posterior beliefs of agent j, we have
ELda(si, si) ≤ ELda(si,mi) and ELdc(si, si) ≤ ELdc(si,mi), ∀mi ∈M(si), ∀si ∈ S. (D.4)
To construct the required posterior beliefs, for everymi ∈M we let agent j assign probability
one to that agent i’s type is smi ∈ argminsi∈Smi
∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣, i.e., µij({smi |mi}) = 1. If ∅ ∈ Smi ,
the existence of smi is trivial. If ∅ /∈ Smi , the existence of smi is guaranteed by the assumption
that Smi is closed. This is because minsi∈Smi
∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣ = minsi∈Smi∩[−|s′i|, |s′i|] ∣∣E[θi|si]∣∣, where s′i
is any element of Smi , and the set Smi ∩ [−|s′i|, |s′i|] is compact. In addition, by construction
we have ssi = si ∀si ∈ S. Given the constructed beliefs, we have E[θi|∅] = E[θi|mi] = 0
∀mi ∈ M(∅), E[θi|si] = si ≥ E[θi|mi] ∀si ≥ 0 and mi ∈ M(si), and E[θi|si] = si ≤ E[θi|mi]
∀si < 0 and mi ∈M(si). It is then straightforward to check that (D.4) is satisfied.
To complete the construction of a fully revealing PBE, we finally consider the information
acquisition stage. Given the communication strategies (md1,md2), the decision rules (yd1 , yd2), and
any pair of efforts (e1, e2) ∈ E2, agent i’s expected payoff is
Udi (ei, ej)
= q
(
K − (1− ei)
[
(1− ej) + ej
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2 + 1
)]
σ2θ
− ei
[
(1− ej)
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
+ ej
(
2δ2 + 2δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)]
σ2θ
)
− c(ei)
= q
(
K − (1− ei)
[
1 + ej
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)]
σ2θ − ei(1 + ej)
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ
)
− c(ei)
= q
(
K −
[
1 + ej
(
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)]
σ2θ + ei
(
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ
)
− c(ei).
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Differentiating with respect to ei, we obtain the following first-order condition:
∂Udi (ei, ej)
∂ei
=
(
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ − c′(ei) = 0. (D.5)
When the cost function c is strictly increasing, and satisfies lime→0 c′(e) <
(
1− δ2+δ(1+2δ)2
)
qσ2θ <
c′(1), (D.5) will admit a unique interior solution edi ∈ (0, 1), which is given by
edi = ed ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ
)
. (D.6)
In addition, when c is strictly convex, the function Udi will be strictly concave in ei, and thus the
solution ei = ed is also the unique global maximizer of Udi (ei, ej), ∀ej ∈ [0, 1]. We have assumed
that the cost function c satisfies all these properties (see Section 4.3).
Similarly, choosing ej = ed also maximizes the expected payoff of agent j independent of the
effort choice of agent i. We can therefore conclude that, together with the “conservative” beliefs
that we construct above for the agents, the symmetric strategy profile ((ed,md1, yd1), (ed,md2, yd2))
constitutes a fully revealing PBE. 
Part (ii) Let ((e∗1,m∗1, y∗1), (e∗2,m∗2, y∗2)) be an equilibrium strategy profile under decentraliza-
tion. Consider any si ∈ S \ {0, ∅}. Repeating the calculations of (D.1), (D.2) and (D.3), it
can be checked that agent i would strictly prefer the type-revealing message mi = msi than the
proposed equilibrium message m∗i (e∗i , si) if both of the following two inequalities hold:
E
(E[θi|si]
1 + δ +
δ2E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ) − θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si

>E
(E[θi|si]
1 + δ +
δ2E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ) − θi
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
 . (D.7)
and
E
[((1 + δ)E[θi|si] + δ(E[θi|si]− E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
>E
[((1 + δ)E[θi|si] + δ(E[θi|si]− E[θi|msi ])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣si
]
. (D.8)
Note that for any si 6= ∅, (D.7) is further equivalent to(
δ(1 + δ)si + δ2(si − E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2
>
(
δ(1 + δ)si + δ2(si − E[θi|msi ])
(1 + δ)(1 + 2δ)
)2
. (D.9)
From (D.8) and (D.9), it is clear that if si > 0, then deviating to msi is not profitable for agent
i only if si ≤ E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]. Similarly, if si < 0, then deviating to msi is not profitable for
agent i only if si ≥ E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)]. These arguments also imply that we must have m∗i (e∗i , si) 6=
m∗i (e∗i , s′i) ∀si, s′i ∈ S \ {0, ∅} such that si · s′i < 0.
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Next, suppose, in contradiction to Proposition 4.1(ii), that there exist i ∈ {1, 2} and a non-
null subset Sˆ ⊆ S\{0, ∅} with respect to Γ, such that µij({sˆi}|m∗i (e∗i , sˆi)) < 1 ∀sˆi ∈ Sˆ.1 Since the
beliefs must be consistent in equilibrium, we have m∗i (e∗i , sˆi) 6= msˆi ∀sˆi ∈ Sˆ. For every on-path
equilibrium message mˆ∗i that is sent by some sˆi ∈ Sˆ, define Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) = {si ∈ Sˆ : m∗i (e∗i , si) = mˆ∗i }.
Let Mˆ∗ be the set of all such messages mˆ∗i .
We claim that the set Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is null with respect to Γ for all mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ∗. This is because if
Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is non-null with respect to Γ for some mˆ∗i , the condition µij({sˆi}|m∗i (e∗i , sˆi)) < 1 ∀sˆi ∈ Sˆ
would imply that there exists si ∈ Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) such that either si > max{0,E[θi|mˆ∗i ]} or si <
min{0,E[θi|mˆ∗i ]} holds. This is not possible given our analysis of (D.8) and (D.9).
Since Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is null with respect to Γ for all mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ∗, Bayes’ rule implies that for every
mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ∗ there must exist an atom smˆ
∗
i ∈ S in the distribution Γ, such that m∗i (e∗i , smˆ
∗
i ) = mˆ∗i
and µij({smˆ
∗
i }|mˆ∗i ) = 1. Note that by construction, each mˆ∗i ∈ Mˆ∗ is associated with a different
atom. However, since Sˆ = ∪mˆ∗i Sˆ(mˆ∗i ) is non-null with respect to Γ, the set Mˆ∗ must be
uncountable, and this would imply that the distribution Γ admits uncountably many atoms.
We thus reach a contradiction. 
D.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Let ((e∗1,m∗1, y∗1), (e∗2,m∗2, y∗2)) be a fully revealing equilibrium under decentralization. Given
the full revelation, we have E[θi|m∗i (e∗i , si)] = E[θi|si] ∀si ∈ S and ∀i = 1, 2. Then, (D.1)
implies that the on-path equilibrium decision rules are uniquely pinned down by Bayes’ rule
and sequential rationality, and they are the exactly ones given by the proposition. As we have
shown in Proposition 4.1(i), given the equilibrium decisions are taken according to (yd1(s), yd1(s)),
ed is the unique expected-payoff-maximizing effort level for both agents. Hence, we must have
e∗i = ed and y∗i (e∗i , si,m∗i (e∗i , si),m∗j (e∗j , sj)) = ydi (si, sj), ∀(si, sj) ∈ S2, i = 1, 2.
D.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Part (i) First, consider the principal’s incentive in the decision-making stage. Taking (m1,m2)
and (η1, η2) as given, in the decision-making stage the principal solves:
max
y1,y2∈R
(η1 + η2)
(
K − δ(y1 − y2)2
)
− η1E
[
(y1 − θ1)2|m1
]
− η2E
[
(y2 − θ2)2|m2
]
.
The first-order conditions imply that at optimum the principal’s actions (y1, y2) must solve the
following system of equations:
− δ(η1 + η2)(y1 − y2)− η1 (y1 − E [θ1|m1]) = 0,
− δ(η1 + η2)(y2 − y1)− η1 (y2 − E [θ2|m2]) = 0.
1Formally, we say that a set Sˆ ⊆ S is non-null with respect to Γ if ∫S 1{s∈Sˆ}dΓ > 0, and it is null with respect
to Γ if
∫
S 1{s∈Sˆ}dΓ = 0.
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Solving the above equations, we obtain the following decision rules which must be satisfied in
any equilibrium:
yci (m,η) =
ηi
ηi+ηj ·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj + δ
)
E [θi|mi] + δηjηi+ηjE[θj |mj ]
ηi
ηi+ηj ·
ηj
ηi+ηj + δ
∀i = 1, 2, (D.10)
where the conditional expectations E[θi|mi] and E[θj |mj ] are taken according to the principal
posterior beliefs about the local states.
Next, we take the above decision rules (yc1, yc2) of the principal as given and consider the
agents’ incentives in the communication stage. We will only verify the equilibrium incentives of
agent 1, as for agent 2 the problem is analogous. Suppose that agent 1 anticipates that agent 2
will exert some arbitrary effort e2 ∈ [0, 1] and communicate his finding truthfully according to the
strategy mc2 specified in the proposition. Since by construction (mc1,mc2) are effort-independent,
we drop the variables (e1, e2) from them. To ease notation, we also assume without loss of
generality that ms = s ∀s ∈ Θ.
Let s1 ∈ S be the signal received by agent 1. Letting λ = η1/(η1 + η2), for every message
m1 ∈M(s1) and every η ∈
[
η, η¯
]2
we have
ELca(s1,m1,η)
=Es2
[
E
[
(yc1(m1,mc2(s2),η)− θ1)2
∣∣∣s1]]
=Es2
[
E
[(
λ (1− λ+ δ)E [θ1|m1] + δ(1− λ)E[θ2|mc2(s2)]
λ(1− λ) + δ − θ1
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣s1
]]
=E
[((λ(1− λ) + λδ)E [θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ − θ1
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣s1
]
+ Es2
[(
δ(1− λ)E[θ2|s2]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2]
, (D.11)
where the last equality follows that Es2 [E[θ2|s2]] = E[θ2] = 0.
Similarly, for the expected loss of mis-coordination, we have for every m1 ∈M(s1) and every
η ∈
[
η, η¯
]2
,
ELcc(s1,m1,η) =Es2
[
E[(yc1(m1,mc2(s2),η)− yc2(m1,mc2(s2)))2|s1]
]
= Es2
[(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]− λ(1− λ)E[θ2|mc2(s2)]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2]
=
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
+ Es2
[(
λ(1− λ)E[θ2|s2]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2]
. (D.12)
where the last equality follows that Es2 [E[θ2|s2]] = E[θ2] = 0.
Since for every (s1,m1) ∈ S ×M(s1), the interim expected payoff of agent 1 is given by
Πˆci (s1,m1) = Eη [q (K − ELca(s1,m1,η)− δELcc(s1,m1,η))] ,
communicating according to mc1 is incentive compatible for agent 1 if under some consistent
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posterior beliefs of the principal, we have
ELca(s1, s1,η) + δELcc(s1, s1,η) ≤ ELca(s1,m1,η) + δELcc(s1,m1,η), (D.13)
for all s1 ∈ S, m1 ∈ M(s1), η ∈
[
η, η¯
]2
. We note that after some rearrangement, (D.13) is
equivalent to
((λ(1− λ) + λδ)E[θ1|∅]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|∅]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
≤
((λ(1− λ) + λδ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
(D.14)
if s1 = ∅. If s1 6= ∅, then (D.13) is equivalent to
((λ(1− λ) + λδ)s1
λ(1− λ) + δ − s1
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)s1
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
≤
((λ(1− λ) + λδ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ − s1
)2
+ δ
(
λ(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
. (D.15)
Since E[θ1|∅] = 0, (D.14) always holds regardless of the principal’s beliefs. To show (D.15),
we construct the following consistent beliefs for the principal: for every m1 ∈ M we let the
principal assign probability one to that agent 1’s type is sm1 ∈ argmins1∈Sm1
∣∣E[θ1|s1]∣∣, i.e.,
µ1p({sm1 |m1}) = 1. The existence of sm1 is guaranteed by the assumption that Sm1 is closed.
Also, by construction ss1 = s1 ∀s1 ∈ S. Given the constructed beliefs, we have E[θ1|∅] =
E[θ1|m1] = 0 ∀m1 ∈ M(∅), E[θ1|s1] = si ≥ E[θ1|m1] ∀s1 ≥ 0 and m1 ∈ M(s1), and E[θ1|s1] =
s1 ≤ E[θ1|m1] ∀s1 < 0 and m1 ∈M(s1).
Next, note that the RHS of (D.15) can be rewritten as the sum of the following two terms:
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m1]− s1)
2 + (1− λ)
2δ2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 s
2
1 (D.16)
and
−2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m1]− s1) s1 +
δλ2(1− λ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2E[θ1|m1]
2. (D.17)
We claim that ∀s1 ∈ Θ, λ ∈ [0, 1] and δ > 0, both of these two terms are minimized when
E[θ1|m1] = s1, which is in turn sufficient for (D.15) to hold for all s1 6= ∅. For the first term
(D.16), this is straightforward. For the second term (D.17), we note that
− 2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)E[θ1|m1]s1 + δλ2(1− λ)2E[θ1|m1]2
= − δλ(1− λ)2 (2s1 − λE[θ1|m1])E[θ1|m1]− 2δ2(1− λ)E[θ1|m1]s1,
and that the function v(x) = −δλ(1−λ)2 · (2s1−λx)x is decreasing in x when x ≤ x¯ and s1 ≥ 0,
and it is increasing if x ≥ s1 and s1 < 0. Hence, given the beliefs we construct for the principal,
(D.17) is also minimized when E[θ1|m1] = s1.
In sum, we have shown that the truthful-telling constraint (D.13) holds for every pair
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η ∈
[
η, η¯
]2
. In other words, it is a best response for agent 1 to reveal his type even when
the distribution of η is deterministic. Therefore, the same must also hold for arbitrary non-
deterministic distribution of η.
To complete the construction of a fully revealing PBE, we finally consider the information
acquisition stage. Given the communication strategies (mc1,mc2), the decision rules (yc1, yc2), and
any pair of efforts (e1, e2) ∈ E2, agent 1’s expected payoff is
U c1(e1, e2)
= q
(
K − (1− e1)
(
(1− e2) + e2
(
Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
]
+ 1
))
σ2θ
− e1
(
(1− e2)Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
]
+ e2Eλ
[
2(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
σ2θ
)
− c(e1)
= q
(
K −
(
1 + e2Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
σ2θ
− e1
(
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
σ2θ
)
− c(e1).
Differentiating with respect to e1, we obtain the following first-order condition:
∂U c1(e1, e2)
∂e1
=
(
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ − c′(e1) = 0. (D.18)
When the cost function c is strictly increasing and satisfies
lim
e→0 c
′(e) <
(
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ < c
′(1),
(D.18) will admit a unique interior solution ec1 ∈ (0, 1), which is given by
ec1 = (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
(1− λ)2 (δ2 + δλ2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
. (D.19)
In addition, when c is strictly convex, the function U c1 will be strictly concave in e1, and thus
the solution ec1 is also the unique global maximizer of U c1(e1, e2) ∀e2 ∈ [0, 1]. These properties
of the cost function have all been assumed in Section 3.
By analogous arguments, one can show that choosing
ec2 = (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
λ2
(
δ2 + δ(1− λ)2)
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
will maximize the expected payoff of agent 2 regardless of the effort choice of agent 1. Fur-
ther, since the distribution F is symmetric in its arguments (η1, η2), λ must be symmetrically
distributed around 1/2. Exploiting this symmetry, we obtain
ec1 = ec2 = ecF ≡ (c′)−1
((
1− Eλ
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ
)
.
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We can now conclude that, together with the degenerate posterior beliefs µip(ei,mi) =
(ecF ,mi) (i.e., the principal assigns probability one to ei = ecF and si = mi) ∀i = 1, 2, the
strategy profile ((ecF ,mc1), (ecF ,mc2), (yc1, yc2)) constitutes a fully revealing PBE. 
Part (ii) Let ((e∗1,m∗1, y∗1), (e∗2,m∗2, y∗2)) be an equilibrium strategy profile under centralization.
Without loss of generality, we focus on agent 1 and consider any s1 ∈ S \ {0, ∅}. Repeating the
calculations of (D.10), (D.11) and (D.12), it can be checked that agent 1 would strictly prefer
the type-revealing message m1 = ms1 than the proposed equilibrium message m∗1(e∗1, s1) if both
of the following two inequalities hold:
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
∗
1(e∗1, s1)]− s1)2 +
(1− λ)2δ2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 s
2
1
>
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
s1 ]− s1)2 + (1− λ)
2δ2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 s
2
1, (D.20)
and
− 2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
∗
1(e∗1, s1)]− s1) s1 +
δλ2(1− λ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2E[θ1|m
∗
1(e∗1, s1)]2
> − 2δ(1− λ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 (E[θ1|m
s1 ]− s1) s1 + δλ
2(1− λ)2
(λ(1− λ) + δ)2E[θ1|m
s1 ]2. (D.21)
Since |E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)]−s1| ≥ 0 ∀s1 ∈ S\{0, ∅}, (D.20) always holds. In addition, similar to what
we have shown for (D.17), (D.21) will also hold if E[θ1|ms1 ] = s1 > max{E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)], 0} or
E[θ1|ms1 ] = s1 < min{E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)], 0}. Hence, for the proposed strategy profile to constitute
an equilibrium, it is necessary that ∀s1 ∈ S{0, ∅}, either E[θ1|ms1 ] = 0 < s1 ≤ E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)]
or E[θ1|ms1 ] = 0 < s1 ≤ E[θ1|m∗1(e∗1, s1)] must hold.
By replacing “the beliefs of agent j” (µij) with “the beliefs of the principal (µ1p)”, the rest
of the proof follows exactly the same steps as in the case of decentralization (see the proof of
Proposition 4.1(ii)). 
D.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.2.
D.5 Comparative Statics of ed and ecF
In this section, we will formally show that the equilibrium effort levels under decentralization
and centralization (ed and ecF ) are both decreasing in δ. Let us define
D(δ) ≡ δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2 (D.22)
and, for every λ ∈ (0, 1),
C(δ, λ) ≡ δ
2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2 . (D.23)
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Differentiating with respect to δ, we have
D′(δ) = (2δ + 1)(1 + 2δ)− 4(δ
2 + δ)
(1 + 2δ)3 =
1
(1 + 2δ)3 > 0, (D.24)
and
∂C(δ, λ)
∂δ
= [2δ(λ
2 + (1− λ)2) + 2λ2(1− λ)2] · (λ(1− λ) + δ)− 2[δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2]
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)3
= λ
3(1− λ)3 + δλ(1− λ)(λ2 + (1− λ)2 − λ(1− λ))
(λ(1− λ) + δ)3
= λ
3(1− λ)3 + δλ(1− λ)((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ))
(λ(1− λ) + δ)3
> 0. (D.25)
Thus, both functions D(δ) and C(δ, λ) are increasing in δ, for all λ ∈ (0, 1). This further implies
that both ed and ecF are decreasing in δ, because
ed = (c′)−1
(
(1−D(δ)) qσ2θ
)
, ecF = (c′)−1
(
(1− Eλ [C(δ, λ)]) qσ2θ
)
, (D.26)
and the cost function c is strictly increasing and convex.
D.6 Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, suppose that corr(η1, η2) = 1. Since the distribution F is symmetric in η1 and η2, for the
global states to be perfectly and positively correlated, we must have Pr (η1 = η2) = 1, and thus
Pr
(
λ = 12
)
= 1, where λ = η1/(η1 + η2). In this case, the RHS of condition (4.4) becomes
CF (δ) =
δ2
(
1
4 +
1
4
)
+ 2δ · 14 · 14
2
(
1
4 + δ
)2 = 4δ2 + δ(1 + 4δ)2 = δ1 + 4δ .
∀δ > 0, we have
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2 >
δ
1 + 4δ ⇐⇒
(1 + δ)(1 + 4δ)
(1 + 2δ)2 > 1
⇐⇒ 1 + 5δ + 4δ
2
1 + 4δ + 4δ2 > 1,
which always holds. Therefore, when corr(η1, η2) = 1, we have D(δ) > CF (δ) ∀δ > 0, i.e.,
condition (4.4) is always violated. From the arguments in the main text, this immediately
implies that ed < ecF ∀δ > 0.
Next, consider the case corr(η1, η2) < 1. Taking the limit of both sides of (4.4) with respect
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to δ, we obtain
lim
δ→+∞
D(δ) = lim
δ→+∞
1 + 1δ(
1
δ + 2
)2 = 14 ,
and
lim
δ→+∞
CF (δ) = lim
δ→+∞
E
(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2λ2(1−λ)2δ
2
(
λ(1−λ)
δ + 1
)2
 = E [λ2 + (1− λ)22
]
= E
[
λ2
]
,
where the last equality follows that the distribution of λ must be symmetric around 1/2. Since
corr(η1, η2) < 1, the distribution of λ cannot be degenerate, and thus by Jensen’s inequality we
further have
lim
δ→+∞
CF (δ) > (E [λ])2 =
1
4 = limδ→+∞ D(δ).
Therefore, by continuity there must exist δ¯1 < +∞, such that D(δ) < CF (δ) ∀δ > δ¯1. Since
ed > eCF ⇐⇒ D(δ) < CF (δ), it immediately follows that ed > ecF ∀δ > δ¯1.
To show that the effort difference ed − ecF is increasing in δ for sufficiently large δ, note that
∂(ed − ecF )
∂δ
= −D
′(δ)qσ2θ
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
(1−D(δ)) qσ2θ
)) − −C ′F (δ)qσ2θ
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
(1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ
)) .
Since the cost function c is strictly convex, and both D′(δ) and C ′F (δ) are strictly positive (see
Section D.5), the above partial derivative is strictly positive if and only if
C ′F (δ)
D′(δ) >
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
(1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ
))
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
(1−D(δ)) qσ2θ
)) . (D.27)
For the RHS of (D.27), we have
lim
δ→+∞
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
(1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ
))
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
(1−D(δ)) qσ2θ
)) = c′′ ((c′)−1 ((1− E[λ2]) qσ2θ))
c′′
(
(c′)−1
(
3
4 · qσ2θ
)) < +∞.
Using the calculation results from Section D.5 (see (D.24) and (D.25)), we also have
lim
δ→+∞
C ′F (δ)
D′(δ) = limδ→+∞ E
[
λ(1− λ)(1 + 2δ)3
(λ(1− λ) + δ)3 ·
(
λ2(1− λ)2 + δ((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ)
)
)
]
= lim
δ→+∞
E
λ(1− λ)(1δ + 2)3(
λ(1−λ)
δ + 1
)3 · (λ2(1− λ)2 + δ((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ)))

= lim
δ→+∞
E
[
8λ(1− λ) ·
(
λ2(1− λ)2 + δ((2λ− 1)2 + λ(1− λ)
)
)
]
= E
[
8λ3(1− λ)3
]
+ E
[
λ(1− λ)(2λ− 1)2 + λ2(1− λ)2
]
· lim
δ→+∞
δ
= +∞.
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Therefore, by continuity, there must exist δ¯2 < +∞, such that (D.27) holds for all δ > δ¯2.
Equivalently, the effort difference ed − ecF must be increasing in δ for all δ > δ¯2.
Finally, we complete the proof of the theorem by letting δ¯ ≡ max{δ¯1, δ¯2}.
D.7 Proof of Theorem 4.2
To simplify the algebra, let us define
α ≡ η1η2(η1 + η2)2 = λ(1− λ), β ≡
η21 + η22
(η1 + η2)2
= λ2 + (1− λ)2 (D.28)
and
∆F (δ) ≡ CF (δ)−D(δ) = E
[
δ2β + 2δα2
2(α+ δ)2
]
− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2 .
From (D.24) and (D.25), we have
∆′F (δ) = E
[
α3 + δα(β − α)
(α+ δ)3
]
− 1(1 + 2δ)3 .
Further, the second derivative of ∆F (δ) is given by
∆′′F (δ) = E
[
α2β − 4α3 − 2α(β − α)δ
(α+ δ)4
]
+ 6(1 + 2δ)4 .
Therefore,
∆F (0) = 0, ∆′F (0) = E
[
α3
α3
]
− 1 = 0,
and
∆′′F (0) = E
[
α2β − 4α3
α4
]
+ 6
= E
[ 1
λ2
+ 1(1− λ)2 −
4
λ(1− λ)
]
+ 6
= E
[( 1
λ
− 11− λ
)2
− 2
λ(1− λ)
]
+ 6
= E
[ 2
λ2
− 4
λ(1− λ)
]
+ 6,
where the last equality follows that λ is symmetrically distributed around 1/2. Note that
∆′′F (0) > 0 ⇐⇒ E
[ 1
λ2
]
> E
[ 2
λ(1− λ)
]
− 3.
Hence, if the condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied, then ∆′′F (0) > 0. Since ∆′F (0) = 0, by
continuity, there must exists δ˜ > 0 such that ∆′F (δ) > 0 for all δ ∈
(
0, δ˜
)
. Since ∆F (0) = 0, and
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∆F is strictly increasing on
(
0, δ˜
)
, then again by continuity there must exist δ ∈ (0,+∞], such
that ∆F (δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0, δ). This immediately implies that ed > ecF ∀δ ∈ (0, δ).
D.8 Proof of Proposition 4.5
By part (i) of Theorem 4.1, we know that if ω = 0, then ed < ecF ∀δ > 0. In this case, we let
δ(ω) = 0 and δ¯(ω) = +∞.
Now consider the functions D(δ) and CF (δ) as defined in (4.4). For every binary distribution
Fω with ω ∈ [0, 1), define
∆(δ, ω) ≡ CFω(δ)−D(δ) =
δ2 · 1+ω22 + 2δ ·
(
1−ω2
4
)2
2
(
1−ω2
4 + δ
)2 − δ2 + δ(1 + 2δ)2 . (D.29)
Since ∆(0, ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ [0, 1), the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 always has a root δ = 0. To ease
the exposition of the algebra, we again use the variables defined in (D.28), which are now given
by α = (1− ω2)/4 and β = (1 + ω2)/2. Provided that δ > 0, we have for all ω ∈ (0, 1),
∆(δ, ω) = 0
⇐⇒ (βδ + 2α
2)(1 + 2δ)2 − 2(δ + 1)(α+ δ)2
2(α+ δ)2(1 + 2δ)2 = 0
⇐⇒ (βδ + 2α2)(4δ2 + 4δ + 1)− (2δ + 2)(α2 + δ2 + 2αδ) = 0
⇐⇒ (4β − 2)δ3 + (8α2 − 4α+ 4β − 2)δ2 + (6α2 − 4α+ β)δ = 0
⇐⇒ (4β − 2)δ2 + (8α2 − 4α+ 4β − 2)δ + (6α2 − 4α+ β) = 0
⇐⇒
(
δ + 4α
2 − 2α+ 2β − 1
4β − 2
)2
= (4α
2 − 2α+ 2β − 1)2 − (6α2 − 4α+ β)(4β − 2)
(4β − 2)2
⇐⇒
(
δ + 4α
2 − 2α+ 2β − 1
4β − 2
)2
= (1− 2α)
2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
(4β − 2)2 , (D.30)
where the fifth equivalence follows that 4β − 2 = 2 + 2ω2 − 2 = 2ω2 > 0. In addition, we can
verify that the RHS of (D.30) is strictly negative if ω >
√
2 − 1. This is because (1 − 2α)2 =
(1 + ω2)2/4 > 0, and
4α2 − 2β + 1 = (1− ω
2)2
4 − ω
2 =
(
1− ω2
2 + ω
)(
1− ω2
2 − ω
)
,
which, given that ω ∈ (0, 1), will be positive if and only if 1 − ω2 − 2ω ≥ 0, or, equivalently,
ω ≤ √2 − 1. Hence, if ω > √2 − 1, the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 does not have any non-zero
root on [0,+∞), and Theorem 1 implies that we must have ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ > 0. Since
ed > ecF ⇐⇒ ∆(δ, ω) > 0, part (ii) of the proposition immediately follows.
Next, suppose that ω ∈ (0,√2 − 1]. In this case, the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 admits the
following two non-zero roots
δ(ω) = −4α
2 − 2α+ 2β − 1
4β − 2 −
(1− 2α)√4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2 , and
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δ¯(ω) = −4α
2 − 2α+ 2β − 1
4β − 2 +
(1− 2α)√4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2 .
In addition, we note that
4α2 − 2α+ 2β − 1 = (1− ω
2)2
4 −
1− ω2
2 + 1 + ω
2 − 1 = ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
4 ,
which is clearly increasing in ω, and it is approximately equal to −0.07 when ω = √2−1. Thus,
the term −(4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1)/(4β − 2) must be strictly positive for all ω ∈ (0,√2− 1]. This
implies that if ω =
√
2−1, the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0 will actually admit two identical and strictly
positive roots, i.e., δ¯(ω) = δ(ω) > 0. By continuity, we must have ∆(δ,
√
2 − 1) > 0 (and thus
ed > ecF ) for all δ ∈ (0, δ(ω)) ∪ (δ¯(ω),+∞).
If ω <
√
2 − 1, from the above analysis we know that δ¯(ω) > max{δ(ω), 0}. Thus, by
continuity and part (ii) of Theorem 4.1, it follows that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ > δ¯(ω). In addition,
since limω→0 4β − 2 = limω→0 ω2 = 0, it is straightforward to verify that limω→0 δ¯(ω) = +∞.
As for the interval [max{0, δ(ω)}, δ¯(ω)], because we have δ¯(ω) > δ(ω), 4α2 − 2β + 1 > 0, and
∆(δ, ω) < 0 if
(
δ − δ¯(ω) + (1− 2α)
√
4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2
)2
<
(2α− 1)2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
(4β − 2)2 ,
it is necessarily the case that ∆(δ, ω) < 0 for δ = δ¯(ω)− ε > 0, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
Hence, we must have ∆(δ, ω) ≤ 0 for all δ ∈ [max{0, δ(ω)}, δ¯(ω)].
It remains to show that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,max{0, δ(ω)}). We note that
δ(ω) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ − 4α
2 − 2α+ 2β − 1
4β − 2 ≤
(1− 2α)√4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2
⇐⇒ (4α2 − 2α+ 2β − 1)2 ≤ (1− 2α)2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
⇐⇒ 6α2 − 4α+ β ≤ 0
⇐⇒ 3(1− ω
2)2
8 −
1− 3ω2
2 ≤ 0,
⇐⇒ (1− ω2)2 − 4(1− ω2) + 4− 43
4
3 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ (1− ω2 − 2)2 − 43 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ (1 + ω2)2 − 43 ≤ 0,
where the second equivalence holds because, as we have shown above, 4α2 − 2α + 2β − 1 < 0
and 4β − 2 > 0 for all ω ∈
(
0,
√
2− 1
)
. Clearly, the equation (1 + ω2)2 − 4/3 = 0 has a unique
real root on (0, 1), which is given by
ωˆ =
√
2
√
3
3 − 1 ≈ 0.393.
It is also straightforward to check that δ(ω) < 0 if ω < ωˆ, and δ(ω) > 0 if ω ∈ (ωˆ,√2−1). Thus,
the claim that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,max{0, δ(ω)}) holds trivially if ω ∈ (0, ωˆ). As for the
168 Appendix: Chapter 4
case ω ∈ (ωˆ,√2− 1), note that the inequality ∆(δ, ω) > 0 can be rewritten as
(
δ − δ(ω)− (1− 2α)
√
4α2 − 2β + 1
4β − 2
)2
>
(2α− 1)2(4α2 − 2β + 1)
(4β − 2)2 .
But then, given that we have shown 1 − 2α > 0 and 4α2 − 2β + 1 > 0, it immediately follows
that we also have ∆(δ, ω) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0,max{δ(ω), 0}) in this case.
D.9 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Consider the function ∆(δ, ω) defined in (D.29). For every δ > 0, we have
∂∆(δ, ω)
∂ω
= [8δ
2ω + δ(4ω3 − 4ω)](1− ω2 + 4δ)− [4δ2(1 + ω2) + 2δ(ω4 − 2ω2 + 1)](−4ω)
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3
≥ δ(4ω
3 − 4ω)(1− ω2) + 8δω(ω4 − 2ω2 + 1)
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3 +
4δ2(4ω3 − 4ω) + 16δ2ω(1 + ω2)
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3
= 4δω(1− ω
2)2
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3 +
32δ2ω3
(1− ω2 + 4δ)3 ,
which is strictly positive for all ω ∈ (0, 1). Thus, ∆(δ, ω) is strictly increasing in ω. Since
∆(δ, 1) = 12 −
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2 > 0 >
4δ2 + δ
(1 + 4δ)2 −
δ2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2 = ∆(δ, 0),
there must exist a unique cutoff ωˆ(δ) ∈ (0, 1), such that ∆(δ, ω) > 0 if and only if ω > ωˆ(δ).
To obtain the exact analytic form of the cutoff, we expand the equation ∆(δ, ω) = 0:
∆(δ, ω) = 0⇐⇒ 2ω2δ2 + ω
4 + 4ω2 − 1
2 · δ +
3ω4 + 6ω2 − 1
8 = 0
⇐⇒ (4δ + 3)ω4 + (16δ2 + 16δ + 6)ω2 − 4δ − 1 = 0
⇐⇒ω4 + 16δ
2 + 16δ + 6
4δ + 3 ω
2 − 4δ + 14δ + 3 = 0
⇐⇒
(
ω2 + 2δ + 2δ + 34δ + 3
)2
= 4δ + 14δ + 3 +
(
2δ + 2δ + 34δ + 3
)2
⇐⇒
(
ω2 + 2δ + 2δ + 34δ + 3
)2
= 64δ
4 + 128δ3 + 128δ2 + 64δ + 12
(4δ + 3)2
⇐⇒
(
ω2 + 2δ + 2δ + 34δ + 3
)2
= (4δ + 2)
2(4δ2 + 4δ + 3)
(4δ + 3)2 . (D.31)
For every δ > 0, equation (D.31) has a unit root on [0, 1], which is given by
ωˆ(δ) =
√
(4δ + 2)
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ − 3
4δ + 3 − 2δ.
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To prove the remaining claims of the theorem, let us denote
Z(δ) = (4δ + 2)
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ − 3
4δ + 3 − 2δ
=
(
1− 14δ + 3
)√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3− 2δ + 34δ + 3 − 2δ,
and thus ωˆ(δ) =
√
Z(δ). Differentiating with respect to δ, we obtain
Z ′(δ) = 4
√
4δ2 + 4δ + 3
(4δ + 3)2 +
(4δ + 2)2
4δ + 3 ·
(
4δ2 + 4δ + 3
)− 12 + 6(4δ + 3)2 − 2,
It is easy to verify that Z ′(0) > 0. In addition, using Mathematica, one can also check that
there is a unique solution to Z ′(δ) = 0 on (0,+∞), which is δ∗ =
√
2
2 − 12 , and it satisfies
ωˆ(δ∗) =
√
2 − 1. Hence, by continuity, we must have Z ′(δ) > 0 ∀δ ∈ (0, δ∗), and Z ′(δ) > 0
∀δ ∈ (δ∗,+∞). This further implies that the cutoff ωˆ(δ) must be strictly increasing on (0, δ∗),
and strictly decreasing on (δ∗,+∞). It is also straightforward to verify that limδ→+∞ Z(δ) = 0,
and thus limδ→+∞ ωˆ(δ) = 0.
D.10 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Using Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we can compute the expected performance of each division
i ∈ {1, 2} in the fully revealing equilibrium under decentralization, which is given by
Πdi (ed, ydi , ydj ) = K − σ2θ + ed
(
1− 2δ
2 + 2δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ .
Exploiting that F is symmetric in η and the decision rules yd = (yd1 , yd2) are independent of η,
we then obtain the expected payoff of the principal under decentralization:
ΠdP = E
[
η1Πd1(ed,yd) + η2Πd2(ed,yd)
]
= 2E[ηi]Πdi (ed,yd)
= 2µ
(
K − σ2θ + ed
(
1− 2δ
2 + 2δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
σ2θ
)
,
where µ ≡ E[ηi] > 0, ∀i = 1, 2.
We next derive the equilibrium payoff of the principal under centralization, which we will
denote as ΠcP . Under decentralization, each agent invests ei = ecF in acquiring information, and
the decision rules are yc = (yc1, yc2) as described in Proposition 4.4. Hence, for each agent i and
a given pair of global states (η1, η2), the expected performance of the two divisions are
Πc1(ecF , yc,η) = K − σ2θ + ecF
1− 2δ2 + 2δλ2(
λ+ δ1−λ
)2
σ2θ ,
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Πc2(ecF , yc,η) = K − σ2θ + ecF
1− 2δ2 + 2δ(1− λ)2(
1− λ+ δλ
)2
σ2θ ,
where we recall that λ = η1/(η1 + η2). Exploiting the symmetry of F , we have
ΠcP = E [η1Πc1(ecF , yc,η) + η2Πc2(ec, yc,η)]
= 2µ
K − σ2θ + ecF
1− 1
µ
E
η1 · δ2 + δλ2(
λ+ δ1−λ
)2
+ E
η2 · δ2 + δ(1− λ)2(
1− λ+ δλ
)2


σ2θ

= 2µ
K − σ2θ + ecF
1− 1
µ
E
δ2 · η1η2η1+η2 + δ · η
2
1η
2
2
(η1+η2)3(
η1η2
(η1+η2)2 + δ
)2

σ2θ
 .
Therefore, ΠdP > ΠcP if and only if the following inequality holds:
ed
ecF
> RF (δ) ≡
1− 1
µ
E
δ2 · η1η2η1+η2 + δ · η
2
1η
2
2
(η1+η2)3(
η1η2
(η1+η2)2 + δ
)2

/(1− 2δ2 + 2δ(1 + 2δ)2
)
. (D.32)
Note that
lim
δ→+∞
RF (δ) = 2− 2
µ
E
[
η1η2
η1 + η2
]
< 2,
and
lim
δ→+∞
ed
ecF
= lim
δ→+∞
(c′)−1
(
(1−D(δ)) qσ2θ
)
(c′)−1
(
(1− CF (δ))qσ2θ
) = (c′)−1 (0.75qσ2θ)
(c′)−1
((
1− E
[(
η1
η1+η2
)2])
qσ2θ
) > 1,
whereD(δ) and CF (δ) are defined in (4.4), and the last inequality follows Theorem 4.1. Thus, the
value of limδ→ ed/ecF is strictly large than 1, and it is increasing as the term E
[
(η1/(η1 + η2))2
]
increases. Let ε ≡ (E [(η1/(η1 + η2))2]− 0.25) qσ2θ , which is strictly positive given the assump-
tion corr(η1, η2) < 1. Using Taylor’s theorem, we obtain
(c′)−1
((
1− E
[(
η1
η1 + η2
)2])
qσ2θ
)
= (c′)−1
(
0.75qσ2θ
)
− ε
c′′((c′)−1(0.75qσ2θ))
+ o
(
ε2
)
.
Since c′′(e) · e < ζ ∀e ∈ [0, 1], we further have
(c′)−1
((
1− E
[(
η1
η1 + η2
)2])
qσ2θ
)
≤ ζ − ε
c′′((c′)−1(0.75qσ2θ))
+ o
(
ε2
)
. (D.33)
When ε is sufficiently small, the value of the higher order terms in o(ε2) can be neglected. Thus,
if ζ is sufficiently close to (but still larger than) ε, the LHS of (D.33) becomes arbitrarily close to
zero (but it is still strictly positive). Hence, if the bound ζ is sufficiently close to ε > 0, then for
the case with small enough ε (i.e., ε ≤ ε¯, where ε¯ is some strictly positive cutoff) we must have
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limδ→+∞ ed/ecF > limδ→+∞RF (δ).2 But then, because the value of limδ→+∞ ed/ecF is strictly
increasing in E[(η1/(η1 + η2))2], and thus also in ε, with the same bound ζ we will also have
limδ→+∞ ed/ecF > limδ→+∞RF (δ) for all ε ≥ ε¯. By continuity, it follows that ed/ecF > RF (δ) for
sufficiently large δ. We can conclude that if ζ is sufficiently small, then there must exist δ¯ > 0,
such that ΠdP > ΠcP if δ > δ¯.
D.11 Proof of Theorem 4.4
In the proof of Theorem 4.2, it is shown that if the condition E
[
1
λ2
]
> E
[
2
λ(1−λ)
]
−3 is satisfied,
then there exists δ > 0, such that CF (δ) > D(δ) ∀δ ∈ (0, δ). Using arguments that are analogous
to those in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we can further show that, for every of such δ there must
exist a cutoff ζ(δ) > 0, such that if c′′(e) · e < ζ(δ) ∀e ∈ [0, 1], then we will also have
ed
ecF
= (c
′)−1
(
(1−D(δ)) qσ2θ
)
(c′)−1
(
(1− CF (δ)) qσ2θ
) > RF (δ),
which, according to (D.32), is both necessary and sufficient for ΠdP > ΠcP .
D.12 Proof of Proposition 4.7
Decentralization Let us first consider part (i) of the proposition. We argue that the pro-
posed equilibrium effort profile (e∗1, e∗2) = (eˇd, eˇd), the fully revealing communication strategies
(mˇd1, mˇd2), and the decision rules (yˇd1 , yˇd2) described below constitute a PBE, where the beliefs of
the players will be fully pinned down Bayes’ rule. Specifically, the decision rules are similar to
the ones in Proposition 4.1, and they are given by
yˇdi (ei, si,mi,mj) =
E[θi|si]
1 + δ +
δ2E[θi|mi]
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) +
δE[θj |mj ]
1 + 2δ ,
∀ei ∈ E, ∀si,mi,mj ∈ R∪{∅}, and ∀i, j = 1, 2, where for each i ∈ {1, 2} E[θi|mi] is the posterior
expectation of the local state θi conditional on si = mi/td if mi 6= ∅, and it is conditional on
si = ∅ otherwise. To prove Proposition 4.7(i), we will suppose that agent j is playing according
to (eˇd, mˇdj , yˇdj ), and then show that it is a best response for agent i to also adopt the proposed
strategy.
Taking the first stage effort ei, the signal si received, and the message mi sent as given, we
can solve agent i’s utility-maximizing problem at the decision-making stage as in the proof of
Proposition 4.1, and obtain the decision rule yˇdi as a solution. Thus, given agent j’s strategy
and the corresponding beliefs, the decision rule yˇdi is sequentially rational for agent i.
Next, we take the decision rule yˇdi , effort ei and signal si as given, and consider agent i’s
strategic incentives when communicating his private information with agent j. We start by
2The assumption that “the marginal cost is sufficiently small at e = 0 ... so that the agents will endogenously
choose to be partially informed (ei ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium”, which is stated in Section 4.3, implicitly restricts that
ζ cannot be too small. Otherwise, we may have the RHS of (D.33) being negative, which implies that in the limit
the agents would actually choose to be not informed at all under centralization (limδ→+∞ ecF = 0). In this case,
if we still have limδ→+∞ ed = (c′)−1(0.75qσ2θ) > 0, i.e., the agents would still want to exert some effort under
decentralization, then obviously the statement limδ→+∞ ed/ecF > limδ→+∞RF (δ) will also hold.
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showing that when agent i receives a non-null signal si ∈ R, he will prefer to send message
mdi (ei, si) = tdsi than any other message mi ∈ R. Note that since agent j will follow the
proposed fully revealing communicating strategy, agent i can always infer the realization of
agent j’s signal sj (which is equal to mj/td if mj 6= ∅, and it is equal to ∅ otherwise). Thus for
every message mi ∈ R sent by agent i (which may or may not equal to mˇdi (ei, si)), sequential
rationality implies that the agents will choose the following actions:
yi =
θi
1 + δ +
δ2(mi/td)
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) +
δE[θj |sj ]
1 + 2δ , yj =
(1 + δ)E[θj |sj ] + δ(mi/td)
1 + 2δ ,
where E[θj |sj ] = 0 if sj = ∅, and θj = sj otherwise. Thus, given any effort ej ∈ E chosen by
agent j, conditional on sending the message mi ∈ R, the expected performance of division i is
Π˜di (mi, θi, ej) = ejEθj [p˜id1(mi, θi, θj)] + (1− ej)p˜idi (mi, θi, ∅) ,
where
p˜idi (mi, θi, θj) =K −
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/td)δ2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) −
δ
1 + 2δ · θj
)2
− δ
(
(1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/td)δ
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) −
1
1 + 2δ · θj
)2
and p˜idi (mi, θi, ∅) = p˜idi (mi, θi, θj)|θj=0. Differentiating with respect to mi, we have, ∀θj ∈ R,
∂Eθj [p˜idi (mi, θi, θj)]
∂mi
= − Eθj
[
2
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/td)δ2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) −
δ
1 + 2δ · θj
)(
−δ2/td
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)]
− δEθj
[
2
(
(1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/td)δ
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) −
1
1 + 2δ · θj
)(
−δ/td
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)]
= 2δ
2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) ·
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/t)δ2 + (1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/t)
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)
· 1
td
,
which is also equal to ∂p˜idi (mi, θi, ∅)/∂mi. Hence, we further have
∂Π˜di (mi, θi, ej)
∂mi
= 2δ
2
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ) ·
(
(δ + 2δ2)θi − (mi/td)δ2 + (1 + 2δ)θi − (mi/td)δ
(1 + 2δ)(1 + δ)
)
· 1
td
,
which is independent of ej . This implies that the strategic communication incentives of agent i
is independent of his belief about the effort exerted by agent j. Thus, from now on we drop the
variable ej from the function Π˜di . We distinguish the following two cases:
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Case 1: si = θi = 0. It is straightforward to verify that
∂[qΠ˜di (mi, θi)]
∂mi
∣∣∣∣∣
mi=θi=0
= 0.
Since z(mˆi, 0) ≥ z(0, 0) = 0 ∀mˆi ∈ R, it immediately follows that
qΠ˜di (0, 0)− z(0, 0) ≥ q · Π˜di (mˆi, 0)− z(mˆi, 0)∀mˆi ∈ R.
Hence, when agent i learns that θi = 0, he always prefer to send mi = 0 than any other mˆi ∈ R.
Case 2: si = θi 6= 0. Suppose first that θi > 0. Consider any message that mi ≥ θi. By
assumption 4.2, sending this message will incur a cost z(mi, θi) = κ(mi − θi)2. Note that by
construction, we have td ≡ 12 +
√
qδ2
κ(1+2δ)2 +
1
4 , which is larger than 1 for all δ ≥ 0, and[
∂[qΠ˜di (mi, θi)]
∂mi
− ∂z(mi, θi)
∂mi
] ∣∣∣∣∣
mi=tdθi
= 0,
i.e., the first-order condition is satisfied exactly at mi = tdθi. This implies that if agent i learns
that the true state is θi > 0, he will prefer to send the message mi = tdθi than any other
messages mˆi ∈ [θi,+∞).
It remains to show that agent i will also prefer mi = tdθi than any message mˆi ∈ [0, θi).
This is indeed the case, because ∂Π˜
d
i (mi,θi)
∂mi
> 0 ∀mi ∈ [0, θi), and, thus, ∀θi > 0 and mˆi < θi,
qΠ˜di
(
tdθi, θi
)
− z(tdθi, θi) ≥ qΠ˜di (θi, θi)− z(θi, θi)
= qΠ˜di (θi, θi)
> qΠ˜di (mˆi, θi)
≥ qΠ˜di (mˆi, θi)− z(mˆi, θi).
In sum, we have shown that for all si = θi > 0, agent i would prefer sending mi = tdθi than any
other message mˆi ∈ R. By symmetry, the same conclusion also holds for all si = θi < 0.
Since the effect on the actions chosen by the agents are the same for mˆi = 0 and mˆi = ∅, and
we allow the cost z(m, 0) to be fully general, it also follows that agent i will not find it profitable
to send mˆi = ∅ when si 6= ∅. As for the remaining scenario si = ∅, it is straightforward to
verify that the expected performance of division i conditional on agent i sending any message
mi ∈ R ∪ ∅ is the same as when he actually receives a non-null signal that si = θi = 0. Hence,
this expected performance is maximized when m1 = ∅. Trivially, the communication cost is also
minimized at m1 = ∅. Therefore, it must be optimal for agent i to send mi = ∅ whenever si = ∅
is observed.
Finally, we take both the decision rules (yˇd1 , yˇd2) and communication strategies (mˇd1, mˇd2) as
given and consider the information acquisition problem for agent i. Given an arbitrary effort
profile (e1, e2), the expected payoff of agent i is now given by
Udi (ei, ej)− eiE
[
κ(tdθi − θi)2
]
,
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where Udi (ei, ej) was defined in the proof of Proposition 4.1. Thus, with costly exaggeration, the
first-order condition at the information acquisition stage is(
1− δ
2 + δ
(1 + 2δ)2
)
qσ2θ − c′(ei)− κ(td − 1)2σ2θ = 0.
Solving the above equation, we obtain the proposed equilibrium effort level eˇd as a unique
solution. Therefore, given the above-mentioned decision rules and communication strategies,
choosing ei = eˇd is indeed optimal for agent i. 
Centralization For part (ii) of the proposition, we consider first the principal’s incentive at
the decision-making stage. Given the communication strategy profile (mˇc1, mˇc2), the relevant in-
formation held by both agents will be perfectly revealed to the principal. In particular, whenever
the principal observes that mi 6= ∅, she can infer that agent i has learned about his local state,
which is given by θi = mi/tc. Thus, sequential rationality implies that the decision rules of the
principal should be similar to the ones in the proof of Proposition 4.2:
yˇci (mi,mj , ηi, ηj) =
ηi
ηi+ηj ·
(
ηj
ηi+ηj + δ
)
E [θi|mi] + δηjηi+ηjE[θj |mj ]
ηi
ηi+ηj ·
ηj
ηi+ηj + δ
,
∀mi,mj ∈ Θ ∪ {∅}, ∀ηi, ηj ∈ [ η, η¯ ], and ∀i, j = 1, 2, where for each i ∈ {1, 2} E[θi|mi] is
the posterior expectations of the local state θi conditional on si = mi/tc if mi 6= ∅, and it is
conditional on si = ∅ otherwise.
Next, we take the above decision rules of the principal as given, and consider the strategic
incentives of the agents at the communication stage. Suppose that agent 2 plays the fully
revealing communication strategymc2. We start by showing that when receiving a non-null signal
s1 ∈ R, agent 1 will prefer to send m1 = tcs1 than any other message mˆ1 ∈ R. In particular,
suppose that agent 1 learns that his local state is θ1 ∈ R, then by sending an arbitrary message
m1 ∈ R he will induce the following contingent actions of the principal:
yc1 =
(λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc) + (1− λ)δE[θ2|s2]
λ(1− λ) + δ
and
yc2 =
(λ(1− λ) + (1− λ)δ)E[θ2|s2] + λδ · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ ,
where λ = η1/(η1 + η2), E[θ2|s2] = 0 if s2 = ∅, and θ2 = s2 (and thus E[θ2|s2] = s2) otherwise.
Note that we can write the action of the principal as a function of agent 2’s private signal because
agent 2 s communication strategy is fully revealing.
Given any effort e2 ∈ E chosen by agent 2, and any realization of the profitability conditions
η1, η2 ∈ [ η, η¯ ], conditional on sending a message mi ∈ R the expected performance of agent 1 is
Π˜c1(m1, θ1, e2,η) = e2Eθ2 [p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η)] + (1− e2)p˜ic1(m1, ∅,η),
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where
p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η) =K −
((λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ −
(1− λ)δ
λ(1− λ) + δ · θ2
)2
− δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (m1/tc − θ2)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)2
and p˜ic1(m1, ∅,η) = p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η)|θ2=0. Differentiating with respect to m1, we have, ∀θ2 ∈ R,
∂Eθ2 [p˜ic1(m1, θ2,η)]
∂m1
=Eθ2
[
2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc)− (1− λ)δθ2
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)]
− Eθ2
[
2δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (m1/tc − θ2)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
λ(1− λ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)]
= 2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
− 2δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
λ(1− λ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
,
which is also equal to ∂p˜ic1(m1, ∅,η)/∂m1. Hence, we further have
∂Π˜c1(m1, θ1, e2,η)
∂m1
=2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ)θ1 − (λ(1− λ) + λδ) · (mˆ1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
− 2δ
(
λ(1− λ) · (mˆ1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
λ(1− λ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
,
which is independent of e2. This implies that the strategic communication incentives of agent 1 is
independent of his belief about the effort exerted by agent 2. Thus, from now on we drop the variable e2
from the function Π˜c1. We distinguish the following two cases:
Case 1: si = θi = 0. It is straightforward to verify that
∂[qΠ˜c1(m1, θ1,η)]
∂m1
∣∣∣∣∣
m1=θ1=0
= 0 ∀η1, η2 ∈ [ η, η¯ ].
Since z(mˆ1, 0) ≥ z(0, 0) = 0 ∀mˆ1 ∈ R, it immediately follows that
qEη
[
Π˜c1(0, 0,η)
]− z(0, 0) ≥ Eη [Π˜c1(mˆ1, 0,η)]− z(mˆ1, 0)∀mˆ1 ∈ R.
Hence, when agent 1 learns that θi = 0, he always prefer to send m1 = tcθ1 = 0 than any other message
mˆ1 ∈ R.
Case 2: si = θi 6= 0. Suppose first that θi > 0. Consider any message that m1 ≥ θ1. By assumption
4.2, sending this message will incur a cost z(m1, θ1) = κ(m1 − θ1)2. Note that by construction, we have
tc = 12 +
√
E
[
qλ(1−λ)[2δ2+δ(λ2+(1−λ)2)]
κ(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
+ 14 , which is larger than 1 for all δ ≥ 0, and
[
∂Eη
[
qΠ˜c1(m1, θ1,η)
]
∂m1
− ∂z(m1, θ1)
∂m1
] ∣∣∣∣∣
m1=tcθ1
= 0,
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i.e., the first-order condition is satisfied exactly at mi = tcθi.3 This implies that if agent 1 learns that
the true state is θ1 > 0 and the principal expects him to send messages according to the fully revealing
communication rule mˇc1, then agent 1 will indeed prefer to send the message m1 = tcθ1 than any other
messages mˆ1 ∈ [θ1,+∞).
It remains to show that agent 1 will also prefer m1 = tcθ1 than any message mˆ1 ∈ [0, θ1). This is
indeed the case, because ∀m1 ∈ [0, θ1) and ∀η1, η2 ∈ [ η, η¯ ],
∂Π˜c1(m1, θ1,η)
∂m1
≥ 2
(
(λ(1− λ) + δ) (θ1 −m1/tc)
λ(1− λ) + δ
)(
(λ(1− λ) + λδ)/tc
λ(1− λ) + δ
)
> 0,
and, thus, ∀θ1 > 0 and mˆ1 < θ1,
qEη
[
Π˜c1 (tcθ1, θ1,η)
]− z(tcθ1, θ1) ≥ qEη [Π˜c1 (θ1, θ1,η)]− z(θ1, θ1)
= qEη
[
Π˜c1 (θ1, θ1,η)
]
> qEη
[
Π˜c1 (mˆ1, θ1,η)
]
≥ qEη
[
Π˜c1 (mˆ1, θ1,η)
]− z(mˆ1, θ1).
In sum, we have shown that for all s1 = θi > 0, agent 1 would prefer sending m1 = tcs1 than any other
message mˆ1 ∈ R. By symmetry, the same conclusion also holds for all s1 < 0.
Since the effect on the actions chosen by the principal are the same for mˆ1 = 0 and mˆ1 = ∅, and we
allow the cost z(m, 0) to be fully general, it also follows from the argument in Case 1 that agent 1 will not
find it profitable to send mˆ1 = ∅ when s1 6= ∅. As for the remaining scenario s1 = ∅, it is straightforward
to verify that the expected performance of division 1 conditional on agent 1 sending any message mˆ1 is
the same as when he actually receives a non-null signal of s1 = θ1 = 0. Hence, this expected performance
is maximized when mˆ1 = ∅. Trivially, the communication cost is also minimized when mˆ1 = ∅. Therefore,
it is optimal for agent 1 to report m1 = ∅ to the principal whenever s1 = ∅ is observed.
By the symmetry of distribution F , the incentive problem of agent 2 is analogous. Thus, given that
agent 1 will be fully revealing his private information to the principal, it is also a best response for agent
2 to follow the communication strategy mˇc2.
Finally, we take both the decision rules (yˇc1, yˇc2) and the communication strategies (mˇc1, mˇc2) as given
and consider the information acquisition problem for agent i. Given an arbitrary effort profile (e1, e2),
the expected payoff of agent i is now given by
U ci (ei, ej)− eiE
[
κ(tcθi − θi)2
]
,
where U ci (ei, ej) was defined in the proof of Proposition 4.3. Thus, with costly exaggeration, the first-order
condition at the information acquisition stage is(
1− E
[
δ2(λ2 + (1− λ)2) + 2δλ2(1− λ)2
2(λ(1− λ) + δ)2
])
qσ2θ − c′(ei)− κ(tc − 1)2σ2θ = 0.
Solving the above equation, we obtain the proposed equilibrium effort level eˇcF as a unique solution.
Therefore, given the above-mentioned decision rules and communication strategies, choosing ei = eˇcF is
indeed optimal for agent i. 
3To arrive at the expression of tc, we exploit that the symmetry of the distribution of λ and observe that
Eλ
[
λ(1−λ)δ2+λ(1−λ)3δ
(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
= E
[
λ(1−λ)[2δ2+δ(λ2+(1−λ)2)]
2(λ(1−λ)+δ)2
]
.
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E.1 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Our proof essentially extends the proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 in Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992)
to Bayesian settings. For the if statement, note that agent i does not deviate from the truth-telling
Bayes-Nash equilibrium if and only if
Ui(xi) ≥ Ex−i (vi(q(x′i,x−i), xi) + ti(x′i,x−i))
= Ui(x′i) + Ex−i (vi(q(x′i,x−i), xi)− vi(q(x′i,x−i), x′i)) (E.1)
for all xi, x′i ∈ Xi. Using (5.2), this is equivalent to require that for all xi, x′i ∈ Xi,∫ xi
x′
i
Ex−i (vix(q(s,x−i), s)) ds
≥Ex−i (vi(q(x′i,x−i), xi))− Ex−i (vi(q(x′i,x−i), x′i)) ,
which is true under the condition that Ex−i(vix(q(s,x−i), xi)) is non-decreasing in s for all xi ∈ Xi.
For the only if statement, suppose mechanism (q, t) is BIC. We then have
Ui(xi) = max
x′
i
∈Xi
(
Ex−i (vi(q(x′i,x−i), xi) + ti(x′i,x−i))).
Since vi is absolutely continuous in xi and has a bounded derivative with respect to type xi equation (5.2)
follows from the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002). It remains to show that BIC also implies
the monotone-expected-marginal condition. Suppose, in contradiction, we have Ex−ivix(q(y,x−i), z) >
Ex−ivix(q(x,x−i), z) for some agent i and x, y, z ∈ Xi, with y < x. Since vi satisfies the increasing differ-
ences over distribution property, this implies that the difference Ex−ivix(q(y,x−i), z′)−Ex−ivix(q(x,x−i), z′)
is strictly positive for all z′ ∈ Xi. It then follows that Ex−ivi(q(y,x−i), z′) − Ex−ivi(q(x,x−i), z′) is in-
creasing in z′ for all z′ ∈ Xi. Therefore, we have
Ex−i (vi(q(y,x−i), x)− vi(q(y,x−i), y)) >
Ex−i (vi(q(x,x−i), x)− vi(q(x,x−i), y)) .
At the same time, the incentive compatibility implies
Ex−i (vi(q(y,x−i), x)− vi(q(y,x−i), y)) ≤ Ui(x)− Ui(y)
and
Ex−i (vi(q(x,x−i), x)− vi(q(x,x−i), y)) ≥ Ui(x)− Ui(y).
We thus reach a contradiction.
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E.2 Proof of Proposition 5.3
The sufficiency part is straightforward. Let us prove the necessity part. Consider some x′, y′ ∈ Xi such
that x′ > y′ and let a ∈ arg mina∈A (vi(a, x′)− vi(a, y′)) and a ∈ arg maxa∈A (vi(a, x′)− vi(a, y′)). Given
our assumption that vi(a, xi) is continuous in a, such a and a are guaranteed to exist. For each a ∈ A
we can then always find α(a, x′, y′) ∈ [0, 1] such that
vi(a, x′)− vi(a, y′) =α(a, x′, y′)
(
vi(a, x′)− vi(a, y′)
)
+ (1− α(a, x′, y′))(vi(a, x′)− vi(a, y′)).
Let us consider distribution G that puts the unit mass on allocation a and distribution F that puts
probability α(a, x′, y′) on a and probability 1− α(a, x′, y′) on a. By construction, we have∫
vi(a, x′)dG−
∫
vi(a, x′)dF =
∫
vi(a, y′)dG−
∫
vi(a, y′)dF,
and the increasing differences over distributions implies that the difference
∫
vi(a, x)dG−
∫
vi(a, x)dF is
a constant function in x, which we denote as gi(a). Hence,
vi(a, x) = α(a, x′, y′)vi(a, x) + (1− α(a, x′, y′))vi(a, x) + gi(a)
= fi(a)Mi(x) +mi(x) + gi(a)
where fi(a) = α(a, x′, y′), Mi(x) = vi(a, x) − vi(a, x), and mi(x) = vi(a, x). The increasing differences
over distributions and vi(a, x′) − vi(a, x′) ≥ vi(a, y′) − vi(a, y′) then implies that Mi(x) is either an
increasing or constant function. For the latter case, we redefine f˜i(a) = 0, M˜i(x) to be any increasing
function, and g˜i(a) = gi(a) + fi(a)Mi(x′) to obtain expression (5.3).
E.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Below, we will prove two leammas, which completes the proof of Theorem 1 as explained in the main
text.
Lemma E.1. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi = [0, 1] and λi is the uniform distribution on Xi. Then, for any
BIC allocation q˜ there exists a feasible allocation q satisfying (5.4) with fi(q(·,x−i)) being non-decreasing
for all i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. The proof essentially repeats the proof of Lemma 2 in Gershkov et al. (2013), and we only
sketch it here. We consider a partition [0, 1]I to 2nI cubes of equal size. For each cube S in this partition,
we approximate f(q˜(x)), x ∈ S, by its average defined by
f(q˜(S)) = 2nI
∫
S
f(q˜(x))dx.
Note allocation q˜(S) ∈ A is well-defined, because mapping f is convex-valued. In addition, discrete
allocation q˜(S) inherits non-decreasing expected marginals from q˜. Lemma 5.1 then ensures that there
exists an allocation q(S) with non-decreasing marginals that can also be extended to piecewise constant
functions over [0, 1]I . Taking the limit with respect to the size of partition, we obtain the result of the
lemma. For the details of the construction, we refer to Gershkov et al. (2013).
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Lemma E.2. Suppose, for all i ∈ I, Xi ⊆ R and λi is some distribution on Xi. Then, for any BIC
allocation q˜ there exists a feasible allocation q satisfying (5.4) with fi(q(·,x−i)) being non-decreasing for
all i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. The proof repeats the proof of Lemma 3 in Gershkov et al. (2013). Its main idea is to relate
the uniform distribution covered by Lemma E.1 to the case of a general distribution. In particular, if
random variable Zi is uniformly distributed, then λ−1i (Zi) is distributed according to λi, where λ−1i (zi) =
inf{xi ∈ Xi|λi(xi) ≥ zi}. Hence, for a given BIC allocation q˜ we use transformation λ−1i to construct an
allocation q˜′ defined on uniformly distributed types that also has a non-decreasing expected marginals.
For allocation q˜′, we then apply the results of Lemmas 5.1 and E.1 to obtain an allocation q′ with non-
decreasing marginals defined on uniformly distributed types. We then use transformation λi to recover an
allocation q with non-decreasing marginals defined on types distributed according to λi. For the details
of the construction, we refer to Gershkov et al. (2013).
E.4 Non-Convex-Valued Mappings: An Example
We now show that the assumption that mapping f being convex-valued is generally indispensable for the
equivalence result of Theorem 5.1.
Consider a two-agent example with the set of possible allocations A = [0, 1]. Each agent i’s type xi
is drawn independently from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. For an allocation q ∈ A and transfers
t1, t2 ∈ R, agent 1’s utility equals to qx1 + t1, and agent 2’s utility is q2x2 + t2. This environment satisfies
all conditions of Theorem 5.1 except for the assumption that mapping (f1, f2) is convex-valued, where
f1(q) = q and f2(q) = q2. Let us consider the following allocation rule:
q(x1, x2) =
1 if max{x1, x2} ≤
1
2 or min{x1, x2} > 1/2,
0 otherwise.
This allocation rule is Bayesian implementable because its expected marginals
∫ 1
0 fi(xi, xj)dxj are non-
decreasing everywhere. It is, however, not dominant-strategy implementable because marginals fi(x1, x2)
are strictly decreasing for some (x1, x2) ∈ X. We now show that there does not exist an equivalent DIC
mechanism for any BIC mechanism with allocation rule q.
Suppose, in contradiction, that for some BIC mechanism (q, t) there exists an equivalent DIC mech-
anism (qˆ, tˆ). Let Ui(xi) and Uˆi(xi) be agent i’s interim expected utilities in mechanisms (q, t) and (qˆ, tˆ),
respectively. Since the two mechanisms are equivalent, we have Ui(xi) = Uˆi(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi and
i = 1, 2. The envelope formula then implies that ∀xi, x′i ∈ Xi,
Ui(xi) = Ui(x′i) +
∫ xi
x′
i
∫ 1
0
fi(q(s, xj))dxjds
= Uˆi(x′i) +
∫ xi
x′
i
∫ 1
0
fi(qˆ(s, xj))dxjds = Uˆi(xi).
Therefore, we have for almost all xi ∈ [0, 1], and for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,∫ 1
0
fi(qˆ(xi, xj))dxj =
∫ 1
0
fi(q(xi, xj))dxj =
1
2 . (E.2)
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Integrating (E.2) over xj , we have for all i ∈ {1, 2},∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
fi(qˆ(x1, x2))dx1dx2 =
1
2 , (E.3)
which further implies that
0 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
[f1(qˆ(x1, x2))− f2(qˆ(x1, x2))]dx1dx2
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
[
qˆ(x1, x2)− (qˆ(x1, x2))2
]
dx1dx2. (E.4)
Since q(x1, x2) ∈ A = [0, 1], equation (E.4) implies that qˆ(x1, x2) ∈ {0, 1} for almost every type
profile (x1, x2) ∈ X. In addition, allocation qˆ being dominant strategy implementable implies that
f2(qˆ(x1, x2)) = (qˆ(x1, x2))2 must be non-decreasing in x2. The equal-expected-marginal condition (E.2)
for agent 1 then implies that for almost all x1 ∈ [0, 1], qˆ(x1, x2) = 0 for x2 ∈ [0, 1/2] and qˆ(x1, x2) = 1
for x2 ∈ (1/2, 1].1
This allocation rule, however, does not satisfy the equal-expected-marginal condition (E.2) for agent
2. In particular,
∫ 1
0 (qˆ(x1, x2))
2dx1 = 0 for all x2 ∈ [0, 1/2], and
∫ 1
0 (qˆ(x1, x2))
2dx2 = 1 for all x2 ∈ (1/2, 1].
We thus reach a contradiction.
E.5 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Consider an arbitrary BIC mechanism (q˜, t˜) and the corresponding DIC mechanism (q, t) constructed in
Theorem 5.1. Since equation (5.7) holds for any g, the first part of Theorem 5.2 immediately follows.
The idea behind the proof of the second part of the theorem is to show that if functions fˇi and gi satisfy
conditions (i) or (ii), the DIC mechanism constructed in Theorem 5.1 also satisfies
Ex
(∑
i
gi(q(x))
)
≥ Ex
(∑
i
gi(q˜(x))
)
. (E.5)
Suppose condition (i) is satisfied. Let us first consider the case where types are discrete and uni-
formly distributed (as in Lemma 5.1). If the marginals of allocation q˜ are not non-decreasing, then
fˇj(q˜j(x′j ,xj)) < fˇj(q˜j(xj ,x−j)) for some j, x′j > xj , and x−j . Using the construction of the algorithm
in Lemma 5.1 we then obtain an allocation qˆ ∈ A satisfying the equal-marginal conditions in (5.4) and
delivering strictly smaller value to objective Ex||f(·)||2. Since function fˇj is non-decreasing and concave
(or non-increasing and convex), we also have
qˆj(xj ,x−j) = qˆj(x′j ,x−j) ≤
1
2 q˜j(xj ,x−j) +
1
2 q˜j(x
′
j ,x−j),
qˆj(xj ,x′−j) ≤ (1− δ)q˜j(xj ,x′−j) + δq˜j(x′j ,x′−j),
qˆj(x′j , xˆ−j) ≤ (1− δ)q˜j(x′j ,x′−j) + δq˜j(xj ,x′−j).
Since gi is non-increasing and concave in each component, this further implies
gi(qˆ(xj ,x−j)) + gi(qˆ(x′j ,x−j)) ≥ gi(q˜(xj ,x−j)) + gi(q˜(x′j ,x−j)),
gi(qˆ(xj ,x′−j)) + gi(qˆ(x′j ,x′−j)) ≥ gi(q˜(xj ,x′−j)) + gi(q˜(x′j ,x′−j)),
1Because of the monotonicity of the allocation rule and qˆ ∈ {0, 1}, the only indeterminacy in qˆ(x1, x2) could
happen at x2 = 1/2.
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for each i ∈ I and, hence, Ex(
∑
i gi(qˆ(x))) ≥ Ex(
∑
i gi(q˜(x))). We iterate this procedure to obtain a
sequence of allocations qn ∈ A and a decreasing numerical sequence sn = Ex||f(qn(x))||2, n = 1, 2, .... If
we find that fˇj(qnj (·,x−j)) is non-decreasing for all j and x−j , we set qn+1 ≡ qn and sn+1 ≡ sn. Since sn
is a weakly decreasing sequence bounded below by 0, it has a limit, which we denote as s. Since set A is
compact, there also exists a convergent subsequence qn with a limit q such that q(x) ∈ A for all x ∈ X.
Clearly, s = Ex(||f(q(x)||2) and fˇj(qj(·,x−j)) is non-decreasing for each j and x−j . Since functions gi
are continuous, we also have Ex
(∑
i gi(q(x))
) ≥ Ex(∑i gi(q˜(x))).
The result can then be further extended to continuous space with an arbitrary distribution similar
to Lemmas E.1 and E.2. We then use equation (5.6) to define payment rule t delivering the same interim
expected utilities. Finally, we derive that the social surplus in the constructed allocation
Ex
(∑
i
vi(q(x), xi)
)
=Ex
(∑
i
fi(q(x))Mi(xi) +mi(xi) + gi(q(x))
)
≥Ex
(∑
i
fi(q˜(x))Mi(xi) +mi(xi) + gi(q˜(x))
)
=Ex
(∑
i
vi(q˜(x), xi)
)
,
where the inequality follows from the equal-marginal conditions in (5.4) and inequality (E.5). This
establishes the claim of the theorem. The proof is analogous when condition (ii) is satisfied.
E.6 Proof of Corollaries
Proof of Corollaries 5.1 and 5.5. The statements follow from Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Corollaries 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. The statements follow from Theorem 5.2.
Proof of Corollary 5.6. Consider any BIC mechanism (q˜, t˜) and the equivalent DIC mechanism
(q, t), constructed in Theorem 5.1. Since we have gi(q) = 0 for each i ∈ I in the public good provision
setting, the same ex ante expected utilities in both mechanisms implies that both mechanism yield the
same expected transfers, i.e., Ex
(∑
i∈I ti(x)
)
= Ex
(∑
i∈I t˜i(x)
)
.
To prove the claim of the corollary, we need to show that the expected costs for the DIC mechanism is
lower than the expected costs for the BIC mechanism, i.e., Ex(K(q(x))) ≤ Ex(K(q˜(x))). This statement
follows from applying the argument of the proof of Theorem 5.2 to function −K instead of functions gi,
i ∈ I. In particular, consider the sequence of allocation qn constructed in the algorithm of Theorem 5.1.
Since function K is non-decreasing and convex, the expected cost of allocations qn is non-increasing in n,
i.e., Ex(K(qn+1(x))) ≤ Ex(K(qn(x))) ≤ Ex(K(q˜(x))). The continuity of function K then implies that
the inequality holds in the limit. Finally, the result further extends to continuous type space with an
arbitrary distribution similar to Lemmas E.1 and E.2.
E.7 Proposition E.1
Proposition E.1. If function vi violates the increasing differences property for some agent i ∈ I, then
there exists a dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanism (q, t) that does not have non-decreasing
marginals vix(q(·,x−i), xi) for all x−i ∈ X−i and xi ∈ Xi.
Proof. Suppose vi(a, x) does not satisfy the increasing differences property. There must exist a, a′ ∈ A,
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and x, y, z ∈ X with x < y < z such that either{
vi(a, x)− vi(a′, x) ≤ vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y)
vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y) ≥ vi(a, z)− vi(a′, z)
, (E.6)
with at least one inequality being strict, or{
vi(a, x)− vi(a′, x) ≥ vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y)
vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y) ≤ vi(a, z)− vi(a′, z)
, (E.7)
with at least one strict inequality. We consider only case (E.6). Case (E.7) can be treated similarly.
Let us assume that the utility of agent i satisfies (E.6). We consider a mechanism with an allocation
rule q and a payment rule t that are functions of agent i’s reports only, i.e., q : Xi → A and t : Xi → RI .
In particular, we assign q(x) = q(z) = a′, q(y) = a, and ∀s 6= x, y, z,
q(s) =
{
a if vi(a, s)− vi(a′, s) ≥ t¯i
a′ otherwise
,
where t¯i = vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y). Agent i receives no transfers if allocation a is chosen and t¯i otherwise, i.e.,
ti(s) = 0 if q(s) = a and ti(s) = t¯i if q(s) = a′. All other agents receive no transfers, i.e., tj(s) ≡ 0 for all
j 6= i and s ∈ Xi. It is straightforward to check that (q, t) is dominant-strategy incentive compatible.
We now show that agent i’s marginals induced by allocation rule q cannot be all non-decreasing.
Suppose, in contradiction, that vix(q(·), s) is non-decreasing for all s ∈ Xi. Then, we have
vix(q(x), s) ≤ vix(q(y), s) ≤ vix(q(z), s), ∀s ∈ Xi
or, equivalently, vix(a′, s) ≤ vix(a, s) ≤ vix(a′, s), ∀s ∈ Xi. But then vix(a′, s) = vix(a, s),∀s ∈ Xi, and
by integration over s we have
vi(a′, y)− vi(a′, x) = vi(a, y)− vi(a, x) and vi(a′, z)− vi(a′, y) = vi(a, z)− vi(a, y),
which contradicts (E.6).
E.8 Proposition E.2
Proposition E.2. Suppose that there exist two agents whose type distributions are absolutely continuous.
If function vi violates the increasing differences over distributions property for some agent i ∈ I, then
there exists a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism (q, t) that does not have non-decreasing expected
marginals Ex−i [vix(q(·,x−i), xi)] for all xi ∈ Xi.
Proof. For any G,F ∈ ∆(A) and any s ∈ Xi, let
∆(G,F, s) =
∫
vi(a, s)dG−
∫
vi(a, s)dF.
Suppose vi(a, x) does not satisfy the increasing differences over distributions property. Then, there must
exist G,F ∈ ∆(A), and x, y, z ∈ X with x < y < z such that either
∆(G,F, x) ≤ ∆(G,F, y) and ∆(G,F, y) ≥ ∆(G,F, z) (E.8)
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with at least one inequality being strict, or
∆(G,F, x) ≥ ∆(G,F, y) and ∆(G,F, y) ≤ ∆(G,F, z) (E.9)
with at least one strict inequality. We consider only case (E.8). Case (E.9) can be treated similarly.
Assume that the utility of agent i satisfies (E.8). Let aG, a′G, aF , a′F ∈ A, and Gα (Fβ) be the binary
probability distribution that puts a weight α (β) on the allocation aG (aF ) and the remaining weight
1− α (1− β) on the allocation a′G (a′F ), where α, β ∈ [0, 1]. We establish the following lemma.
Lemma E.3. There exists a pair of binary distributions Gα, Fβ such that
∆(Gα, Fβ , x) ≤ ∆(Gα, Fβ , y) and ∆(Gα, Fβ , y) ≥ ∆(Gα, Fβ , z) (E.10)
with at least one inequality being strict.
Proof of Lemma E.3 Since both Gα and Fβ can be deterministic, the claim of the lemma is clearly true
if the increasing differences property is violated. Thus, it is without loss to assume that this property
is satisfied by vi. We want to first show that ∃a, a′, a′′ ∈ A that satisfy the two following conditions
simultaneously:
(i) vi(a, x)− vi(a′′, x) 6= vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y) 6= vi(a, z)− vi(a′′, z).2
(ii) @λ ∈ R such that
(vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y))− (vi(a, x)− vi(a′, x))
=λ[(vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y))− (vi(a, x)− vi(a′′, x))],
and
(vi(a, z)− vi(a′, z))− (vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y))
=λ[(vi(a, z)− vi(a′′, z))− (vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y))].
From the contrary, suppose that such a triple of allocations does not exist. Then, ∀a, a′, a′′ ∈ A, either
vi(a, x)− vi(a′′, x) = vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y) = vi(a, z)− vi(a′′, z),
or there exists λaa′a′′ ∈ R such that
(vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y))− (vi(a, x)− vi(a′, x)
=λaa′a′′ [(vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y))− (vi(a, x)− vi(a′′, x))]
and
(vi(a, z)− vi(a′, z))− (vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y))
=λaa′a′′ [(vi(a, z)− vi(a′′, z))− (vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y))].
2Note that because of the increasing differences property, ∀a, a′′ ∈ A we can only have either vi(a, x) −
vi(a′′, x) 6= vi(a, y)−vi(a′′, y) 6= vi(a, z)−vi(a′′, z) or vi(a, x)−vi(a′′, x) = vi(a, y)−vi(a′′, y) = vi(a, z)−vi(a′′, z).
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Fix any a′, a′′ ∈ A such that vi(a′, x) − vi(a′′, x) 6= vi(a′, y) − vi(a′′, y) 6= vi(a′, z) − vi(a′′, z).3 Let us
consider a set
Aa′′ = {a ∈ A : vi(a, x)− vi(a′′, x) = vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y) = vi(a, z)− vi(a′′, z)},
and A¯a′′ = A \Aa′′ . Note that ∀s, s′ ∈ Xi, we have
∆(G,F, s)−∆(G,F, s′)
=
∫
Aa′′∪A¯a′′
∫
[(vi(a, s)− vi(a˜, s))− (vi(a, s′)− vi(a˜, s′))]dFa˜dGa.
Hence,
∆(G,F, y)−∆(G,F, x)
=
∫
A¯a′′
∫
λaa˜a′′ [(vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y))− (vi(a, x)− vi(a′′, x))]dFa˜dGa
+
∫
Aa′′
∫
[(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a˜, y))− (vi(a′′, x)− vi(a˜, x))]dFa˜dGa
=
∫
A¯a′′
∫
−λaa˜a′′λa′′aa′ [(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′, y))− (vi(a′′, x)− vi(a′, x))]dFa˜dGa
+
∫
Aa′′
∫
λa′′a˜a′ [(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′, y))− (vi(a′′, x)− vi(a′, x))]dFa˜dGa
= [(vi(a′′, x)− vi(a′, x))− (vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′, y))]K,
where
K =
∫
A¯a′′
∫
λaa˜a′′λa′′aa′dFa˜dGa −
∫
Aa′′
∫
λa′′a˜a′dFa˜dGa,
and, similarly,
∆(G,F, z)−∆(G,F, y)
=
∫
A¯a′′
∫
λaa˜a′′ [(vi(a, z)− vi(a′′, z))− (vi(a, y)− vi(a′′, y))]dFa˜dGa
+
∫
Aa′′
∫
[(vi(a′′, z)− vi(a˜, z))− (vi(a′′, y)− vi(a˜, y))]dFa˜dGa
=
∫
A¯a′′
∫
−λaa˜a′′λa′′aa′ [(vi(a′′, z)− vi(a′, z))− (vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′, y))]dFa˜dGa
+
∫
Aa′′
∫
λa′′a˜a′ [(vi(a′′, z)− vi(a′, z))− (vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′, y))]dFa˜dGa
= [(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′, y))− (vi(a′′, z)− vi(a′, z))]K.
Since vi(a′′, s)− vi(a′, s) is monotone in s ∀s ∈ Xi, we have
sign [∆(G,F, y)−∆(G,F, x)] = sign [∆(G,F, z)−∆(G,F, y)] ,
which violates (E.8). Hence, there must exist a, a′, a′′ ∈ A that satisfy both (i) and (ii). Note that for
3If such allocations do not exist, we will have ∆(G,F, x) = ∆(G,F, y) = ∆(G,F, z), which violates (E.8).
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any such a triple of allocations (a, a′, a′′), we must also have
vi(a, x)− vi(a′, x) 6= vi(a, y)− vi(a′, y) 6= vi(a, z)− vi(a′, z) and
vi(a′′, x)− vi(a′, x) 6= vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′, y) 6= vi(a′′, z)− vi(a′, z),
since otherwise the two equations of (ii) will hold for either λ = 0 or λ = 1. Consequently, any triple of
allocations that is a permutation of (a, a′, a′′) will also satisfy conditions (i) and (ii), which suggests that
the order of selecting a, a′ and a′′ does not matter. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume
further that
vi(a, y)− vi(a, x) < min{vi(a′, y)− vi(a′, x), vi(a′′, y)− vi(a′′, x)}. (E.11)
Next, for all s ∈ Xi, let us denote
∆(α, β, s) = [αvi(a′′, s) + (1− α)vi(a, s)]− [βvi(a′, s) + (1− β)vi(a, s)]
= α[vi(a′′, s)− vi(a, s)] + β[vi(a, s)− vi(a′, s)]
and
∆ˆ(α, β, s) = [αvi(a′, s) + (1− α)vi(a, s)]− [βvi(a′′, s) + (1− β)vi(a, s)]
= α[vi(a′, s)− vi(a, s)] + β[vi(a, s)− vi(a′′, s)].
Given (E.11) and the increasing differences property, ∆(α, β, y)−∆(α, β, x) ≥ 0 if and only if
α ≥ β
[
(vi(a′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′, x)− vi(a, x))
(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′′, x)− vi(a, x))
]
, (E.12)
while ∆(α, β, y)−∆(α, β, z) ≥ 0 if and only if
α ≤ β
[
(vi(a′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′, z)− vi(a, z))
(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′′, z)− vi(a, z))
]
. (E.13)
Similarly, we have ∆ˆ(α, β, y)− ∆ˆ(α, β, x) ≥ 0 if and only if
α ≥ β
[
(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′′, x)− vi(a, x))
(vi(a′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′, x)− vi(a, x))
]
, (E.14)
while ∆ˆ(α, β, y)−∆(α, β, z) ≥ 0 if and only if
α ≤ β
[
(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′′, z)− vi(a, z))
(vi(a′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′, z)− vi(a, z))
]
. (E.15)
Note that again because of the increasing differences property, the R.H.S. of the inequalities (E.12),
(E.13), (E.14) and (E.15) are all positive. Hence, if
(vi(a′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′, x)− vi(a, x))
(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′′, x)− vi(a, x)) <
(vi(a′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′, z)− vi(a, z))
(vi(a′′, y)− vi(a, y))− (vi(a′′, z)− vi(a, z)) ,
one can always find α, β ∈ [0, 1] such that both (E.12) and (E.13) are satisfied, and with at least one of
them holds strictly. Otherwise, if the above strict inequality holds the other way round, then one can
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always find α, β ∈ [0, 1] such that both (E.14) and (E.15) are satisfied, and with at least one of them
holds strictly. In conclusion, we can always construct a pair of binary probability distributions Gα, Fβ
that satisfy ∆(Gα, Fβ , x) ≤ ∆(Gα, Fβ , y) and ∆(Gα, Fβ , y) ≥ ∆(Gα, Fβ , z), with at least one inequality
being strict. 
Lemma E.3 shows that if vi violates the property of increasing differences over distributions for some
probability distributions (G,F ), it must also violate this property for some binary probability distributions
(Gα, Fβ). Given this important observation, we now construct a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism
that violates the monotone-expected-marginal condition.
Let (Gα, Fβ) be a pair of binary distributions that satisfies (E.10). By assumption, there must exist
an agent j 6= i whose type distribution is absolutely continuous (and hence atomless). By continuity, we
can always find transfers tGj , tFj ∈ R, and partitions XGj ∪XG
′
j = Xj and XFj ∪XF
′
j = Xj such that
(i) Pr
(
xj ∈ XGj
)
= 1− Pr
(
xj ∈ XG′j
)
= α,
Pr
(
xj ∈ XFj
)
= 1− Pr
(
xj ∈ XF ′j
)
= β;
(ii) vj(aG, xj) ≥ vj(a′G, xj) + tGj ∀xj ∈ XGj ,
vj(aG, xj) ≤ vj(a′G, xj) + tGj ∀xj ∈ XG
′
j ;
(iii) vj(aF , xj) ≥ vj(a′F , xj) + tFj ∀xj ∈ XFj ,
vj(aF , xj) ≤ vj(a′F , xj) + tFj ∀xj ∈ XF
′
j .
Consider a mechanism with an allocation rule q and a payment rule t that are functions of the reports of
agents i and j. In particular, we let
q(xi,x−i) =

aG if xi = y, and xj ∈ XGj ,
a′G if xi = y, and xj ∈ XG
′
j ,
aF if xi ∈ {x, z}, and xj ∈ XFj ,
a′F if xi ∈ {x, z}, and xj ∈ XF
′
j ,
and ∀s 6= x, y, z,
q(s,x−i) =

aG if ∆(Gα, Fβ , s) ≥ t¯i and xj ∈ XGj ,
a′G if ∆(Gα, Fβ , s) ≥ t¯i and xj ∈ XG
′
j ,
aF if ∆(Gα, Fβ , s) < t¯i and xj ∈ XFj ,
a′F if ∆(Gα, Fβ , s) < t¯i and xj ∈ XF
′
j ,
where t¯i = ∆(Gα, Fβ , y). Agent i receives t¯i if either allocation aF or a′F is chosen, and ti = 0 otherwise.
Agent j receives tGj (tFj ) if allocation a′G (a′F ) is chosen, and tj = 0 otherwise. For all agents k 6= i, j,
tk(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ X. It is straightforward to check that (q, t) is a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
We now show that agent i’s expected marginals induced by allocation rule q cannot be always non-
decreasing. In contradiction, suppose Ex−ivix(q(·,x−i), s) is non-decreasing for all s ∈ Xi. Then, for any
s ∈ Xi we have
Ex−i [vix(q(x,x−i), s)] ≤ Ex−i [vix(q(y,x−i), s)] ≤ Ex−i [vix(q(z,x−i), s)],
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or, equivalently, ∫
vix(a, s)dFβ ≤
∫
vix(a, s)dGα ≤
∫
vix(a, s)dFβ ,
which implies
∫
vix(a, s)dGα =
∫
vix(a, s)dFβ for all s ∈ Xi. Then, by the integration over s we have
∆(Gα, Fβ , x) = ∆(Gα, Fβ , y) and ∆(Gα, Fβ , y) = ∆(Gα, Fβ , z),
which contradicts to (E.10).
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